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I. INTRODUCTION
The year 1992, when the U.S. Bill of Rights began its third century, may prove to have
been critical for both public and private orderings due to at least two major trends. The first
of these was the centripetal trend of unification within the European Community (EC) of
Western Europe. The second was the trend of centrifugal forces that have destroyed several
states in Eastern Europe and are at work elsewhere in the world.
Last year was to have been the target for further European integration under EC auspices
though the Maastricht Treaty on European Union Denmark's rejection of the Treaty in a
referendum, and France's narrow acceptance of it in similar voting in October 1992, appear
to have cooled this movement for now.2 Among countervailing considerations behind the
French referendum results may have been the instability of the money markets,3 fear of
German dominance in Europe, and resurgence of nationalism,4 which some might call a
revival of tribalism.
5
1. Maastricht Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 247 (1992) [hereinafter Maastricht
Treaty].
2. By late 1992 four of the 12 EC nations had ratified the Treaty, i.e. Greece, Ireland, Italy and
Luxembourg, and five more were likely to do so. Germany and Great Britain may approve it but with
amendments. Walter Goldstein, Europe After Maastricht, 71 FOREIGN AFF 117,118 (No. 5, 1992); Alan Riding,
French Approve Unity Treaty, But Slim Margin Leaves Doubts, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1992, at Al; 12 Nations
Consider Unity, id. at A8. Danes Back Revised EC Treaty, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 1992, at A16; Charles
Goldsmith, EC Presidency Prepares Denmark Set Special Options, id., Dec. 4, 1992, at A6. At the same time,
Swiss voters turned down membership in the European Economic Area (EEA), a proposed link between the
Community and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), while Liechtenstein voters approved such a
relationship. A favorable result is not certain in Norway or Sweden. Richard L. Holman, Liechtenstein Votes to
Join Bloc, id., Dec. 14, 1992, at A6; Alan Riding, Swiss Reject Tie to Wider Europe, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1992,
at A7; Margaret Studer & Bob Hagerty, Swiss Reject Proposal to Join Economic Zone, WALL ST. 1., Dec. 7,
1992, at A10. For analysis of the EFTA-EC linkage through the EEA, see infra notes 77-78 and accompanying
text.
3. Goldstein, supra note 2, at 118; Steven Greenhouse, Europe Officials Call French Vote Balm for
Nervous World Markets, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1992, at Al. Others believe the currency crisis and the narrow
vote in France hurt chances for its ever being ratified. Peter Gumbel, EC Unity Pact Encounters Major Snags,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 1992, at A10. Loss of employment may not help the unification movement either. Roger
Cohen, Price of European Unity Is Reckoned in Lost Jobs, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 10, 1993, at 3.
4. See Craig R. Whitney, Europe: Muted Joy, and Many Misgivings, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.21, 1992, at Al;
See William E. Schmidt, Suffer the German Gladly? Not These East Enders, id., Oct. 2, 1992, at A4. And see
Peter Gumbel, Germany Strives to Redo Image That's Grown Ugly, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 1992, at A13.
5. See Goldstein, supra note 2, at 123; Robert S. Wood, Europe: Transfigured or Transfixed?, 45 NAy.
WAR CoLL. REV. 20, 22-23 (No. 4, 1992). For a recent sampling, with all the old problems of racism and
nationalism, see, e.g., Walter Laqueur, Russian Nationalism, 71 FOREIGN AFF. 103. (No. 5, 1992); Andrei
Codrescu, Gypsy Tragedy, German Amnesia, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1992, at A27 (Romanian gypsies),
undoubtedly referring to Agreement in Relation to the Reassimilation of German and Romanian Citizens,
F.R.G.-Rom., Sept. 24, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 1295 (1992); Roger Cohen, Cross v. Crescent, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17,
1992 (religion); Thomas L Friedman, Russian Appeals to U.N. to Safeguard Minorities, id., Sept. 23, 1992, at
A17 (Russian minorities in newly-independent Baltic republics); Gumbel, supra note 4; Steven Kinzer, Three
Turks Killed: Germans Blame a Neo-Nazi Plot, N.Y. TIuME, Nov. 24, 1992, at Al; A. M. Rosenthal, The
European Danger, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1992, at A21 (neo-Nazi attacks on foreign laborers, attacks on Muslims;
Czech and Slovak animosities); Elisabeth Rubinfein, Russia Is Caught Up in Ethnic Brush Fires, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 29, 1992, at A10 (Russian troops caught in ethnic cross-fire in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Tajikistan);
See Schmidt, supra note 4; See Rogher Thurow, Life in a Cleansed Area of Croatia is Hollow, Like a Bombed-
Out Home, WALL ST. J., Oct. 19, 1992, at All (discussing Serb "ethnic cleansing" of Croats to clear a corridor
to the Adriatic Sea). See generally David Beinder & Barbara Crossette, As Ethnic Wars Multiple, U.S. Strives
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In Eastern Europe, the Soviet bloc's disintegration, signalled by the fall of the Berlin
Wall in 1989, is now complete with dissolution in 1991 of both the Warsaw Pact, a
counterpoint to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,6 and the Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance,7 the bloc's analogue to the EC. Ringing down the Iron Curtain was
the prelude to the end of the Soviet Union, in December 1991. The USSR, constituted by
the Union Treaty of 1922,' has been replaced by the thin shell of the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS), a federation.9 All of the former Soviet republics are now
recognized as independent states"0 and are Members of the United Nations. 1 The major
for a Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1993, at 1 (providing a good overview).
6. Compare North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243, as modified by
Protocol on the Accession of Greece and Turkey, Oct. 17, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 43, 126 U.N.T.S. 350; Protocol on
the Accession of the Federal Republic of Germany, Oct. 23, 1954, 6 U.S.T. 5707, 243 U.N.T.S. 308; Protocol
on the Accession of Spain, Dec. 10, 1981, T.1.A.S. No. 10564; with Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and
Mutual Assistance, May 14, 1955,219 U.N.T.S. 3, whose article 11 had an unusual 10-year denunciation clause,
now overridden by the 1991 agreements. The usual rule is one year, unless a treaty specifies otherwise. Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 29, 1969 (hereinafter Vienna Convention), arts. 54,56, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, 344-45. Although the United States is not a party to the Convention, many of its provisions codify
customary, international law. RESTATEMENT (THiRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNrrED STATES
(hereinafter RESTATEmENT (THiRD)), Part III, Introductory Note, at 145. See The International Law Commission,
Report on the Work of its Eighteenth Session, Report of the Commission to the General Assembly, U.N. Doe.
A/6309/Rev. 1 (hereinafter ILC Report), repr. in 2 (1974) Y.B. INT'L L. CoMM. 171 (analyzing the Convention).
Some European countries, particularly France and Germany, have supported a distinctly European defense
system, a federative defense arrangement rather than, or in addition to, the more loosely integrated NATO
organization. Wood, supra note 5, at 15-26. Eastern Europeans have explored the possibility of membership in
NATO, which established the North Atlantic Cooperation Council to formalize relations with Eastern and Central
European states. Id. at 30-31. To cope with the worldwide recession, many NATO countries are slicing troop
commitments. The sole exception is Greece. "And that isn't good news to the alliance, which worries that Athens
is preparing to get involved in the Yugoslav civil war, and thus widen the Balkan conflict." Martin du Bois,
Military Cuts Cause Disquiet on Western Front, WAu ST. J., Jan. 28, 1993, at A10.
7. Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, Dec. 14, 1959,'368 U.N.T.S. 253. CMEA was announced
by communique in 1949 and formalized 10 years later. CMEA, also known by the acronym COMECON, was
dissolved in June 1991. COMECON To Dissolve Today, WALL ST. J., June 28, 1991, at A10.
8. Treaty Concerning Establishment of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Dec. 30, 1922
(hereinafter Union Treaty), 1 Soy. T.S. 199. Both the Union Treaty, art. 26, and the 1923 U.S.S.R. CONST., art.
4, preserved the right of secession for the republics of the USSR.
9. See Declaration by the Heads of State of Belarus, the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic
[hereinafter "RSFSR"], and Ukraine, Dec. 8, 199 1; Agreement Establishing the Commonwealth of Independent
States, Dec. 8, 1991 [hereinafter CIS Agreement], U.N. Doc. A/46/71 (1991). See Stephanie B. Goldberg, A
More Perfect Union Part I: A Lawyer in Moscow, 76 A.B.AJ. 58 (Oct. 1990); Goldberg, A More Perfect Union
Part 1I: The Center Cannot Hold, id. at 70 (Nov. 1990); Goldberg, A More Perfect Union Part III: No Turning
Back, id. 70 (Dec. 1990); Goldberg, Danger on the Right, 77 at id. 70 (May 1991). The Treaty on the Union
of Soviet Sovereign Republics, published in Pravda, Aug. 15, 1991, would have voided the Union Treaty, while
creating a more decentralized federal union in which each republic party to the treaty was declared a sovereign
state, with the right of sucession. This treaty died at the proposal stage. See Conference on Yugoslavia,
Arbitration Committee, Opinion No. 1, 31 I.L.M. 1494, 1995 (1992) (restating the traditional definition of a
federal state).
10. The Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were the first to be recognized as independent
states in mid-1992. For U.S. diplomatic correspondence relating to the Baltics' independence and eventual
recognition, see Recognition of New States: Baltic States: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, I HACKwORTH DIGEST §
37. The three nations were absorbed into the Soviet Union in 1939-40 after Germany secretly agreed with the
USSR on division of spheres of influence in Eastern Europe. KRYSTYNA MAREK, IDENTITY AND CONTINUrrY
OF STATES IN PuBuc INTERNATIONAL LAW 369-70 (1954). Under the original arrangement, Lithuania would
have gone to Germany, and the USSR would have been saddled with parts of Poland largely populated with
ethnic Poles. A secret protocol to the original agreement assigned Lithuania to the USSR in exchange for
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question within the CIS is whether the present governments can survive, 12 and perhaps
Germany's suzerainty over all of ethnic Poland. The Soviet Union kept areas of Poland largely populated by
Belarnssians and Ukrainians. ROBERT CONQUEST, STALIN: BREAKER OF NATIONS 222-24 (1991). The United
States never recognized the absorption. Id. at 399; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE
72, 145, 150 (1992). This was recognized in decisions of the courts, e.g. The Maret, 145 F.2d 431,438-39, 440-
42 (3d Cir. 1944); see also Recognition: Effect of Nonrecognition, 2 WHITEMAN DIGEST § 69, at 628-38 and
Herbert W. Briggs, Non-Recognition in the Courts: The Ships of the Baltic Republics, 37 AM. J. INT'L L. 585
(1943). The same was true for Baltic assets, frozen since World War II. Letter of President Jimmy Carter to the
Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate, 15 WKLY. COMPIL. OF PRESID. DoC'Ts 1656-57 (1979).
However, for personal matters, e.g. reunification of families, the United States did confer with the USSR.
Statement of Robert L. Barry, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs to the Subcommittee
on International Organizations of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, June 26, 1979, 79 DEP'T ST. BULL.
52 (Sept. 1979). The record of other states on the issue of the Baltic states was mixed. See, e.g., MAREK, supra
at 405-09. Thus the United States only had to establish diplomatic relations. President George Bush, US to
Establish Diplomatic Relations with Baltic States, 2 DEP'T ST. DISPATCH 647 (1991). By March 1992, the United
States had recognized all 12 former Soviet republics. US to Establish Diplomatic Relations with Georgia, 3
DEP'T ST. DISPATCH 253 (1992).
11. Belarus, then known as the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic; Ukraine, formerly the Ukrainian
Soviet Socialist Republic; and the USSR became charter members of the United Nations as part of the Yalta
Conference agreements of 1945. Protocol of Proceedings of the Crimea Conference, Feb. 11, 1945, art. 1(2), 3
BEVANS 1013. Few states treated the Byelorussian S.S.R. or the Ukrainian S.S.R. as states. RESTATEMENT
(THIRD), supra note 6, § 202, r.n. 6. When the USSR collapsed, Russia took the Soviet U.N. seat on December
24, 1991. End of Soviet Union-Formation of CIS-Resignation of Gorbachev, 34 KEESINo'S REC. WORLD
EVENTS 38654, 38656 (1991). The Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania had been admitted to the United
Nations in September 1991, along with North and South Korea, the Federated States of Micronesia, and the
Marshall Islands. Opening of46th GeneralAssembly Session, id. 38458 (1991); see also S.C. Res. 709-11 (Sept.
11, 1991), 2 DEP'T ST. DISPATCH 684 (1991). The remaining ex-Soviet republics, except Georgia, were admitted
March 2, 1992 along with San Marino. New Members, 38 KEESING'S REC. WORLD EVENTS 38842 (1992).
Georgia was admitted July 31, 1992. In Brief, id. 39033 (1992). Under U.N. CHARTER, art. 4, membership is
open to all "peaceloving states which accept the obligations... in the ... Charter and, in the judgment of the
[U.N.], are able and willing to carry out these obligations." The U.N. Security Council recommends and the
General Assembly decides upon admissions. U.N. admission is not the same as recognition by all U.N. Members,
but it does mean that recognition of a state has been substituted, to a large extent but not entirely, by admission
to the United Nations. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 6, § 221 & cmt. a; § 222(1), cmt. a & r.n. 1.
Independence of the Baltic states was not the only territorial loss for Russia as it transitioned from Empire to
the Soviet Union. The Central Powers concluded separate peace treaties with Ukraine, then a Russian province,
and with Finland, then a Grand Duchy under Russian suzerainty, during World War I. Treaty of Peace with the
Ukraine, Feb. 9, 1918, 223 Consol. T.S. 43; Treaty of Peace, Mar. 7, 1918, Fin.-Ger., id. 109. Russia agreed to
sign a peace treaty with Ukraine and to recognize the February 9 treaty in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, Mar. 3,
1918, id. 81. To be sure, the Armistice, Nov. 11, 1918, art. 15, 2 BEvANS 9, 13 directed annulment of Brest-
Litovsk and supplementary treaties, and the Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919, arts. 292, 433, 225 Consol. T.S.
188, 321, 387-88, abrogated it. However, Soviet Russia recognized the independence of both Belarus and
Ukraine by Preliminary Treaty of Peace with Poland, Oct. 12, 1920, arts. 1, 2, 4 L.N.T.S. 7, 33-36. The Peace
Treaty of Dorpat, Oct. 14, 1920, Fin.-Sov.Russ., 3 id. 5, presumed Finnish independence. The Treaty of Riga,
Mar. 18, 1921, art. 2, 6 id. 51, 123, further recognized Ukrainian independence. Georgia's independence was
recognized by Peace Treaty, May 7, 1920, Georgia-Sov.Russ., art. 1, 1 Soy. T.S. 44, 45. Similarly, Treaty of
Alliance, Sept. 13, 1920, Khorezmian Peoples' Sov.Repub.-Sov.Russ., art. 1, id. 59, recognized the independence
of what had been the Khanate of Khiva, later Uzbekistan. Agreement Regarding the Independence of Armenia,
Dec. 20, 1920, Armenia-Sov.Russ., art. 1, id. 82, did this for Armenia.
12. See, e.g. Neela Banerjee, Russian Monitors Perilous Georgian Strife, WALL ST. J., Oct. 13, 1992,
at A17; Steven Erlanger, As Georgia Chief, Shevardnadze Rides Whirlwind, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1992, at A3;
Serge Schmemann, Coup by Ex-Communists Is Reported in Tajikistan, id., Oct. 25, 1992, at 19.
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whether there may be more fragmentation within the CIS,13 even as Western entrepreneurs
are moving east to close deals.14
The collapse of the Soviet Union has shared media space with the bloody breakup of
Yugoslavia, with Slovenia and Croatia first achieving statehood, and then U.N.
Membership, 5 followed by statehood and U.N. Membership for Bosnia and
Herzegovina.' 6 Macedonia, to the north of Greece, is now nominally independent," with
13. Twenty semiautonomous republics within the Russian Federation (Russia) have either declared
independence from Russia, are negotiating terms for association with Russia, or already have arrangements to
give them more control over their internal affairs. Jeff Cole, In Questfor Billions, GM's Hughes to Bring Phones
to Tatarstan, WALL ST. J., Aug. 21, 1992, at Al-A2. One interesting development has been the movement
toward reestablishment of a German Volga Republic within Russia. See Protocol of Collaboration on the Gradual
Restoration of Citizenship to Russian Germans, Ger.-Russ., July 10, 1992, (hereinafter Protocol of Collaboration),
31 I.L.M. 1301 (1992). The Republic of Georgia is contending with two secessionist regimes: South Ossetia,
a semiautonomous region under the USSR that wants independence and merger with North Ossetia, a part of
Russia; Abkhazia, a western region on the Black Sea that has declared independence and is now under Georgian
military occupation. The western part of the Republic has been disrupted by militia loyal to deposed President
Zviad K. Gamsakhurda. Erlanger, supra note 12, at A3; Erlanger, Post-Soviet Unrest: 1 Cease-Fire, 1 Coup,
id., Sept. 4, 1992, at A3. Other internecine divisions within the states that once were republics within the USSR
include the Trans-Dniester region of Moldova, which seeks separation because of the fear that Moldova may
seek to unite with Romania, which governed most of Moldova before the USSR annexed the area during World
War II; Crimea, transferred to Ukraine by Nikita S. Krushchev in 1954, with an ethnic Russian majority;
Nogorno-Karabakh, claimed by Armenia but an enclave within Azerbaijan. Serge Schmcmann, Russia and Its
Nasty Neighborhood Brawls, N.Y. TIME, Oct. 18, 1992, at El.
14. See, e.g., Neela Banderjee, A U.S. Entrepreneur Treads Warily in Georgia, WALL ST. J., Sept. 30,
1992, at A10; Thomas C. Hayes, Exxon and Mobil in Russia Venture, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 11, 1992, at D3; Junda
Woo & Amy Stevens, Attorneys Wary of Es-Soviet Republics, WALL ST. J., Jan. 3, 1992, at B3. Internal
disorders are contributing to production decline in the key petroleum industry, which may have a domino effect
worldwide. J. Robinson West, Russia: Oil Industry, the New Domino, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 13, 1992, at 13.
Aeroflot, once the USSR's state-run airline and the world's largest air carrier, has already crashed; it "lies in
about 80 pieces scattered across the former Soviet Union." Brian Coleman, Dissolution of Aeroflot Creates
Chaos, WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 1993, at Al0. Money and goods are pouring out of Russia promoting a "take the
money and run" strategy. Celestine Bohlen, Russia Is Bleeding Billions in Wealth, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 1, 1993,
at Al.
15. InternationalRecognition ofSlovenia and Croatia, 38 KEasiNo's Rac. WoRm EvENTs 38849 (1992);
In Brief, id. 39033, (noting their admission on May 22, 1992). For U.N. membership procedure, see supra note
11. Conference on Yugoslavia, Arbitration Commission, Opinion No. 5: Recognition of the Republic of Croatla
by the European Community and Its Member States, 31 LL.M. 1503 (1992) took the view that Croatia
provisionally met EC criteria, infra note 129, for statehood. Similarly, Conference on Yugoslavia, Arbitration
Commission, Opinion No. 7: International Recognition of the Republic ofSlovania by the European Community
and Its Member States, 31 I.L.M. 1512 (1992) took the view that Slovenia met the EC criteria.
16. The United States recognized Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia on April 7, 1992. U.S.
Recognition of Former Yugoslav Republics, 3 DEP'T ST. DISPATCH 287 (1992). Bosnia and Herzegovina may
be on the threshold of extinction through Serbian conquest with the possible collaboration of Croatia.
17. Because Greece has objected to its use of "Macedonia," also a name for an area in northern Greece,
as its official name and has therefore refused to recognize Macedonia, that state is recognized by only a handful
of nations. Roger Thurow, Nouvelle Macedonia Pits Greeks, Slavs in Moniker Muddle, WALL ST. J., Nov. 19,
1992, at Al. The United States has not recognized Macedonia thus far. U.S. Recognition of Former Yugoslav
Republics, supra note 16. The number of nations recognizing Macedonia statehood has been growing, however.
Macedonia: New Government-Further International Recognition, 38 KEsiNO's REc. WoRLD EVENTS 39036
(1992). Conference on Yugoslavia, Arbitration Commission, Opinion No. 6: Recognition of the Socialist
Republic of Macedonia by the European Community and Its Member States, 31 I.L.M. 1507 (1992), was of the
view that Macedonia met all the EC statehood criteria, infra note 129, on January 11, 1992. The United Nations
has sent 800 peacekeeping troops to the area. A compromise name-Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia-has been advanced to secure U.N. membership for the area. If that occurs, the U.N. Security
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only Serbia and Montenegro left in what was the Union of South Slavs."8 . As in the case
of the CIS, there is the possibility of rival governments 19 asserting statehood status and
clamoring for recognition and perhaps U.N. Membership. Yugoslavia has been suspended
from its U.N. seat.2" The "Velvet Divorce," to divide Czechoslovakia into a customs union,
is quite tame and most civilized by comparison.2
Although relatively quiet for now, other separatist movements, or claims to territory,
may take their cue from the unfolding drama in Eastern Europe: Basque unrest in Spain,
22
Northern Ireland, and other ethnic groups or claims for Hungary,2 3 Albania,24 and
Romania.2 The newly-independent Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are
experiencing problems with Russian minorities within their borders.26 The trend to
Council would instruct the new member and Greece to settle differences. Paul Lewis, Compromise Likely to Take
Macedonia into U.N., N.Y. TtMms, Jan. 26, 1993, at A8. Greece has increased its military budget, the only
NATO nation to do so, and that may be a bad sign for the future. Du Bois, supra note 6.
18. The United States has stated that it will not accept Serbia/Montenegro as the continuation state of
Yugoslavia in multilateral institutions. James A. Baker, III, Helping the New Independent States; Sanctions on
Serbia/Montenegro, 3 DEP'T ST. DISPATCH 429 (1992). Conference for Peace in Yugoslavia, Arbitration
Commission, Opinion No. 8, 31 I.L.M. 1521 (1992) was of the opinion that Yugoslavia no longer existed as a
state on July 4, 1992.
19. See supra note 16. Besides these entities, there has been the possibility that the ethnic Albanians,
who outnumber Serbs 8 to 1 in Serbia's Kosovo Province, may rebel. If they do, a bloodbath is predicted, with
neighboring Albania perhaps coming to their aid. Thurow, supra note 17.
20. See Yehuda Z. Blum, UN Membership of the "New" Yugoslavia, Continuity or Breach?, 86 AM. J.
INT'L L. 830 (1992) (analyzing membership issues in the cases of the India-Pakistan, Pakistan-Bangladesh, and
USSR breakups, and concluding that the remainder of Yugoslavia should have been allowed to remain in the
former Yugoslavia's seat, based on relative population and territorial size of the new states, and prior
Organization practice). But see S.C. Res. 777, U.N. Doc. S/RES1777 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 1473 (1992).
21. Czech-Slovak Tie on Customs Union, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 27, 1992, at A6; see also Czechs and Slovaks
Divide Up Assets on Brink of Separation, id., Dec. 11, 1992, at A8. Even the national anthem-a combination
of melodies with Czech and Slovak origins-has been divided. The two countries are now U.N. members.
Czechs and Slovaks Join U.N., id., Jan. 9, 1993, at 4. Most Czechs and Slovaks would have opposed the split,
but a parliamentary measure that would have authorized a referendum was defeated, apparently due to President
Vaclav Havel's failure to lobby for it. Henry Brandon, Who Split Czechoslovakia?, id., Sept. 24, 1992, at A29;
Henry Kamm, At Fork in Road, Czechoslovaks Fret, id., Oct. 9, 1992, at A10.
22. Wood, supra note 5, at 23.
23. Hungary's prime minister has noted that territories lost to what was Yugoslavia as a result of the
1919-20 peace treaties that ended World War , see infra notes 271,341, were ceded to a country that no longer
exists. Gati, supra note 16, at 68; see also Barry Newman, As Yugoslavia Burns, Nationalism Haunts Hungary's
Peace, Too, WALL ST. J., Dec. 9, 1992, at Al.
24. Charles Gati, From Sarajevo to Sarajevo, 71 FoREiGN AFF. 64, 68 (1992); Stephen Kinzer, Ethnic
Conflict is Threatening in Yet Another Region of Yugoslavia: Kasovo, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 9, 1992, at A8; Roger
Thurow, Wider Yugoslav War Threatens to Ignite the Region, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12, 1992, at Al. Stephen
Engelberg & Judith Ingram, Now Hungary Adds Its Voice to the Ethnic Tumult, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 25, 1993, at
A3. Newly-independent Slovakia has begun to feel the problem of dealing with 600,000 Hungarians, over 10
percent of the population, within its borders. Engelberg, In a New Slovakia, Fears Are Both New "and Old, id.,
Jan. 22, 1993, at A3.
25. Romania proposed, and Moldova has rejected, a "treaty of fraternity and integration," and there are
problems with Romanian minorities in Hungary and vice versa. Gati, supra note 24, at 68; Newman, supra note
23. More recently, the Moldovan Parliament rejected a referendum on unification with Romania. Two-thirds of
Moldova's population are ethnic Romanians. Moldova Snubs Romanian Link, WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 1993, at
A10.
26. Serge Sclunemann, Russia and Its Nasty Neighborhood Brawls, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 18, 1992, at El.
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separatism has manifested itself elsewhere. There is a fledgling Kurdistan in northern
Iraq,27 and there has been talk of partitioning Iraq in the wake of the 1990-1991 Gulf
War.28 The Asian republics of the former Soviet Union have experienced secessionist
movements,29 and the possibility of a separate Siberian-Far Eastern Republic has been
suggested. 3' Bosnia and Herzegovina, a former province of Yugoslavia and now nominally
independent, has a Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina claiming nearly all of
Bosnian territory.3' The defeat of the Charlottetown agreement by Canadian voters in an
October 1992 referendum may fuel the separation movement for Quebec? 2
Integration, as well as outright unification, has brought other nations together during this
decade. The territory within the purview of the 1987 Free Trade Agreement between Canada
and the United States33 has the potential for expansion if the 1992 North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is ratified by Canada, Mexico, and the United States.14
Germany is now one, with the merger and unity treaties of 1990 that folded the German
27. The Kurds have almost had their own state twice before: in 1920, pursuant to the unratified Treaty
of Sevres, Aug. 10, 1920, arts. 62-64, 113 BRrr. & FOR. ST. PAPERS 652, 666-67; and in 1946 in Kurdish Iran.
The Kurds reside in Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey, whose governments have long been concerned about this
restive minority. Chris Hedges, Kurds Creating a Country on the Hostile Soil of Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12,
1992, at Al, A6.
28. Youssef M. Ibrahim, GulfArabs Thinking of a Divided Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1992, at 12. Of
late, France, the United Kingdom and the United States have declared a "no-fly" zone in southern Iraq, home
to dissident Shiite Muslims, which might increase chances for the area's separation from the Baghdad
government. Africa may also be ripe for realignment of borders along ethnic lines. Many former colonies'
borders were "debonairly drawn by the Congress of Berlin in 1878." JuLUs STONE, CONFLICT TImOUOH
CONSENSUS 139 (1977); Robert D. Kaplan, A Continent Adrift, S.F. CHRON., This World, Jan. 10, 1993, at 11.
Butsee Frontier Dispute (Burkria Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.CJ. 554,565 and Conference on Yugoslavia, Arbitration
Commission, Opinion No. 3, 31 I.L.M. 1499, 1500 (1992) (discussing uti possidetis, a general principle of law,
upholds the sanctity of international borders).
29. E-g. Tajikistan, whose Kulyab and Jurgan-Tyube regions are in a secessionist mood, see Erlanger,
supra note 13, at A3 and Ousted Tajik Leader's Army Enters Capital, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1992, at A12.
Refugees from Tajikistan are fleeing into neighboring Afghanistan, which may be on the verge of disintegrating.
Edward A. Gargan, Refugees Fleeing Tajik Civil Strife, id., Jan. 14, 1993, at A12; Gargan, Afghanistan, Always
Riven, Is Breaking into Ethnic Parts, id., Jan. 17, 1993, at 1.
30. Zbigniew Brzezinsld, The Cold War and Its Aftermath, 71 FOREIGN APP. 31, 33 (No. 4 1992);
Laqueur, supra note 5, at 108. Some autonomous regions in Siberia have already declared sovereignty, e.g.
Yakutia. Celestine Bowman, Poor Region in Russia Lays Claim to its Diamonds, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1992, at
3.
31. Chuck Sudetic, Serbs in Bosnia Allow Red Cross to tsit Camps, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1992, at 12.
32. Clyde H. Farnsworth, The Canadian Impasse, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1992, at Al; Farnsworth,
Accord's Defeat Heartens Quebec Separatists, id., Oct. 29, 1992, at A9. See also Gregory Marchildren &
Edward Maxwell, Quebec's Right of Secession Under Canadian and International Law, 32 VA. J. INT'L L. 583
(1992).
33. Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 22-23, 1987 & Jan. 2, 1988, Canada-U.S., reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 281
(1988), creating the world's largest free trade area. For analysis, see U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement, 3
DEP'T ST. DISPATCH 433 (1992).
34. Kenneth H. Bacon, Quick Reaction: Trade Pact Is Likely to Step Up Business Even Before Approval,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 13, 1992, at Al; Keith Bradsher, Economic Accord Reached by U.S., Mexico and Canada
to Lower Trade Barriers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1992, at Al; Bradsher, Trade Pact Signed at 3 Capitals, id.,
Dec. 18, 1992, at DI; Clyde H. Farnsworth, Mulroney's Task: Selling Trade Pact to Canadians, id., Aug. 13,
1992, at D5; Tim Golden, An Outsider Nation at Last Arrived, Mexico is Embracing the Agreement, id. at D4.
For U.S. Government analysis, see North American Free Trade Agreement, 3 DE,'T ST. DISPATCH 110 (1992);
Robert B. Zoellick, The North American FTA: The New World Order Takes Shape in the Western Hemisphere,
id. 290 (1992).
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Democratic Republic (GDR, or East Germany) into the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG,
or West Germany)" and the end of the Allied occupation of Berlin.36 Even these
agreements have spawned problems. The 1992 U.S. election results and the unhappiness of
many in the United States over perceived job flights south of the border may spell defeat for
NAFTA.37 Germany has experienced civil unrest, and Germans may be paying more taxes
to cover the costs of unification.
The waves of separatism and integration of states around the world will provoke two
sets of issues in the future. The first is what impact unification or separation may have on
the treaty map. Unification includes integration, after the EC or North American models,
or outright merger into a single state, as in Germany. Separation, the dividing of a state into
smaller and perhaps newer states, has happened in Czechoslovakia, the USSR, and
Yugoslavia, and may occur in the wake of the breakup of the Soviet Union.38 The second
35. The process was accomplished by three agreements: Treaty Establishing a Monetary, Economic and
Social Union, Federal Republic of Germany (FRG)-German Democratic Republic (GDR), May 18, 1990, 29
I.L.M. 1108 (1990); Treaty on the Establishment of German Unity, FRG-GDt, Aug. 31, 1990, [hereinafter
German Unity Treaty], 30 id. 457 (1991); Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, Sept. 12,
1990, id. 1186 (1990), the latter subject to ratification by the six nations (France, two Germanys, USSR, United
Kingdom, United States) who were the Occupation Powers for Germany at the end of World War H.
36. Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, Sept. 12, 1990, art. 7,29 I.L.M. 1191. See
also Agreement on the Settlement of Certain Matters Relating to Berlin, Sept. 25, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 445 (1991);
Exchange of Notes Concerning Presence of Armed Forces in Berlin, Sept. 25, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 450 (1991);
Exchange of Notes Concerning the Relations Convention and the Settlement Convention, Sept. 25, 1990, 30
1.LM. 454 (1991); Treaty on Good-Neighborliness, Partnership and Cooperation, Nov. 9, 1990, FRG-USSR,
[hereinafter FRG-USSR Good Neighborliness Treaty] 30 1.L.M. 504 (1990).
37. Ratification of NAFTA will offer "vital opportunities to extend the EC's trading reach and economies
of scale." Goldstein, supra note 2, at 132. Loss of jobs, purportedly due to further unification under the EC, has
already been experienced. Cohen, supra note 3. On the other hand, if NAFTA performs as promised, relative
price reductions on goods produced within NAFTA may compete favorably with EC-produced goods; thus
NAFTA may give its partners competitive leverage as against the EC or other regional economic blocs. Perhaps
George Orwell's 1984 prophecy of regional bloc wars will come true, in the sense that there will be regional
economic wars, unless these are blunted by future rounds of negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947 [hereinafter GAIT], 61 Stat.(5) AS, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, and its numerous protocols. To
the extent that regional groups such as NAFTA, EFTA or the EC can represent their members' interests rather
than individual nations interest, more may be accomplished in GATT rounds. For a sample of the present state
of affairs, see Roger Cohen. U.S.-Europe Discord on Trade Talks, N.Y. TmEs, Dec. 18, 1992, at D2. Integration
of a different sort, and by different methods, may occur in East Asia if China seeks to realign borders to reflect
its territorial holdings of 150 years ago. See Nicholas D. Kristof, China Builds Its Military Muscle, Making Some
Neighbors Nervous, id, Jan. 11, 1993, at Al.
38. As further analyzed in Part II, the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties,
Aug. 23, 1978, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 80/31 (1978) [hereinafter Vienna Treaty Succession Convention], reprinted
in 17 I.L.M. 1488 (1978) may be invoked in this process. Conference for Peace in Yugoslavia, Arbitration
Commission, Opinion No. 9, 31 I.L.M. 1523, 1524-25 (1992) has specifically recommended use of the
.principles of international law embodied" in the Convention; Conference for Peace in Yugoslavia, Arbitration
Commission, Opinion No. 1, 31 I.L.M. 1494, 1495 (1992) had said the Convention "dr[e]w inspiration" from
the principles of international laws on state succession. U.S. objections to the Convention are stated in The Law
of Treaties and Other International Agreements: Observance, Application and Interpretation: Succession of States
in Respect of Treaties, 1978 DIGEST § 2, at 704-06, which includes a text of the Convention as adopted. Other
sources on the law of treaty succession include: IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLtC INTERNATIONAL LAW
655-56, 667-73 (4th ed. 1990); International Law Commission, Report on the Work ofIs Twenty-Sixth Session,
U.N. Doc. A9610/Rev. 1 (1974), in 2(1) 1974(1) Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N (1975) [hereinafter ILC Report); LORD
McNAIR, THE LAw OF TREATIES chs. 37-41 (2d ed. 1961), the first edition of which (1938) includes additional
materials on British materials; 2 D. P. O'CoNNEra, STATE SuccEssION IN MUNIcIPAL LAw AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW (1967); RESTATEMENT (THID), supra note 6, § 210; 2 WHITEMAN, DIGEST, ch. 4, § 10; Giandonato
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problem is the effect of separation and integration of states on public and private orderings,
ranging from the title to state property, which is a major issue in the former command
economies of Eastern Europe, to purely personal legal rights, such as taxation, reception of
bodies of private law, or nationality. 9 "It is generally thought that ... succession of States,
[that is] of the legal consequences ensuing from a change in sovereignty upon a certain
territory, is one of the most complex and debated questions in international law."4 There
are thorny legal issues involved with each, which are independent variables in that resolution
of public and private orderings within an integrated or united state or separated or seceded
states can proceed without the intervention of an existing or modified treaty regime.
Conversely, treaty regimes, whether those in force under predecessor regimes or those
developed after separation, unification, or integration, can have little or no impact on large
sectors of the public or private order within the resulting state, states, or other arrangements.
However, since treaty issues can give a different answer to questions of public or private
orderings,' the first analysis should be the impact of these changes on existing treaty
regimes, the options states have to preserve or alter these regimes, and the results therefrom.
That is the theme of this article.
To serve as counterpoint for the remainder of the article, Part I traces the movement
toward integration in Western Europe, with primary focus on the European Community, and
Caggiano, The ILC Draft on the Succession of States in Respect of Treaties: A Critical Appraisal, 1 ITAL. Y.B.
INT'L L. 69 (1975); C. Wilfred Jenks, State Succession in Respect of Law-Making Treaties, 29 BRIT, Y.B. INT'L
L. 105 (1952); J. Mervyn Jones, State Succession in the Matter of Treaties, 24 id. 360 (1947); D.P. O'Connell,
Independence and Problems of State Succession, in W.V. O'BRIEN, THE NEW NATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND DIPLOMACY 7-26 (1965); O'Connell, Independence and Succession to Treaties, 38 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 84
(1962); Ian Sinclair, Some Reflections on the Vienna Convention on Succession of State in Respect of Treaties,
in ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ERIK CASTREN: CELEBRATING His 75TH BIRTHDAY MARCH 20, 1979, at 149 (Kar
Hakapaa ed. 1979); James B. Stewart, Jr., Comment, The International Law Commission, 26th Session: Draft
Article on the Succession of States in Respect of Treaties: The Pragmatic Development of International Law,
16 HARV. J. INT'L L. 638 (1975). F.A. Vallat, Some Aspects of the Law of State Succession, 41 GROTIUS Soc'Y
TRANS. 123 (1956). The International Law Association considered the issue contemporaneously with the U.N.
International Law Commission. INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION COMMITTEE ON STATE SUCCESSION TO
TREATIES AND OTHER GOVERNMENTAL OBLIGATIONS, THE EFFECT OF INDEPENDENCE ON TREATIES (1965)
[hereinafter THE EFFECT OF INDEPENDENCE ON TREATIEs]; INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE
FIFrY-SECoND CONFERENCE 557 (1967) [hereinafter ILA 52D REPORT); State Succession, in INTERNATIONAL
LAW ASSOCIATION; REPORT OF THE FIFrY-THIRD CONFERENCE 589 (1969) [hereinafter ILA 53D REPORT];
Report of the Committee on the Succession of New States to the Treaties and Certain Other Obligation of their
Predecessors, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF Tm FIFrY-FOURTH CONFERENCE 101 (1971)
[hereinafter ILA 54TH REPORT].
39. On this subject, see generally BROWNLIE, supra note 38, at 654-67, 673-75; 1 HACKWORTH, DIoEST
§§ 78-82; 1 MOORE, DIGEsT § 92-108; 1 D. P. O'CoNNELL, STATE SUCCESSION IN MUNICIPAL LAW AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 104-452 (1967); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 6, §§ 208-09; 2 WHITEMAN, DIGEST
ch. 4, §§ 1-9. The Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State Property, Archives and Debts,
Apr. 7, 1983, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.117/14 (1983) [hereinafter Vienna State Property Succession Convention],
reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 306 (1983) had only lukewarm support in the U.N. General Assembly (54 votes for, 11
including the United States against, 11 abstaining). No state had become party to it, and only 8 states had signed
it, as of 1990. UNITED NATIONS, MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSrIED WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL As AT
31 DECEMBER 1990, U.N. Doc. STILEG/Ser. E/9, at 93 (1990). However, Conference for Peace in Yugoslavia,
Arbitration Commission, Opinion No. 9,31 I.L.M. 1523, 1524-25 (1992) has specifically recommended use of
the "principles of international law embodied" in the Convention.
40. Caggiano, supra note 38, at 70.
41. Vienna State Property Succession Convention, supra note 39, arts. 10-11, 14(1), 17(1), 18(1), 22-23,
27(1), 30(1), 35, 38(1), 41,22 1.L.M. at 311-12,314, 316-17, 320-24 (force of treaty law in resolving problems
under the Convention or otherwise regulated by custom).
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the impact it has had on the treaty regimes of the states of that region. Part II analyzes the
probable results which disintegration will have on the treaties to which Czechoslovakia, the
USSR, and Yugoslavia are signatories, with the analysis performed in the context of the
1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties (Succession
Convention). 2 The Succession Convention has not been ratified by enough states for it to
be effective,43 probably because of states' objections to its final provisions on temporal
application," boundary and territorial regimes and the relationship with the concept of
permanent sovereignty over natural resources,45 the separation of states clausess and its
'dispute settlement clauses4 The Convention does provide a convenient frame of reference,
however, and in some cases restates whatever customary law has been generated.4 8 Part III
examines other factors, outside the law of treaty succession, that may affect treaty regimes
in the succession context. Part IV offers some observations and conclusions for the future.
As will be seen, behind the friction of war,49 the economic dislocations, and the growing
42. See supra note 38.
43. Vienna Treaty Succession Convention, supra note 38, art. 49, 17 I.L.M. at 1514, requires 15
ratifications. As of 1990 24 states had signed, but only 8 had ratified the Convention; the Unites States is not
a signatory. UNrrED NATIONS, supra note 39, at 813.
44. Vienna Treaty Succession Convention, supra note 38, art. 7, 17 I.L.M. at 1492, states the general rule
that its terms apply only prospectively, to successions occurring after it would enter into force, "unless otherwise
agreed," but adds that successor states could declare, upon ratification, that the Convention would apply
retroactively to a prior succession if any state deposits a similar declaration. See Sinclair, supra note 38, at 163-
68; The Law of Treaties, supra note 38, § 2, 705.
45. Vienna Treaty Succession Convention, supra note 38, arts. 11-13, 17 I.L.M. at 1494-95. See Sinclair,
supra note 38, at 163, 168-74; Stewart, supra note 38, at 642; The Law of Treaties, supra note 38, § 2, 705.
Caggiano, supra note 38, at 80, says the ILC did not explore the issue sufficiently.
46. Vienna Treaty Succession Convention, supra note 38, arts. 34-37, 17 I.L.M. at 1509-11. See Sinclair,
supra note 38, at 164, 174-76.
47. Vienna Treaty Succession Convention, supra note 38, arts. 41-45, 17 I.L.M. at 1512-13. See Sinclair,
supra note 38, at 164, 176-80; The Law of Treaties, supra note 38, § 2, 705.
48. Compare Sinclair, supra note 38, at 153, citing Report of the Special Rapporteur to the International
Law Commission, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/202 (1968), in 1968(2) Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 87-93 (1970); with Jones,
supra note 38, at 372, writing a generation earlier (1947), and stating "that there is now sufficient material
available regarding the practices of states ... to assert the existence of positive rules of law on the subject...."
The 1992 Conference on Yugoslavia, Arbitration Commission, Opinion No. 1, 31 I.L.M. 1494, 1495 (1992)
spoke of the Treaty Succession Convention, supra note 38, as "hav[ing] drawn inspiration" from the principles
of international law. Id., Opinion No. 9, 31 I.L.M. 1523, 1524-25 (1992) declared that "the principles of
international law embodied in" the Convention, supra note 35, were the basis for discussion as to treaty
succession. Neither Opinion flatly states that the Convention restates international law, nor do they require the
succession states to follow the Convention. The Israeli and U.S. delegates to the International Law Commission,
which submitted the draft Convention to the U.N. General Assembly, were dubious about preparing a draft
treaty, the alternative being model rules. Sinclair, supra at 154-55. The same doubt has been expressed in other
contexts. See, e.g. Panel, Development in the Law of Naval Warfare: Custom or Codification, 1989 PRoc. Am.
SOC*Y INT'L L. 145, 149, 151 (1990) (Remarks by Professors Dinstein, Meron, Reisman) objecting to the
codification or "restatement" approach of, e.g. Natalino Ronzitti, The Crisis of the Traditional Law Regulating
International Armed Conflicts at Sea and the Need for its Revision, in THE LAw OF NAVAL WARFARE 51
(Natalino Ronzitti, ed. 1988) and David L. Larson, Naval Weaponry and the Law of the Sea, 18 OcEAN DEVEL.
& INT'L L. 125, 156 (1987) (naval warfare issues); HOwARD M. HOLTZMANN & JOSEPH E. NEJHAUS, A GUIDE
TO THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTRrNATIONAL CoMMERcIAL ARBTRATION 9-15 (1989) (option for
model law for international commercial arbitration instead of draft multilateral convention). And see generally
R.Y. Jennings, The Progressive Development ofInternational Law and Its Codification, 24 BRiT. Y.B. INT'L L.
301, 308 (1947), who concludes that the restatement approach may be superior to the multilateral treaty for
codification of existing law.
49. Cf. CARL VON CLAUSEWrIZ, ON WAR 113-23 (Michael Howard & Peter Paret ed. & trans. 1976).
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tribalism ° in Europe may lurk legal issues, largely unnoticed5 or unthinkable,52 that
may plague public and private orderings for a longer time.
II. THE WORLD'S SECOND GREAT CUSTOMS UNION
The ongoing process of merger among the nations of Western Europe, under the
leadership of the European Community since World War If, has precedents that stretch from
the Middle Ages through the last century. Great Britain, formally known as the United
Kingdom, has four components: England, which was itself once divided among various
Saxon kings; Wales; Scotland; and Northern Ireland. 3 Continental European nations have
had similar experiences of consolidation: Spain, liberated from the Moors and consolidated
in 1492 by Ferdinand and Isabella; France; the Netherlands; Switzerland; and, in the late
Nineteenth Century, Germany and Italy. Imperial Russia and the Austro-Hungarian Empire
are prime examples of consolidations, often by force, of polyglot collections of states or
ethnic areas.
A process of legal integration occurred in what became the United States. The Articles
of Confederation, which carried the Nation through the Revolutionary War, gave way to the
Constitution of 1789, S4 soon augmented by the Bill of Rights in 1791 and, later, the
50. Goldstein, supra note 2, at 123; Wood, supra note 5, at 22-23.
51. In 1987, for example, RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 6, § 208, r.n. 4 said in part:
This Restatement largely follows and incorporates the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
.. , but not the provisions of the 1978 Convention on Succession, many of which appear to be of
modest utility for the Foreign Relations Law of the United States. The Convention on Succession
addresses problems that were of lively interest to the entities that became independent during 1960-
80; it is expressly inapplicable to succession that occurred prior to its entry into force .. ., unless the
parties to an agreement stipulate otherwise. A comparable waveof emerging states in the years ahead
is unlikely.
52. Id. pays scant attention to the impact of armed conflict on treaty succession or the law of treaties.
Id. § 210 does not even mention the possibility, and id. § 336, cmt. e & r.n. 4 treat war as a species of the
doctrine of fundamental change of circumstances. Neither the Vienna Treaty Succession Convention, supra note
38, nor the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 6, have explicit provisions either;, for analysis,
see infra notes 292-303 and accompanying text.
53. Wales was annexed in the Thirteenth Century, with final union 300 years later. Scotland became part
of Great Britain in the Eighteenth Century by the Act of Union. J. H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH
LEGAL HISTORY ch. 2 (3d ed. 1990).
54. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, preamble, arts. II, Ill. The ambivalent separateness of the former
colonies under the Articles is revealed in the Treaty of Peace, Nov. 30, 1782, U.K.-U.S., art. 1, 8 Stat. 54, 55:
"His Britannic Majesty acknowledges the said United States, Vizt New Hampshire, Massachusetts-Bay, Rhode-
Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland,
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, to be free, sovereign and independent States; That he
treats with them as such; And for himself, his Heirs and Successors, relinquishes all Claims to the Government,
Propriety and territorial Rights of the same, and every part thereof... .' (emphasis added). See also the
permanent Treaty of Peace, Sept. 3, 1783, U.K.-U.S., art. 1, id. 80, 81; compare the format of the Jay Treaty,
Nov. 19, 1794, U.K.-U.S., id. 116. This ambivalence is further reflected in the theories of how international law
became part of the law of the United States. See generally Louis Henkin, How International Law Became Part
of United States Law, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1555 (1984). The courts continued to refer to the United States in the
plural even after the Civil War. See, e.g., Leary v. United States, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 607, 611 (1872). Perhaps
the cautionary approach of the parties lay in the fact that the Articles of Confederation did not become operative
until March 1,178 1, at the end of the Revolution. The Declaration of Independence's last paragraph had asserted
statehood in 1776, however. 3 CHARLES CHENEY HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY As INTERRETmm AND
APPLIED BY THE UNIr STATES 1387-88 n. 7 (2d rev. ed. 1945). Although id. says that none of the ex-colonies
negotiated a treaty with a foreign state, the new States of the United States did negotiate agreements with each
1993 / Integration and Disintegration in Europe
important Civil War Amendments, XIII, XIV, and XV, which imposed civil rights on the
States of the Union, in large part through the Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal
protection clauses.55 The remainder of the Western Hemisphere has seen more or less
successful attempts at mergers of various sorts, ranging from brief bilateral confederations,
such as Bolivia-Peru, early in the Nineteenth Century,56 through the Central American
Federation of the early Twentieth Century,57 to current trends, such as the Andean Code,
the Central American Common Market, and the 1987 Canada-U.S. free trade agreement,
which NAFTA may expand in the near future.58 Separatist tendencies are also a Western
Hemisphere theme as well, as in the case of Canada and Quebec.59
Thus, the integration of Europe through the EC can be seen as part of a larger,
worldwide movement toward commonality. However, there are countertrends toward
separatism among nations and within the borders of individual countries, along with
occasional assertions of national supremacy in the decisions of national courts and other
agencies.
A. Historical Prologue to the Common Market'"
Although many trace the development of the Common Market to thinkers and planners
of post-World War II Europe, the seeds of the concept developed during that war. Winston
Churchill proposed a common nationality for France and the United Kingdom just before the
other. See, e.g., Georgia v. South Carolina, 497 U.S. 376, 378-79 (1990), considering the Treaty of Beaufort,
Apr. 28, 1787. These sorts of agreements are now regulated by the Compact Clause, U.S. CoNsT., art. , § 10.
Thus the United States has escaped the problem of former independent states' treaties when those states merge
into a larger state. See, e.g., HYDE, supra at 1535-36 (Germany). The Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST., art. VI,
cl. 2, validates treaties made in the name of the United States before ratification of the Constitution, e.g. the
Treaties of Peace, supra, but does not explicitly cover agreements between ex-colonies or between one of the
13 States and a foreign country.
55. The Constitution of the Confederacy was, in some respects, an attempted throwback to the Articles
of Confederation in the Confederate Constitution's recognition of state sovereignty, but the U.S. Constitution's
commerce clause, subject to a ban on internal improvements, and the necessary and proper clause, were retained.
Compare U.S. CONST., art. , § 8, cl. 3, 18 with ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, preamble, arts. 1-Ill and
CoNWED. CoNsT., pmbl., art. 1, cl. 3, 18. See also C. LEE, THE CONFEDERATE CoNsTrruTroNs 95-96, 101-02
& 145 (1963).
56. Jones, supra note 38, at 365-66, notes that the parties, like certain German States (Bavaria, Saxony,
Wurttemberg) under the Second Reich, retained authority to treat with other countries.
57. Id. at 366, noting the same retention of rights for Federation members.
58. See supra note 32.
59. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
60. Much of what follows has been analyzed in greater detail in these sources, which may be consulted
for further reference: P. J. G. KAPrEYN & P. VERLoRBN VAN THEmAAT, INTRODUCnON TO THE LAW OF THE
EUROPEAN COmmuNIriEs (L. Gormley 2d ed. 1989); P.S.R.F. MATHuSEN, A GuiDE TO EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
LAW (5th ed. 1990); W. NICHOLL & T. SALMON, UNDERSTANDING THE EuROPEAN COMMuNrms (1990); ERIC
STEIN, ET AL., EUROPEAN CoMMUNrrY LAW AND INsTrrtrToNS IN PERSPECTvE (1976, 1985 Supp.). These
general casebooks also have references: J. BARTON & BART FISHER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INvEsTmENT
170-210 (1986); R. FOLSOM, Er"AL., INTERNATIONALBUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 910-1034 (1986); Louis HEmKiN,
Er AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERiLALs 1413-66 (2d ed. 1987); JOHN JACKSON & W. DAVEY,
LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 199-233 (2d ed. 1986); HENRY STENER & DErLEV
A. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 1036-1122 (3d ed. 1986). All have document supplements and
are updated occasionally. As DEREK BOWErr, THm LAw OF INTERNATIONAL INsTruTroNS (1963) demonstrates,
there are other, similar regional organizations, many of which are discussed in the EC sources listed supra.
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fall of France in 1941,61 and the U.K.-U.S. Atlantic Charter declaration of August 14, 1941
included as its fourth point furtherance "by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished,
of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed
for their economic prosperity; subject to "existing obligations." The Charter's fifth point
noted the parties' "desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the
economic field with the object of securing, for all, improved labor standards, economic
advancement and social security."62 The Charter, which is still in force, was accepted in
principle by many future EC members in the 1942 Declaration by the United Nations, a
wartime alliance for the defeat of Nazi Germany. 3 The name and many of the concepts
carried over into the present United Nations Charter.
After the war Churchill suggested a "United States of Europe," with beginnings in a
partnership between France and Germany and a Council of Europe. 4 In 1948, as part of
the Marshall Plan for reconstruction of Europe, the Organization of European Economic Co-
Operation was established. It was renamed the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) in 1961, and the U.S. is a member.6 5 The Council of Europe was
formalized in 1949.66 The next year Robert Schuman, Foreign Minister of France,
proposed that the competing French and German coal and steel industries, whose
competition was a cause of two world wars, be placed under a High Authority. In 1951 the
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) treaty, setting the pattern for agreements to
follow, was signed by Belgium, France, the FRG, Italy, Luxembourg, and the
Netherlands.67
Other aspects of supranational law followed contemporaneous parallel paths. The
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
entered into force in 1953;68 numerous protocols amplifying its protections and procedures
have followed. This regional treaty, one of many that bind EC members, antedated all
61. 2 WINSTON S. CHuRcHma, THE SEcoND WoRiL WAR 207-15 (1949).
62. Atlantic Charter, Aug. 14, 1941, U.K.-U.S., 55 Stat. 1603.
63. Declaration by United Nations, Jan 1, 1942, id. 1600; see also U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 10,
at 286, 400 (1992), which lists 47 nations as parties to the agreements. The Axis began to impose transnational
regimes for business and labor in territories it conquered too. See infra note 98.
64. Churchill's first suggestion for this came in a 1942 British cabinet meeting. NICHOLL & SALMON,
supra note 50, at 6; ARTHUR HENRY ROBERTSON, THE COUNcIL. OF EUROPE i-2 (1956).
65. Convention for European Economic Co-Operation, Apr. 16, 1948, 888 U.N.T.S. 141, superseded by
Convention on the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Dec. 14, 1960, 12 U.S.T. 1728,
888 U.N.T.S. 179.
66. Statute of the Council of Europe, May 5, 1949, 87 U.N.T.S. 103, since amended several times. For
initial analysis, see generally ROBERTSON, supra note 64. The Western European Union (WEU) was another step
along the way. NICHOLL & SALMON, supra note 60, at 11. France and Germany have proposed recently that the
WEU, which now includes all EC members except Denmark and Ireland, became an integral part of the process
of European union, with a joint 50,000-member army. By contrast, Italy and the United Kingdom have argued
that the WEU should remain distinct and concentrate on rapid reaction forces that might be used outside the
NATO area. Wood, supra note 5, at 27.
67. European Coal and Steel Community Treaty and Convention, Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140
(unofficial English translation).
68. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950,
213 U.N.T.S. 221. This Convention was the primary product of the Council of Eruope. See ROBERTSON, supra
note 64, ch. 9.
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worldwide agreements except the Genocide Convention by more than a decade.69 The
Maastricht Treaty would provide for a common citizenship with the rights to reside within
the Community, to vote and run for office in local elections outside a person's own country,
to vote and run for the European Parliament, and to have diplomatic protection by any
Member State.7" Although ideas for a European Defense Community and a European
Political Community foundered, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which
initially included Canada and the United States, and which eventually included many EC
members and even some nonmembers of the EC, such as Turkey, closed the defense gap.7
In 1948 the Western European Union, which now has nine members, had been
established as an alliance concerned with European cooperation in the field of security.72
It was moribund for 30 years73 but began to show renewed life during the 1980-88 Tanker
War, as European countries responded to common security concerns beyond the NATO
Treaty area.
Economic integration continued with the Treaties of Rome in 1957, creating the
European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community
(EURATOM)74 with a structural organization roughly parallel to that of the ECSC. Eight
years later, the Merger Treaty75 folded the ECSC and EURATOM into the EC with a single
structure of organizations. In 1972, the Treaty of Brussels added Denmark, Ireland, and the
United Kingdom to the EC. In 1975, Greece was admitted to EC membership, and in 1986,
Portugal and Spain became members.76 Three years after the Treaty of Rome, European
states on the periphery of the EC negotiated the European Free Trade Association (EFTA),
69. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948,78 U.N.T.S.
277; see also, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights with Optional Protocol, Dec. 19, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171, now in force for the United States with numerous reservations, understandings and
declarations; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
70. Maastricht Treaty, supra note 1, art. G(c), 31 I.L.M. at 258-59.
71. North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949,63 StaL 2241,34 U.N.T.S. 243, as modified by Protocol on the
Accession of Greece and Turkey, Oct. 17, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 43, 126 U.N.T.S. 350; Protocol on the Accession of
the Federal Republic of Germany, Oct. 23, 1954, 6 U.S.T. 5707, 243 U.N.T.S. 308; North Atlantic Treaty:
Accession of Spain, Dec. 10, 1981, T.I.A.S. No. 10564. Other blocs have organized themselves regionally, often
with a parallel defense pact. For example, the Arab League was organized pursuant to the Pact of the League
of Arab States, Mar. 22, 1945, 70 U.N.T.S. 238. The Treaty of Joint Defence and Economic Co-Operation
Between the Arab League States, Apr. 13, 1950, 49 AM. J. INT'L L. Strp. 51 (1955), is a parallel regional
defense organization analogous to the NATO Agreement. Such regional arrangements for self-defense are
contemplated under U.N. CHARTER, art. 51. Europe's Multilateral Organizations, 3 DEP'T ST. DISPATcH 531-32
(1992) gives a thumbnail history of NATO. The Arab League was formed to protect Arab interests against
Jewish interest in establishing a national home in what became Israel and to achieve unity and protect Arab
interests. MAmn KHADDURI, THE GuLF WAR: THE ORIGINs AND IMPLICATIONS Op THE IRAQ-IRAN CONFLICT
140 (1988).
72. Treaty for Collaboration in Economic, Social and Cultural Matters and for Collective Self-Defence,
Mar. 17, 1948, 19 U.N.T.S. 51.
73. Europe's Multilateral Organizations, supra note 71, at 534.
74. Treaty for the Establishment of the European Economic Community, Mar. 15, 1957 (hereinafter
Treaty of Rome), 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. I-Part H (Cmd. 5179-11), 298 U.N.T.S. 3; Treaty Establishing the
European Atomic Energy Community, Mar. 25, 1957, id. 167. The U.N.T.S. versions are unofficial English
translations.
75. Treaty Establishing a Single Council and a Single Commission of the European Communities, Apr.
8, 1965, (hereinafter Merger Treaty), reprinted in 4 I.L.M. 776 (1965).
76. Norway's popular referendum rejected EC membership after it signed the 1972 treaty. In 1985
Greenland, for whom Denmark has exercised foreign relations authority, seceded from the EC. See generally
MATHIJSEN, supra note 60, at 9-12.
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which promotes removal of trade barriers without the pledge of integration. 7 EFTA has
lost states, namely Denmark, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom, to the EC, and today
it has only seven members, some of which are seeking EC membership: Austria, Finland,
Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. In 1991 the EFTA-EC
negotiations to create a European Economic Area (EAA) hit a snag when the EC Court of
Justice held that the system of judicial supervision to be established under the EAA was
incompatible with the Treaty of Rome.71 If the EAA is approved by EFTA members,
EFTA may become only an extension of the EC. The scope of the EC may be further
expanded in the future because Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland have had associate
status with the EC, and because EFTA has economic cooperation accords with the Baltic
states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania and with Bulgaria and Romania.79 As the center
of Europe has integrated more tightly economically, the periphery is being pulled
centripetally.
The Maastricht Treaty," perhaps slowed by the results of the Danish and French
referenda," would have provided for a common currency, 2 a European central bank,83
and a common citizenship with certain rights, principally the suffrage and office holding in
local and European Parliamentary elections." Other provisions more fully fold the ECSC,
EURATOM, and the EEC into one organization, 5 to be known formally as the European
Community (EC). 6 More significantly, perhaps, is the choice of European Union, which
is "a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe,
77. Convention Establishing the European Free Trade Association, Jan. 4, 1960, 370 U.N.T.S. 3.
78. Opinion 1191, Draft Agreement Between the European Community and the European Free Trade
Association Relating to the Creation of the European Economic Area, 31 I.L.M. 442,457-65. The plan was dealt
another blow in 1992 when the voters of Switzerland, an EFTA member, rejected the EEA. The concept is in
trouble in Norway and Sweden. Liechtenstein's voters approved the link, however. See supra note 2. The
economic force of a combined EC-EFTA through the EAA may be enormous, but Goldstein, supra note 2, at
125-26, notes the possibility that the exchange-rate mechanism presently linking EC members could be split in
two, with hard-currency nations (Benelux, France, Germany) as one unit and the rest of EFTA/EC in another.
The European Economic Area Treaty, May 2, 1992, is 1000 pages long and would stipulate free movement of
goods, labor, service, and capital among members. Europe's Multilateral Organizations, supra note 71, at 533;
Wood, supra note 5, at 31.
79. Wood, supra note 5, at 31-32. Goldstein, supra note 2, at 120, says that EC membership for the
Visegrad Group (the Czech state(s?), Hungary and Poland), as well as Cyprus, Malta and Turkey, are not likely
in this century.
80. Maastricht Treaty, supra note 1.
81. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
82. Maastricht Treaty, supra note 1, arts. G(4), adding art. 3a, G(25), substituting arts. 109j-109m, 31
I.L.M. at 257, 264, 274-77, as modified by Protocol on the Transition of the Third Stage of Economic and
Monetary Union, Feb. 7, 1992, at 355; Protocol on Certain Provisions Relating to the United Kingdom, Feb. 7,
1992; Protocol on Certain Provisions Relating to Denmark, Feb. 7, 1992, at 356; Protocol on France, Feb. 7,
1992, at 357. David J. Schaeffer, Salvaging Maastrichtat the Edinborough Summit, 56 IN''L PRAcT. NOTEBOOK
10 (1993) (providing a good summary of the Edinborough Summit).
83. Maastricht Treaty, supra note 1, arts. G(7), G(25), 31 I.L.M. at 258,264-77 which links the ECB with
the central banks of members in a European System of Central Banks (ESCB). The ECB and the ESCB will be
independent from the member states' instructions and other community institutions. The European Monetary
Institute (EMI) would play a monitoring role. See also Protocol on the Statute of the ESCB and the ECB, Feb.
7, 1992, id. at 331, and Protocol on the Statute of the EMI, Feb. 7, 1992, at 345.
84. Id. art. G(9), at 258-59. Members would retain the right to declare who are their nationals. Declaration
on Nationality of a Member State, Feb. 7, 1992, at 365.
85. Id. arts. G-, at 256-323.
86. Id. art. G(1), at 256.
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in which decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen,"87 as the title of the new
concept.
Most significantly for the purposes of this analysis were provisions for a common
defense and foreign relations policy. Besides pledging support, cooperation, and
coordination, EC Members would delegate to the EC Council the authority to make
decisions, and the Presidency would represent the Union in matters coming within the
common foreign and security policy. Members would agree to carry out Council decisions
in this field. "The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to
the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defense policy, which
might in time lead to a common defence." The Union requested that the W'EU be declared
"an integral part of the development of the Union, to elaborate and implement decisions and
actions of the Union which have defense implications." The EC Council, in concert with the
WEU, would "adopt the necessary practical arrangements."88 The nine WEU members, also
EC members, have pledged development of WEU as a means of strengthening "the European
pillar of the Atlantic Alliance," meaning NATO. 9 The Maastricht Treaty also states that
"The Union shall respect the national identities of its Member States." '° This "ambitious
... design," with its "ambiguous addendum" for a common defense, seems severely set back
for the time being, along with other notions of collective security outside NATO.9' Other
parts of the Treaty, which are discussed below,' would amend the powers and procedures
of EC institutions.
Parallel trends existed elsewhere. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe (CSCE), which includes 50 European nations, Canada, and the United States,93 was
often a platform for Cold War rhetoric until the 1990 Paris Summit, which resulted in an
agreement to create permanent institutions across all of Europe, including offices in nations
formerly behind the Iron Curtain. The organizational structure is in its infancy and has been
ineffectual in trying to resolve the conflicts in Yugoslavia. NATO has begun to evolve; in
late 1991 it established a formalized relationship between NATO members and former
communist states of Europe under the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). There
87. Maastricht Treaty, supra note 1, art. A, at 255.
88. Id. art. J, at 323-27. See Declaration on Voting in the Field of the Common Foreign and Security
Policy, Feb. 7, 1992, at 369; Declaration on Practical Arrangements in the Field of the Common Foreign and
Security Policy, Feb. 7, 1992; Declaration on the Use of Languages in the Field of the Common Foreign and
Security Policy, Feb. 7, 1992, at 370. The Single European Act, Feb. 17 & 28, 1986, art. 30, 25 I.L.M. 506, 517-
18 (1986) had also pledged the EC members' support for formulating and implementing a European foreign
policy. The WEU had been revitalized in 1986, coincidental with European efforts to deal with conflict in the
Persian Gulf. Europe's Multilateral Organizations, supra note 71, at 534. See also Marc Weller, The
International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 86 AM. J. INT'L L.
659, 571-607 (1992) (providing a description of EC diplomatic efforts, along with those of the CSCE and the
United Nations, to end the crisis in Yugoslavia).
89. Declaration on Western European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 31 I.L.M. at 370-72, noting the Declaration
on the Role of the Western European Union and Its Relations With the European Union and the Atlantic
Alliance, Dec. 10, 1991; Declaration of Members of the Western European Union, Dec. 10, 1991.
90. Maastricht Treaty, supra note 1, art. F(l), at 256; see also Treaty of Rome, supra note 74, art. 2,298
U.N.T.S. at 15, as amended by the Maastricht Treaty, supra note 1, art. G(2), 31 U.N.T.S. at 256-57 ("Member
States").
91. Goldstein, supra note 2, at 119, 127, 132.
92. See infra Parts ll.B.1-H.B.4.
93. Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe (CSCE), Aug. 1, 1975, 14
I.L.M. 1292 (1975).
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has even been talk of Russian membership in NATO. However, like the CSCE, NACC thus
far has largely been a series of conferences and consultations for collective security. 9
In terms of institutional development, the EC is the most sophisticated, whether seen
from the standpoint of experience, structure, or relative power as a quasi-governmental
organization. It may become the prototype for other institutions. Examination of the
structure of the EC and its institutions' authority is in order to determine the impact, if any,
they may have on treaty succession.
B. Community Structure
When the broad aspects of the U.S. Constitution and its amendments are compared with
the European network of international agreements, with their Venn diagram potential to
include parties outside Europe, such as the U.S. and Canada in the case of NATO, there
emerges a very rough parallel to the U.S. Constitution, with major exceptions. These
exceptions include full political union, full powers over foreign relations and defense, and
the power to tax. In some respects the similarities between the still-developing European
model and the U.S. Constitution, including implementing legislation and court decisions, are
striking. However, the two systems diverge sharply on other matters. There is not yet a
"United States of Europe," as urged by Churchill 45 years ago, but the potential for such is
greater today than ever before. That said, the development of the EC, or European Union
as the Maastricht Treaty would have it, does raise issues of treaty succession.
There are four primary institutions in the Community: the Commission, the Council, the
European Parliament, and the Court of Justice. As amendments in the Maastricht Treaty
make clear, in reality there are three Commissions, one each for the EC, the ECSC, and
EURATOM, because of the three agreements.95 However, the same people serve on each
Commission aid handle the business of all three organizations. In practice, therefore, the
Community institutions are referred to in the singular, even though each member of the
Commission in effect wears three hats, representing the EC, the ECSC, and EURATOM.
1. The Commission
The 17-member Commission is the administrative arm of the EC and therefore the
moving force behind the Community's activities. It is the Commission and its staff that:
send proposals for decisions to the Council, decide matters on its own initiative, administer
finances, negotiate treaties, and generally represent the EC within and without the
Community. Its Community law enforcement powers, both against member states for
nonfulfillment of obligations and against other entities, such as businesses, are its primary
interface with the private sector. The Commission may also issue nonbinding
recommendations and opinions.
94. James A. Baker, III, NACC Intervention, 3 DEP'T ST. DISPATCH 201 (1992); Europe's Multilateral
Organizations, supra note 71, at 532; Goldstein, supra note 2, at 126-27; Wood, supra note 5, at 29-31. Weller,
supra note.88, at 571-607, describes the interwoven efforts of the ECSC, the EC and the United Nations to
resolve the Yugoslav crisis. See also Paul Lewis, Aboutto Step up Action on Serbia, N.Y. TIMs, Dec. 18, 1992,
at A14; Elaine Sciolino, NATO Offers Support, id.; Paul Lewis, NATO to Help U.N. on Yugoslav Plans, Dec.
16, 1992, at A3. Lewis, supra note 17.
95. See, e.g., Maastricht Treaty, supra note 1, arts. C-E, L-M, P, 31 I.L.M. at 255-56, 329-30; Merger
Treaty, supra note 75.
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2. The Council
The Council has a representative from each of the 12 member nations. Its primary
function is ensuring coordination of the general economic policies of EC members. The
Council and the Commission can make "decisions" which are rules of law binding on EC
nations. In that regard the Council is like the U.N. Security Council, except that there is no
veto,96 and the Commission, as the administrative arm of the EC, must initiate draft
decisions. Council decisions must fall within the competence of the EC, and any amendment
of a proposed Commission decision must be approved unanimously. The Council also
coordinates overall courses of economic action by statements of policy and, since 1986, has
endeavored to state a European foreign policy.97 As noted above, the formerly ad hoe
procedure will be replaced by formal authority if the Maastricht Treaty goes into effect.98
3. The European Parliament
Originally begun as the Assembly, the European Parliament's 518 members have been
elected to five-year terms by popular vote from among the EC nations' citizenry since 1979.
The treaties establish the number of representatives from each EC country; seating is by
multinational political group. Although the Parliament now participates in the budget
process, it cannot legislate or raise taxes. In that regard the Parliament has approximated the
functions of the U.N. General Assembly, whose powers are largely recommendatory." The
Maastricht Treaty would significantly increase the Parliament's powers. If that Treaty is
ratified, the Parliament will be able to reject a proposal which is before the Council for
adoption by qualified majority thereof, if a majority of Parliament members oppose the
proposal and if agreement has not been reached through a Joint Consultation Committee.
Parliament now can approve the appointment of the President of the Commission as well as
its other members, ask the Commission to submit proposed acts, conduct inquiries into
violations of Community law, appoint an Ombudsman to conduct inquiries, and receive
complaints concerning maladministration of any Community institution except the Court of
Justice.l°°
4. The Court of Justice
The 13-judge Court of Justice has original and appellate jurisdiction and the power of
administrative review. Member nations can sue other members for failure to fulfill EC
96. U.N. CHARmR, arts. 24-27, 48.
97. For a more recent round of pronouncements, see Conclusions of the Presidency, European Council,
Maastricht (Dec. 9-10, 1991), Bull. E.C. 12-1991 (1991), reprinted in INT'L PRACTrnONER'S NoTEBooK, 5-10
(No. 53, 1992).
98. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text. For an example of the latter, see Final Remarks on
the European Community Summit Meeting, Dec. 16, 1990, 1 Dm,'T ST. DISPATCH 354 (1990), the EC
declarations on the Persian Gulf crisis, the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinian problem.
99. U.N. CHARTER, arts. 10-17; but see also id., arts. 75-91. The European Single Act, Feb. 28, 1986,
reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 506 (1986) expanded the Parliament's powers. For analysis, see Andrew Maravcsik,
Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interests and Conventional Statecraft in the European
Community, 45 INT'L ORa. 19 (1991); Eric Stein, European Foreign Affairs System and the Single European
Act System of 1986, 23 INT'L LAw. 977 (1989).
100. Maastricht Treaty, supra note 1, arts. G(39)-G(41), G(60)-G(61), 31 I.L.M. at 287-89, 296-98.
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obligations, and they can bring actions against the Council, the Commission, or the
Parliament. Similarly, the Council, the Commission, or the Parliament can sue other
Community institutions. Most importantly, however, the Commission can bring a
proceeding against a member nation for failure to fulfill a Community obligation. Unlike
the International Court of Justice, which hears only claims by nations or certain agencies and
organs of the U.N.,1°' the Court of Justice can entertain suits by individuals or companies
against the Council, the Commission, or other Community institutions, as well as suits to get
a preliminary ruling on an EC issue at the request of the national court in which an individual
or company is litigating. EC civil servants can also bring claims in the Court of Justice.
Since 1989, pursuant to the Single European Act, a 12-judge Court of First Instance,
which is an EC trial-level court, has been available to hear claims by individuals or
companies involving certain Community issues and disputes involving EC civil servants.
Appellate jurisdiction lies in the Court of Justice."
The Court of Justice sits in panels, except over suits brought by a member nation or an
EC institution and when it has been requested to give a preliminary ruling. The Court of
First Instance always sits in panels.
C. The Substance of Community Law
The international agreements establishing the EC run to hundreds of articles, and over
three decades of practice have developed thousands of Council and Commission decisions,
as well as volumes of cases in the Court of Justice and in the national courts of member
nations. Thus, only the general parameters of Community law can be sketched here.10 3
The principal purpose of the EC has been the creation of a common internal market
among its member nations. To accomplish this, first, the treaties have provided for free
movement of goods by eliminating customs duties and other measures having an equivalent
effect on intra-Community imports and exports, and they have provided for the adoption of
a common customs tariff for third countries, which are those nations outside the EC, such
as the U.S. The customs union became fully effective July 1, 1986, eighteen months ahead
of schedule. On such matters of trade, the Community mirrors the U.S. Constitution and the
judicial interpretation of the dormant Commerce Clause."4 The EC recognizes exceptions
similar to the legitimate local public interest exception to the free flow of interstate
commerce within the United States. 0 5
Second, the Treaty of Rome provides for free movement of workers and those providing
services. Nationals of EC countries may now hold European Passports. Again,
interpretations of the U.S. Constitution on interstate travel and the right to engage in
101. See U.N. CHARTER, arts. 92-96; I.CJ. STATUTE, arts. 34-37. This limitation has given rise to the
espousal procedure, by which a nation adopts its national's claim as its own and litigates the case before the
Court. See, e.g., Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. U.K.), 1924 P.C.IJ. (ser. A), No. 2, at 11-12.
102. Single European Act, Feb. 17 & 18,1986, arts. 4,11,26,25 I.L.M. 506, 508, 510, 516 (1986).
103. See supra note 60 (providing sources on this subject, many of which have copious bibliographies).
104. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 3, 18; § 9, cl. 5, 6; § 10, cl. 2,3; Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 194-97
(1824), followed in Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111, 118-29 (1942), which upheld federal legislation
implementing the Commerce Clause. See also H. P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949) and
Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
105. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 628-29 (1978) (dictum).
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commerce supply useful parallels."0 6 The EC also recognizes the "freedom of
establishment," which is the right to set up businesses across borders. It is similar to the
right of U.S. businesses to establish themselves out-of-state, subject to registration and
similar requirements.0 7 Third, the Community treaties provide for free movement of
capital and free movement of payments, insofar as these are connected with free movement
of goods, services, and capital.
To achieve these ends, the EC has developed, or is developing, common policies for
agricultural products, fishery products, transportation, and free competition. The most recent
development has been passage of a new banking law, with a view to further strengthened
economic and monetary coordination in stages.' The Maastricht Treaty also includes
provisions for giving competence to the EC over education; vocational training; culture;
public health; consumer protection; trans-European networks for transportation, energy, and
telecommunications; industrial growth; economic and social cohesion; research and
technological development; and the environment." ° In 1985 the Commission's White
Paper laid down a program and timetable for a completed Internal Market by 1992,1"0
which has been accomplished. Besides these more recent developments, articles 85-89 of
the Treaty of Rome, similar in content to the U.S. antitrust laws,"1 have been a
longstanding contrast to the pre-World War II cartel policies of some European nations." 2
Historians have listed anticompetitive policies as a cause of World War ll."
106. Supreme CL of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (1985); Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518
(1978); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-31 (1969); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 173-76
(1941), variously based on U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3; art. IV, § 2, cl. 1; the Court has not agreed on the exact
source of the right. LAURENCE H. TRIaE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-8 (2d ed. 1988). The Third
Reich's war effort had encouraged transborder migration of "free" labor in addition to its use of slave labor and
prisoners of war. See infra note 113.
107. St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 356 (1882); see also Philip Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due
Process Clause and the in Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts-From Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review, 25
U. CHI. L. REv. 569, 577-82 (1958). Germany had developed a primitive form of cross-border establishment
during World War II. See infra note 112.
108. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text; see also MATHUsEN, supra note 60, at 13-14, 258-62;
Michael Gruson & Wolfgang Feuring, The New Banking Law of the European Economic Community, 25 INT'L
LAW. 1 (1991). Pockets of problems remain, however. Although most of the continental European EC members
joined the 1991 Schengen Agreement to allow free travel for EC nations' citizens without passports, Denmark,
Ireland and the United Kingdom have not. Alan Riding, It's 1993, and Europe Still Has Borders, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 31, 1993, §5, at 6.
109. Maastricht Treaty, supra note 1, arts. G(33)-G(38), 31 I.L.M. at 278-87.
110. MATHUSEN, supra note 60, at 12-13; Ehermann, The '1992 Project": Stages, Structures, Results and
Projects, 11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1097 (1990).
111. Compare Treaty of Rome, supra note 74, arts. 85-86, 298 U.N.T.S. at 47-49, with 15 U.S.C. §§ I
(1988) et seq. For a recent commentary, see Symposium, Europe 1992: Roundup on the Law and Policitcs of
the European Community, 1991 PROC. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 152, 155, 155-59 (remarks by Diane P. Wood
summarizing the case law gloss).
112. For a description of one government-supported arrangement, see generally United States v.
Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Canter, 1963 Trade Cas. (CCII) $ 70,600 (S.D.N.Y. 1962),judgment
revised, 1965 Trade Cas. (CCII) 71,352 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
113. Cf. NICHOLL & SALMON, supra note 60, at 285. R. J. OvERY, THE ROAD TO WAR 41,168, 305-06
(1989); Wendt, "Economic Appeasement'-A Crisis Strategy, in WOLFGANG MOMMSEN & LUTHER
KETTENACKER, THE FASCIST CHALLENGE AND THE POLICY OF APPEASEMENT 157 (1983). A similar process
occurred episodically in Europe before World War L K. PRmHAM, CARTEL PROBLEMS: AN ANALYSIS OF
COLLECnvE MONOPOLES IN EUROPE wrrH AMERICAN APPLICATION 241-82 (1935), published just before the
German and Italian policies on autarky were promulgated in 1936. Germany and Austria had sought to form a
customs union in 1931, but the 8-7 vote of the World Court held the arrangement invalid under the Treaty of
The Transnational Lawyer/ Vol. 6
D. The Supremacy of Community Law
EC law operates under principles similar to that of the Supremacy Clause of the U.S.
Constitution..'1 4 In the Simmenthal case, the Court of Justice held that national courts had
a duty to apply provisions of Community law and to refuse to apply conflicting national
laws." 5 As Lord Denning of the United Kingdom's Court of Appeal said in an opinion
criticized in some respects," 6
The first and fundamental point is that the Treaty concerns only those matters
which have a European element, that is to say, matters which affect people or
property in the nine [now twelve] countries of the Common Market besides
ourselves. The Treaty does not touch any of the matters which concern solely the
mainland of England and the People in it. These are still governed by English law.
They are not affected by the Treaty. But when we come to matters with a European
element, the Treaty is like an incoming tide. It flows into the estuaries and up the
rivers. It cannot be held back. Parliament has decreed that the Treaty is
henceforward to be part of our law. It is equal in force to any statute. The
governing provision is Section 2(1) of the European Community Act, 1972 ....
The statute is expressed in forthright terms which are absolute and all-embracing.
Any rights or obligations created by the Treaty are to be given legal effect in
England without more ado. Any remedies or procedures provided by the Treaty are
to be made available here without being open to question. In the future, in
transactions which cross the frontiers, we must no longer speak or think of English
law as something on its own. We must speak and think of Community law, of
Community rights and obligations, and we must give effect to them. This means
a great effort for the lawyers. We have to learn a new system. The Treaty, with the
regulations and directives, covers many volumes. The case law is contained in
hundreds of reported cases both in the European Court of Justice and in the national
'St-Germain-en-Laye. Customs Union Between Germany and Austria, 1936 P.C.IJ., Scr. A/B, No. 41, at 73.
Some German industrialists who had supported Adolf Hitler's rise to power opposed the government's autarky
principles, although many profited by them. P. HAYEs, INDUSTRY AND IDEOLOGY: IG FARBEN iN THE NAZI ERA
74-216 (1987); WILLIAM L. SHIRER, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE THIRD REIcH 258-62 (1960). Others, such as
the Krupps, were heavily involved with developing the German war machine and strongly supported the policy.
WILLIAM R. MANCHESTER, THE ARMS OF KRPup 382 (1964). During World War 11 some industries, driven by
the demands of war, formed primitive transnational wartime economic communities for markets, free of tariff
barriers and duties, movement of labor and the rationalization of currencies and basic industries such as coal and
iron, under German control. J. GILiNoHAM, INDusTRY AND PoLrIcs IN THE THIRD REmcH, 117-30, 146-59
(1985); HAYEs, supra at 342-46. These sources indicate that there may have been more diverse forces at work
in the economic arena than the view that industrial autarky and other anticompetitive devices helped propel
Europe into war. From the Nazis' perspective, autarky helped prepare for war, but whether industrial leaders
were active, willing collaborators is open to doubt, except in cases such as the Krupp interests. Indeed, as
GILLINOHAM, supra points out, once war came, certain sectors of German industry engaged in the same kind
of rationalization-by which more efficient production was to be accomplished-as free trade would have
promoted, albeit under the umbrella of military occupation.
114. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cL. 2.
115. Case 106/77, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal S.p.A., 1978 E.C.R. 629,644.
116. Eg. KAPETYN & VAN THEMAAT, supra note 60, at 315; see also id. at 350.
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courts of the Nine [now twelve]. Many must be studied before the right result can
be reached. We must get down to it. 17
Justice Van Devanter spoke as eloquently on the impact of the Constitution's Supremacy
Clause in the context of the primacy of the Federal Employers' Liability Act in the State
courts:
The suggestion that the act of Congress is not in harmony with the policy of the
State, and therefore that the courts of the state are free to decline jurisdiction, is
quite inadmissible, because it presupposes what in legal contemplation does not
exist. When Congress, in the exertion of the power confided to it by the
Constitution adopted that act, it spoke for all the people and all the states, and
thereby established a policy for all. That policy is as much the policy of
Connecticut as if the act had emanated from its own legislature, and should be
respected accordingly in the courts of the state.118
Thus, although the European Parliament has no power to tax and only a limited power to
legislate,119 the Commission, the Council, and the Court of Justice are developing a
considerable body of law for an economic union that exceeds the United States in population
and Gross Domestic Product.12 The problem is more acute for U.S. interests, in terms of
international business relationships, because of the possibility of extraterritorial application
of EC law' 2'and because of the risk of conflicting standards between U.S. law, particularly
federal law, and the law of EC member nations. 22 Recent decisions demonstrate the
strength of the U.S. Constitution's reservation of all other powers to the States of the Union
or to the people,' and there has been talk of such a stated philosophy within the EC.124
E. Human Rights and Civil Rights
Although the business aspects of Community law have held the spotlight for many in
America, there has been a parallel development in the human rights movement in Europe.
This movement is roughly analogous to the development of civil rights, primarily through
117. H. P. Bulmer Ltd. v. J. Bollinger S.A., 2 C.M.L.R. 91 (C.A. 1974)
118. Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 223 U.S. 1, 57 (1912). See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947)
(stating the obligation of state courts to enforce federal statutes even if they would be considered "penal" in
nature).
119. Cf U.S. CONST. art. , § 8, cl. 1, 18. See also supra note 55.
120. Cf. STEIN, Er AL., supra note 60, at 2 (1985 Supp.).
121. KAPETYN & vAN THEMAAT, supra note 60, at 516. For analysis of comparable principles in United
States law, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 6, §§ 402-03, 415.
122. See, e.g. the conflicts in the Laker Airways litigation, summarized in RESTATEMEN (THIRD), supra
note 6, § 403, r.n. 6-7.
123. U.S. CONST. amend. X; see also Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1988) and cases like Volt
Information Services, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University, 489 U.S. 468, 475-79
(1989).
124. William E. Schmidt, European Unity: Reaffirming Respect for Diversity, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1992,
at 12. Under the general principles of state sovereignty, that has been implicit all along. Case of the S.S. Lotus
(Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.IJ. (Ser. A) No. 10, at 18, 18.
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federal legislation, in the U.S.'25 Along with the European Convention on Human
Rights, 2 6 Community institutions have promoted an "emerging European
constitution."" 7 For example, the EC Court of Justice has ruled in favor of equal pay for
equal work, holding specifically on the basis of Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome that
female flight attendants were entitled to the same salary as males.2 8 The Maastricht
Treaty has added certain rights to vote and to stand for office. 9
F. Has the Community Achieved Statehood Status for Purposes of Treaty Succession?
Commentators have traditionally recognized four indicia of statehood:
[A]n entity that [consists of] [1] a defined territory and [2] a permanent population,
[3] under the control of its own government, and [4] that engages in, or has the
capacity to engage in, formal relations with other such entities. 3 '
If "defined territory" equates with national sovereignty over at least some part of the
territory, then the Community lacks that aspect of statehood.13 ' Similarly, since EC
Members have the authority to recall their citizens for certain purposes, the Maastricht
citizenship formula 32 does not eliminate the Members' personal jurisdiction over their
nationals. 133 Although EC organs possess some power of governance and a capacity to
enter into foreign relations, 34 the Community does not have full powers. Presently EC
members must consult with each other if there are "serious internal disturbances affecting
public order,... war or of serious international tension constituting a threat of war or in
order to carry out undertakings into which it has entered [to maintain] peace and international
security." 1
35
125. The states of the United States have been active, to a greater or lesser degree, in this field too. See,
e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99D-1 (1987).
126. See supra note 68.
127. Symposium, The Emerging European Constitution, 1978 PRoc. AM. SoC'Y INT'L L. 166, 169
(Remarks of Eric Stein). For current analysis, see A. ARNuLL, Ti GENERAL PRINcipLES O1' EC LAW AND TrlE
INDIVIDUAL (1990).
128. Defrenne v. SABENA, 1976 E. Comm. J. Rep. 455, 473-76.
129. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
130. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 6, § 201; cf. Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties
of States, Dec. 26, 1933,. art. 1, 48 Stat. 3097, 3100, 165 L.N.T.S. 19, 25; for analysis of U.N. Membership,
as distinguished from statehood, see supra note 11. Recently some states have added a requirement that the new
state indicate its commitment to human rights and other basic principles of international law. See, e.g., European
Community, supra note 13. The Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Committee, Opinion No. 1, confirmed
the traditional attributes of statehood. 31 I.L.M. 1494, 1495.
131. Symposium, The European Community-International Personality Pre- and Post-1992, 1990 PRoc.
AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 213, 215-17 (1991) (remarks by Torsten Stein).
132. See supra notes 84, 128 and accompanying text.
133. Stein, supra note 131, at 215, referring to Witzemann v. Hauptzollamt Munchken Mitle, Case No.
C-343/89, 1990 E.C.R. - (not yet published). Juliane Kokott, European Community Case Note: Witzemann
v. Hauptzollamt Munchen Mine, Case No. C 343/89, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 564 (1991).
134. The Treaty of Rome, supra note 74, arts. 145, 298 U.N.T.S. at 69, 92, authorizes the Council to
conclude treaties with other states or unions of states, or international organizations.
135. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text. See also Charles Ludolph, Remarks, quoted in Panel,
The European Community-International Personality Pre- and Post-1992,1990 PRoc. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 213,
220-21 (1991) (describing the relationship between defense-related trade and the EC policy for competition in
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The Maastricht Treaty, when it comes into force, will only look to the time when the
Community might articulate a "common defense." For now, the Community will look to
WEU, which considers itself but one pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.'3 6 There are neutral
EFTA states, for example Austria, Sweden, and Switzerland, some of which have interest
in EC membership, for which the Maastricht link to the WEU may cause problems.
137
However, the adjective "common" is a reinforcement for the declaration in article F(1) and
elsewhere in the Maastricht Treaty that the European Union shall respect the national
identities of its Member States.
38
Because the Community has no sovereignty over the Member states' territory, limited
control over the population, limited governance powers, and a bifurcated arrangement for
coordinating foreign relations,139 and most particularly because the Community treaties
have declared the separateness of its Members as states, the EC would not become a single
state after Maastricht. The Community would remain a customs union, perhaps occupying
approximately the position of the world's nations just before the San Francisco conference
that produced the U.N. Charter in 1945.140 The law of treaties, represented by the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, 14' not the law of treaty succession, 142 is the body of
law governing the conventions of the Community. And because the principles of the
Convention would apply to the EC if and when all its members ratify the Maastricht Treaty,
the law of treaties, not the law of treaty succession, would also govern NAFTA parties'
treaty arrangements if and when that Agreement comes into force. Neither the Maastricht
Treaty nor NAFTA would destroy the sovereignty of its treaty partners. And as Part Im
demonstrates, the law of treaties, as well as the law of treaty succession, also affects the
succeeding states of Eastern Europe.
m. DISINTEGRATION AND UNION IN CENTRAL AND
EASTERN EUROPE: LEGAL CONSEQUENCES
The disappearance of the Soviet Union and the end of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia
prompt two inquiries: (1) To what extent are the spin-off entities "states" as a matter of
international law? and (2) what are the results for the web of treaties developed by the prior
regime?
other lines).
136. EC Members can take measures for protecting their security in connection with arms production and
war materials; these are exempted from the Community competition rules. If the disturbances, armed conflict
or war production distort competition, the Commission and the state(s) affected must examine conditions under
which these measures may be adopted to Community competition rules. There is also a right of resort to the
Court of Justice for an in camera hearing. Treaty of Rome, supra note 74, arts. 223-25, 298 U.N.T.S. at 88.
137. Neutrals' accessions to the Community after the Maastricht Treaty is ratified can be accomplished
if the Community and its Members agree on an appropriate Protocol, as has occurred many times before, or if
the neutrals accede without such, thereby giving up their neutrality to that extent.
138. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
139. For a graphic analysis of this point, see Symposium, supra note 131, at 217-18 (remarks by Harold
K. Jacobsen).
140. See Symposium, supra note 11, at 162-164 (remarks by Cynthia C. Lichtenstein). Lichtenstein also
sees the centralization of currency policy as an important diminution of sovereignty. IcL
141. Vienna Convention, supra note 6.
142. Drafters of the Vienna Treaty Succession Convention, supra note 38, deliberately avoided inclusion
of "hybrid unions" such as the EC, within the purview of the Convention. Sinclair, supra note 38, at 181-82,
citing ILC Report, supra note 38, at 253.
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A. Indicia of Statehood; Recognition of States
The Baltic nations of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have been recognized as states, as
have all CIS members 143 and Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina.144 All
enjoy, or have enjoyed, U.N. Membership, which may have different criteria from the
traditional four attributes of statehood. 45 The narrower statehood issues may relate, in the
near term, to separatist entities such as Tatarstan within Russia, Ngomo-Karabakh within
Azerbaijan, the Dniester Republic within Moldova, or the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina. 146
If any of the recently-recognized states founders by losing its territory, losing control
of its governance, losing its capacity to engage in foreign relations, or losing any
combination of the attributes of statehood, it may disappear as a state. 47 By the early
winter of 1992-93, Bosnia and Herzegovina had lost over two thirds of its territory, 48 and
this newly-recognized state may lose its status soon. The Republic of Georgia may be
another candidate.' 49
A additional possibility is a coalition that may pass for statehood. International
organizations can possess a separate personality if they have:
(1) A permanent association of states, with lawful objects, equipped with organs;
(2) a distinction, in terms of legal powers and purposes, between the organization
and its member states; and
(3) the existence of legal powers exercisable on the international plane and not
solely within the national systems of one or more states. 50
143. See supra notes 9-14.
144. See supra notes 15-18.
145. See REsTATEdENT (rRD), supra note 6, § 201 and analysis supra note 129 and accompanying text.
The constituent republics of the Soviet Union could not have been states at the time of their departure from the
USSR, because responsibility for foreign relations was charged to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs
of the USSR. See Notification by the Soviet Union, July 23, 1923, reprinted in ILC Report, supra note 38, at
254.
146. See supra notes 19, 24, 27, 29-30 and accompanying text.
147. HANS KELSEN, PINCiPLEs OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 263-64 (1952). Conference for Peace in
Yugoslavia, Arbitration Commission, Opinion No. 10, 31 I.L.M. 1525, 1526 (1992) was of the opinion that the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) was a "new state" and not the successor to the former
Yugoslavia. Although complete loss of a population would appear impossible, it would seem that Iraq may have
had that in mind for Kuwait. S.C. Res. 677, U.N. Doe. S/RES/677 (1990), reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1564 (1990);
see also George K. Walker, The Crisis Over Kuwait, August 1990-February 1991, 1991 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L
L. 25, 39 n. 77.
148. See supra note 16. A U.N.-backed peace plan under negotiation in early January 1993 would divide
Bosnia and Herzegovina into ethnically-oriented areas as a "last chance for peace." David Binder, Balkan
Factions Begin New Talks, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 1993, § 1 at 1.
149. Eduard Shevardnadze, head of the provisional State Council of Georgia, is not in full command of
what he has characterized as a "semi-legitimate, semi-Govenment." Erlanger, supra note 13. He should know
the legal situation better than most; he is the former USSR foreign minister.
150. BROWNLIE, supra note 38, at 681-82, summarizing Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service
of the United Nations, 1949 I.CJ. 174, 178-79.
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Thus, international organizations, such as the EC, may have an international personality,'15
but this does not make them states. The distinction between an international organization
and a state is that the latter controls its own governance and has at least the capacity to enter
into foreign relations, while the organization includes several states, each of whom has its
own legal powers distinct from the those of the organization.
The relationship of the EC to its members might be compared with the apparent
ambiguity of the CIS. The initial December 8,1991 Agreement which established the CIS
included provisions for joint command and control of military forces, particularly nuclear
weapons; "common coordinating institutions" for foreign policy; cooperation in formation
and development of "common economic space and Europe-wide and Eurasian markets and
... customs policy," while speaking of "negotiations between the appropriate organs, and
if necessary at the state and governmental level" in resolving disputes under the Agreement;
and the location of the "coordinating organs" at Minsk.5 2 These arrangements appear, at
least in the defense arena, to go beyond the powers of the EC. The Alma Ata Declaration,
which came out two weeks later, asserted that the "Commonwealth... is neither a State nor
a supra-State entity," while it confirmed the marketing arrangements of the Agreement, the
disappearance of the USSR, and a guarantee of performance of treaties entered into by the
former Soviet Union.' Nevertheless, a contemporaneous agreement speaks of "a
supreme organ of the Commonwealth, the Council of Heads of State,... as well as a
Council of Heads of Government... and.., coordinating bodies of the Common-
wealth." 4
How much of the December 8 Agreement, signed only by Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine,
remains after the Alma Ata accords, signed by 11 of the 12 former Soviet republics,15 is
therefore conjectural. A judicious combination of applying the later-in-time rule5 6 and
applying the terms of the treaty, taken in their context and in the light of their object and
purpose, plus subsequent practice and the relevant rules of international law,'57 is
necessary to determine the meaning of the new arrangements, which were conceived,
negotiated, and signed in the shadow of deadlock over a new Soviet Treaty to replace the
151. Cf. BROWNLIE, supra note 38, at 682. The Treaty of Rome, supra note 74, art. 210, 298 U.N.T.S.
at 86, declares that "The Community shall have legal personality," but that statement alone would not necessarily
grant the EC legal personality.
152. CIS Agreement, supra note 9, arts. 6-7, 9, 14, 31 I.L.M. at
144-46.
153. Compare Alma Ata Declaration, supra note 9, at 148-49 with CIS Agreement, supra note 9 of
preamble, arts. 7, 12-13, at 143-46.
154. Agreement on Coordinating Bodies of the Commonwealth of Independent States, Dec. 21, 1991, at
150. Agreement on the Protection of the State Boundaries and Maritime Economic Zones of the State-
Participants of the Commonwealth of Independent States, Mar. 20, 1992, art. 4, at 496, 497. This agreement
commits the CIS Council of Heads of States and the Council of Heads of Governments to coordinating and
effectuating protection of the CIS borders and maritime zones; the unified command of the border forces is
charged with carrying out the Councils' decisions. Id.
155. The Republic of Georgia has since acceded to the agreements.
156. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 6, art. 30, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 340. Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations, Mar. 20, 1986, art. 30, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.129/15 (1986), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 543,561-62 (1986). See also IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA
CoNvENTIoN ON THE LAW Op TREATIEs 94-98 (2d ed. 1984).
157. Vienna Convention, supra note 6, art. 31, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 340; Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties between States and International Organizationm% Mar. 20, 1986, art. 31, U.N. Doe. A/CONF.129/15
(1986), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 562-63. This rule probably restates customary law. SINCLAIR, supra note 156, at
19. See also id. at 115-40.
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1922 Union Treaty.'58 For now, it appears that the title of the CIS, "Commonwealth of
Independent States," articulates its function in international law: it is a federation of
independent nations loosely bound for certain purposes, such as self-defense, which articles
51 and 52 of the U.N. Charter permit. If the CIS system fails and the process of
disint6gration descends further, so that formerly autonomous regions such as Abkhazia or
Tatarstan 5 9 begin picking up real authority as states, the legal problems at the CIS level
may result in a proliferation of 20 or 30 more "states" and another round of applications for
U.N. Membership.
B. Recognition of Governments
Thus far the world community, including the U.S., has recognized the new governments
of the former Soviet satellites as the legitimate governments of their countries. The U.S. has
occasionally deferred recognition of a government, such as Soviet Georgia's government,
until there has been assurance that it will observe the norms of basic human rights. The
practice with respect to Georgia, and in 1991 with respect to U.S. recognition of the Baltic
States' governments, where the United States had never recognized their absorption into the
USSR in 1941,16 demonstrates the point that recognition of a state and recognition of an
effective government are two distinct, executive decisions.' Given the turbulent state of
Eastern Europe, it is quite likely that there will be turnovers in governments.1 62
If the U.S. does not recognize the succeeding government, it cannot assert rights to
government assets in the courts of the U.S. 16 3 However, certain private rights may be
asserted.' 64 To allow an unrecognized government to sue in the U.S. courts would be
tantamount to recognition by the judiciary, a function reserved by the Constitution to the
executive." The situation in Eastern Europe has not yet changed to the point where the
recognition issue, and resulting problems for civil litigation and antecedent business
relationships, might arise. The United States, like most states, was relatively prompt in
recognizing the new governments in the former Soviet Bloc nations of Bulgaria,
158. Cf. Declaration by the Heads of State of Belanis, Russia, and Ukraine, Dec. 8, 1991,31 I.L.M. 142
(1992).
159. See supra note 13.
160. See supra note 11.
161. RESTAmENT1 (Hnm),supra note 6, § 203, cmt. a; § 204. A change of governments does not affect
boundaries established by treaties. Surya P. Sharma, The India-China Border Dispute: An Indian Perspective,
59 AM. J. INT'L L. 16, 45-47 (1965); accord, Harvard Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, arts. 24, 26,
29; Surpp. 657, 662 (1935), which adds the caveat of impossibility of performance.
162. 1 OPPENHEiM, INTERNATONAL LAW (Hersch Leuterpacht ed., 7th ed. 1948) § 521 n. 1.
163. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 410-11 (1964) (dictum); Guaranty Trust Co.
v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 137-41 (1938); RESTATEMENT (1'-D), supra note 6, § 204. But see National
Petrochem. Co. of Iran v. M/T Stolt Sheaf, 860 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1081 (1989)
(agency of nonrecognized government may sue where U.S. amicus brief urged such) and compare Republic of
Viet Nam v. Pfizer Inc., 556 F.2d 892 (8th Cir. 1977).
164. See, e.g. National Petrochem. Co., supra note 163; Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 262 N.Y.
220, 186 N.E. 679 (1933); Upright v. Mercury Bus. Mach. Co., 13 App. Div.2d 36, 213 N.Y.S.2d 417 (1961).
165. U.S. CoNsT., art. 1I, §§ 2-3 (power to appoint, receive ambassadors). See also United States v.
Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942). There is a rough analogy to the
unrecognized government principle in the States' use of door-closer statutes, e.g. N.C. GENq. STAT. § 55-15-02
(1992). Such statutes are valid under U.S. law. Cf. Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949),
overruling earlier cases that said that although such statutes were valid as between the state courts, they could
not deprive federal courts of jurisdiction. See also Allen v. Alleghany Co., 196 U.S. 458, 465 (1905).
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Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Romania. The U.S. does not recognize Iran's present
government, 166 and similar problems may be in store for Iraq. These principles have
obvious implications for U.S. lawyers in private practice.
C. Moving Borders Around and Independence: Problems Involving the CIS Republics,
Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia
Another aspect of the change in Eastern Europe is the problem of border adjustments
and proclamations of independence. Although the Polish border with Germany has been
validated, the scope of existing treaty law is an issue with respect to Czechoslovakia,
Yugoslavia, and the former USSR because of their dissolution into separate nations, the
possibility of further divisions in Russia and elsewhere, and the combination of states as in
the CIS arrangement. This is particularly important given the insistence of the former USSR,
and therefore, perhaps, of its successors, on the primacy of treaties.
167
A look at the law of international agreements and how those rules may be affected by
territorial changes or succeeding states is appropriate. Particular attention will therefore be
paid to recent multilateral conventions that "codified" the law to some extent, especially the
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties'68 and the 1978 Vienna Convention on
Succession of States in Respect of Treaties,'69 which was drafted within the framework of
the law of treaties rather than from the perspective of a succession's impact on a treaty
regime,17 notwithstanding what its title may imply. Although the U.S. is not a party to
either agreement, the "Treaty on Treaties" has been ratified by at least 63 states,'7 ' and the
U.S. Department of State and U.S. courts have recognized major parts of the Convention as
restating customary law.17' The Treaty Succession Convention has enjoyed a more modest
following; although it purports to restate customary principles most of the time, there
are some hiatuses. 74 Nevertheless, its format is useful for this analysis, and relevant
166. See National Petrochem Co., supra note 163.
167. GRIGORY .TUNKIN, THEORY OF INT'ERNATIONAL LAW 133-36 (William A. Butter transl. 1974); John
N. Hazard, Soviet Tactics in International Law Making, 7 DEN. J. INT'L L. & PoL 9, 11, 31 (1977); I. L
Lukashak, The Principle Pacta Sunt Servanda and the Nature of Obligation Under International Law, 83 AM.
J. INT'L L. 513 (1989); see also North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (FRG v. Den., FRG v. Neth.), 1969 I.CJ.
4, 155, 156, 169 (Koretzky, J.). This view, along with everything else in the former Soviet Union, may be
changing rapidly. Compare, e.g., IGOR BLISCHENKO, INTERNATIONAL HUMANrrARIAN LAW 17 (Ivan Chulaki
transl. 1989) and Richard Szawlowski, Book Review, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 595 (1990) with R. A. Mullerson,
Sources of International Law: New Tendencies in Soviet Thinking, 83 id. 494, 501-09 (1989).
168. Vienna Convention, supra note 6, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
169. Vienna Treaty Succession Convention, supra note 38, 17 I.L.M. 1488.
170. ILC Report, supra note 38, at 168; Caggiano, supra note 38, at 70; Sinclair, supra note 38, at 153,
157-58.
171. UNITED NATIONS, supra note 39, at 803, lists 15 more states as nonparty signatories.
172. RESTATEMENT (T-maD), supra note 6, Part II: Introductory Note, at 145.
173. UNITED NATIONS, supra note 39, at 813, listing 8 parties and 24 signatories. See supra note 43 and
accompanying text.
174. Compare, e.g. BROWNLIE, supra note 38, at 668; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 6, § 208, r. n.
4, which notes that the Succession Convention provisions "appear to be of modest utility for the Foreign
Relations Law of the United States," THE EFFEcr OF INDEPENDENCE ON TREATIES, supra note 38, at xiii (1965);
Sinclair, supra note 38, at 153; Stewart, supra note 38, at 639; with ILC Report, supra note 38, at 167, 170,211.
The International Law Commission, created as a subsidiary organ of the U.N. General Assembly, has had a
membership of different political standpoints that combines technical expertise and experience in government.
In practice the Commission has not maintained strict separation of its tasks of codification and progressive
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provisions will be considered, with exceptions noted where the Succession Convention
appears to depart from customary practice.
The value of the Convention is complicated, or perhaps compromised further, because
it attempts to take into account both the views of the newly independent countries and
custom purportedly arising from the circumstances of their statehood, as well as the relevant
practice of older nations.175 This attempt to straddle two bodies of relatively inconsistent
claims to the content of the law, while choosing neither, may further explain why the
Convention has had a low acceptance rate. 176 Moreover, the utility of the Convention, to
the extent that it does not restate customary law, would not have binding effect on any newly
independent state whose predecessor is a Convention partner.'" Finally, with the passage
of time, its lack of ratifications is arguably a "silent rejection of the treaty." 78
The Succession Convention is but the latest attempt to formulate coherent theories to
regularize principles of treaty succession. Four themes have been advanced, all of which
may be observed in the Convention.' 79 Hugo Grotius analogized states to a people, and
upon change of sovereignty, that is, decease of the predecessor or separation, all rights and
obligations would devolve on the new state or states.' This theory of universal
succession perhaps lies behind the European states' practice of devolution agreements to
pass down a treaty regime from a colonial power to a newly independent state.'
Universal succession is akin in result to the doctrine of continuity, which says that the
personality of the predecessor is extinguished, and as an immediate consequence of this
dissolution of legal personality, the successor assumes its predecessor's international rights
and obligations as if they were its own.8 2 The result is that the successor may choose
which treaties it will attempt to retain and which ones it will denounce,' which is one root
of the contemporary practices of unilateral declaration, the temporizing Nyerere Doctrine,




Yet another theory is the "moving treaty frontiers" doctrine, which can be seen as an
offshoot of the Grotius theory of universal succession. Under this doctrine, a treaty regime
development of the law. HERBERT W. BRIGGS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION (1969); BROWNLIP, supra
note 38, at 30-31; Herbert W. Briggs, Reflections on the Codification of International Law by the International
Law Commission and by OtherAgencies, 126 RECUmiL DES CouRs 233 (1969); Jennings, supra note 48, at 310-
29; Hersch Lauterpacht, Codification and Development of International Law, 49 AM. J. INT'L L. 16 (1955);
Shabtai Rosenne, The International Law Commission, 1949-59, 30 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 104 (1960).
175. Sinclair, supra note 38, at 156-57, citing ILC Report, supra note 38, at 167; see also Caggiano, supra
note 38, at 82.
176. See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
177. Caggiano, supra note 38, at 71.
178. Richard R. Baxter, Treaties and Custom, 129 RECUEIL DES CoURs 25, 100 (1970). To the extent that
the Maastricht Treaty, would attempt to state positive law, its failure to come into force after rejection by EC
members is an example of this principle. See supra note 2.
179. LuNO-FoNO CHEN, STATE SUCCESSION RELATING TO UNEQUAL TREATIES 15-19 (1974) lists four;
I O'CoNNEL., supra note 39, at 8-35, counts about nine.
180. HUO GROTIUS, DE JuRI BELLI Er PAcis 315-19 (Francis W. Kelsey trans. 1913).
181. See infra notes 244-45 and accompanying text.
182. See 1 CoNNECL, supra note 39, at 12-13 (labeling the concept as a "theory of organic
substitution"). I L. OPPENlEIm, supra note 162, § 80. See also 1 O'CONNELL, supra at 14, who discusses the
related "theory of self-abnegation.-
183. CUEN, supra note 179, at 17-18.
184. See infra note 260 and accompanying text.
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follows state borders as they expand or contract.s This concept has also been articulated
in the Convention' 6
The "clean slate doctrine," sometimes styled as the imperative theory, declares that a
successor, particularly a new state emerging from a colonial regime, begins international life
unhampered with the conventional baggage of its predecessor." 7 There are, of course,
elements of the clean slate doctrine in the current unilateral declaration, Neyerere, and total
rejection practices of states. However, devolution practice arguably nods in this direction
by attempting to commit a new state to all or part of its predecessor's treaty regime as of the
approximate time of its independence. 8 It must be noted that those doctrines do not apply
to a succession of governments, although both the Soviet Union and Hitler's Third Reich
flirted with claiming a clean break with the past.8 9
Treaty succession problems are but one part of the larger issue of succession to internal
law, state properties, state debts, and other obligations or rights such as nationality. The
recent agreement between Russia and Ukraine concerning the Black Sea fleet' is the most
visible of these issues. Others have included title to Soviet property in the CIS republics' 9'
and, most ominously, control of the former USSR's nuclear weapons.'92 Germany has
supplied a model for these thorny issues19 with its comprehensive treaty arrangement upon
unification in 1990,' and ideally, this procedure will be followed in Eastern Europe.
Although the treaty succession problem has been analyzed almost as an afterthought to the
185. CHEN, supra note 179, at 18-19.
186. See infra note 211 and accompanying text.
187. CHEN, supra note 179, at 16-17; 1 O'CONNEL, supra note 38, at 15-17.
188. See infranotes 244-45 and accompanying text.
189. Detlev F. Vagts, International Law in the Third Reich, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 661, 689-90 (1990); see
also Boleslaw A. Boczek, The Soviet Union and the Antarctic Regime, 78 AM J. INT'L L. 834, 841 (1984).
190. Ukraine Accused of Ship Thievery, Wash. Times, July 23, 1992, at 9, which also records Ukraine's
attempts to lure Russian naval personnel and their ships into Ukrainian control. The Black Sea fleet is a
microcosmic mirror of the uncertainty and misery pervading the former Soviet Union. Adi Ignatious, Black Sea
Fleet Stranded in Tug-of War, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17, 1992, at A8; Polmar, supra note 13. For a general view
of the misery in Ukraine at large, see Serge Schmemann, Ukraine Facing the High Costs of Democracy, N.Y.
TIMS, Nov. 6, 1992, at 1. Without the agreement, Ukraine would have had naval bases without a navy. The
Yugoslav navy has a more difficult situation: perilous access to its only remaining base, Kotor Bay, due to the
independence of Croatia and loss of nearly all the Dalmatian coast. John F. Burns, Croats Return to Stronghold
on Adriatic, N.Y. TImEs, Dec. 11, 1992, at A9.
191. Robert Keatley, Ukrainian-Russian Dispute Over Assets Revives Old Distrust Between Neighbors,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 16, 1992, at A19; Russia has assumed 85 percent of the loans made to the former Soviet
Union through December 31,1991. Russia also agreed to pay Ukraine's share in exchange for Ukraine's waiving
claim to assets held by Russia, e.g. ownership stake in overseas embassies. Russia is completing similar
negotiations with other former Soviet republics. Louis Uchitelle, New Man, Old Burden: Moscow Owes $86
Billion, N.Y. TaiEs, Dec. 16, 1992, at A14. Czechoslovakia's assets are also being divided, with fixtures and
buildings belonging to the new state in which they are located. Czechs and Slovaks, supra note 21.
192. See CIS Agreement, supra note 9, art. 6, 31 1.L.M. 144; Alma Ata Declaration, supra note 9.
193. The Vienna State Property Succession Convention, supra note 38,22 I.L.M. 306, had only lukewarm
support in the U.N. General Assembly (54 votes in favor, 11 including the United States opposed, and 11
abstentions). No state has become party to the Convention, and only 8 states had signed it as of 1990. UNITED
NATIONS, supra note 39, at 93. Thus the principal source for this question has been an amalgam of treaties after
the fact, custom, and judicial decisions. See generally, e.g., BROWNLE, supra note 38, at 654-67, 673-75; 1
HACKWORTH, DIGEsT ch. IV, §§ 78-82; 1 MooRE, DIGEsT §§ 92-99; 1 O'CoNNELL, supra note 39; 2
WHrrEMAN, DIGEsT, ch. IV.
194. See generally Treaty Establishing A Monetary Economic and Social Union, supra note 35, arts. 10-35,
and Annexes I-IX, 29 1.L.M. at 1125-45, 1153-85 (1990).
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general problem of succession in other aspects of such transitions, treaty issues should have
initial consideration. If a treaty governing certain property or transactions survives the
transition of states, and particularly if there is consistent practice under it, then the tangle of
customary law issues addressed by the commentators has less chance of arising. 9 '
1. Territorial Scope ofAgreements
The basic, common-sense rule is that a treaty applies to all of a nation's territory unless
the treaty states otherwise.'96 A recent example is the inapplicability of the NATO Treaty
to the 1980-88 Tanker War in the Persian Gulf. NATO members would have been required
to respond only if attack had occurred in Europe, North America, or Turkey, including the
North Atlantic area and islands north of the Tropic of Cancer or the Mediterranean Sea.
Response is also required if ships or aircraft under a member's jurisdiction are attacked."97
Thus, the NATO members' contribution to freedom of navigation claims in the Tanker War
was on the basis of comity, or perhaps self-interest, and not treaty obligation. 98 By
contrast, if Iraq had attacked Turkey during the 1991 Gulf War, NATO would have been
activated."9 On the other hand, if Iraq attacked French or U.K. possessions in the Indian
Ocean, the NATO agreement would not have applied. In some cases, a treaty will invite
parties to state to which of their territories the agreement applies.200
An important implied exception is the agreement that is obviously intended for
application in a certain area.2"' Examples include the European Community agreements
or the European human rights convention, which do not apply directly to other nations, or
terms within a treaty of general application. For example, the provisions in the U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea which apply to warship passage in the territorial sea
obviously have no direct relevance to high seas transit. °2 Such treaties' terms may be said
to be declaratory of custom, however, in analogous contexts.
In terms of boundary regimes, use of a territory, or restrictions on the use of a territory,
the Succession Convention provides that a succession of states does not affect the prior treaty
regime.2 3 The sole exception relates to foreign military bases. 2° The successor state
195. Cf. .CJ. STATUTE, art. 38(1); RESTATEMENT (THIR), supra note 6, § 102.
196. Vienna Convention, supra note 6, art. 29, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 339; accord, RESTATEMENT (THIRD),
supra note 6, § 322(2). See also SINCLAIR, supra note 156 at 89-92.
197. North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, art. 6, 63 Stat. at 2244, 34 U.N.T.S. at 245, as modified by
Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of Greece and Turkey, Oct. 17, 1951, art. 2, 3 U.S.T.
44, 126 U.N.T.S. 350. See also supra note 6.
198. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT oF STATE, WESTERN DEFENSE: THE EUROPEAN RoLE IN NATO 16-17
(1988); Peter Hayes, Chronology 1987, 66 FOREIGN AFF. 653, 660 (1988).
199. Walker, supra note 147, at 44.
200. An example is the U.N. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
June 10, 1958, art. 10, 21 U.S.T. 2517,2521,330 U.N.T.S. 3,44. See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
supra note 10, at 284 (providing a list of territorial declarations made under the Convention).
201. SINCLAIR, supra note 156, at 88-92.
202. Compare U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982 (hereinafter UNCLOS), arts. 17-26,
29-32, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122 (1982), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1273-76 (1982), with id,. arts. 87-90, 95, 110,
21 1.L.M. 1286-89.
203. Vienna Treaty Succession Convention, supra note 38, arts. 11-12(2), 17 I.L.M. 1494-95, cited with
approval by Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia v. Libya), 1986 I.CJ. 18, 65-66. These provisions
generally comport with customary law. ILC Report, supra note 38, at 196-208; 2 O'CONNELL, supra note 38,
at 12-24 (1967), which nctes the traditional terminology of treaties involving "real" interests, i.e. boundaries,
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also retains "permanent sovereignty... over its natural wealth and resources. 2 5 This last
provision presumably would spell trouble for predecessor state treaties related to exploitation
of natural resources in an area such as the Exclusive Economic Zone offshore from a coastal
nation. Whether the military bases exception has a foundation in customary law is
questionable, 2 " but the permanent sovereignty exception apparently has its basis in
General Assembly resolutions that may be grounded in international law today.20 7 The
Restatement (Third), Foreign Relations Law of the United States, appears to make no
exceptions for foreign military bases, because it declares that "[p]re-existing boundary and
other territorial agreements continue to be binding. ... .' These provisions do not answer
the problem of treaty applicability to a territory, as opposed to a treaty's declaration of what
"servitudes," and the use or prohibition on use of territory; RESTATEMENT (THin), supra note 6, § 210(4).
204. Vienna Treaty Succession Convention, supra note 38, art. 12(3), 17 I.L.M. at 1495. Albert J. Esgain,
Military Servitudes and the New Nations, in O'BRiEN, supra note 38, at 42, 95-97 concluded that the whole
concept of military servitudes had been refuted by state practice, and that those servitudes that survived a state
succession did so because of a treaty between the new state and the dominant state, with the principle of self-
determination (see U.N. CHARTER, arts. 1(1), 55) being a major factor in the post-Charter era calculus. To the
extent that "negative" servitudes, ie. those that providing for non-fortified areas, see Esgain, supra at 87-93, are
included, such a broad-brush pronouncement may result in more areas that could be militarized by new states,
rather then less. See O'Connell, supra note 38, at 10 (noting that the military base issue is an example of the
artificial characterization of succession situations within legal terms to suit a particular political circumstance,
noting the differences between the U.S. base leases in the British West Indies, and the Guantanamo naval base
in Cuba).
205. Vienna Treaty Succession Convention, supra note 38, art. 13, 17 I.L.M. at 1495.
206. Compare, e.g., ILC Report, supra note 38, at 203, (such a provision would be reflective of practice,
citing Esgain, supra note 204) with 2 O'CoNNw.tL, supra note 38, published in 1967 and not cited (contra).
CHEN, supra note 179, at 172-74, 213-15, would apply the unequal treaties doctrine to succession of these kinds
of treaties under certain circumstances. For analysis of the unequal treaties doctrine in the law of treaties context,
see infra notes 273-74 and accompanying text. Ambassador Richard D. Kearney, chair of the U.S. delegation
to the Treaty Succession Convention, perceptively stated in his Report to the Secretary of State (Sept. 12, 1977),
reprinted in Law of Treaties and Other International Agreements: Observance, Application and Interpretation:
Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, in 1977 DIOEsT § 2, at 386, the "paramount importance" of art. 13,
then numbered art. 11, to the Convention. "Disputes over boundaries and boundary regimes have been a most
fertile source of armed conflict among states. If boundary settlements and regimes established by treaty could
be challenged because a succession of states takes place the results could be catastrophic." Id.
207. See Texas Overseas Petrol. Co. v. Libya, 17 I.L.M. 1, 27-31 (Dupuy, Arb., 1977) (noting that U.N.
General Assembly resolutions are only recommendatory under U.N. CHARTER, art. 10 (as distinguished from
mandatory Security Council "decisions" under id., arts. 25,48, and sub silentio that the "permanent sovereignty"
principles of, e.g., Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281, art. 2(1), U.N. Doc.
A/RESI3281 (1975), reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 251,252-53 (1975); PermanentSovereignty Over Natural Resources,
G.A. Res. 3171, art. 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3171 (1974), reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 238, 239 (1974); Permanent
Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803, art. 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/1803 (1962), reprinted in 2
I.L.M. 223 (1963) are therefore not binding as resolutions or as customary law). On this point, as opposed to
the compensation issue in Texas Overseas in which the arbitrator held against Resolutions 3171 and 3168 as not
declaring the law, the similarity of language in all three resolutions on permanent sovereignty would appear to
have been strong evidence, in 1978 when the Convention was adopted, of ex lata. Compare RESTATEMENT
(THURD), supra note 6, § 103(2)(d) & cmt. c. Neither the military bases exception nor the permanant sovereignty
statement were in the treaty draft from the ILC. Compare ILC Report, supra note 38, at 196, 208, with Vienna
Treaty Succession Convention, supra note 38, arts. 12(3), 13, 17 1.L.M. at 1495. These additions were among
the principal objections to the Convention and may be among the reasons why the Convention has not received
many signatures or ratifications. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
208. They are not subject to the moving-treaty-frontiers rule or principles associated with merged states
or newly independent states. RESTATEMENT ClTmRD), supra note 6, § 210(4). See also infra notes 234-35 and
accompanying text.
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the territory is. The latter pass through treaty successionunaffected, except perhaps as to
military bases.
The International Court of Justice appears to have given sub silentio approval of this
principle in the Right of Passage Case, which cited agreements between Indian princes and
Portugal and between Portugal and Great Britain,2°9 which treaties were concluded long
before Indian independence in 1947. The International Law Association took the interesting
position that if a boundary treaty has been "executed," meaning that the boundary has been
delimited and no further action has been taken, "the treaty has spent its force and what is
succeeded to is not the treaty but the extent of national territory so delimited." If a boundary
treaty provides for future action to delimit it or provides for future reciprocal right relative
to the boundary, then the treaty would be subject to the ILA rules on treaty succession and
therefore would not necessarily be final in nature.210
Nevertheless, the territorial application statement of a predecessor state party to a treaty,
or the treaty itself, may determine whether the successor state can invoke the treaty. If the
predecessor state, or the basic treaty, has declared that the treaty does not apply to the
territory of what becomes the successor state, then the treaty cannot ipso facto bind the
successor state." On the other hand, if the treaty regime does bind the territory
comprehended by the successor state, the successor state is bound by the treaty if it notifies
multilateral treaty partners, or agrees to be bound in the case of a bilateral treaty, subject in
either case to the claims of impossibility of performance or fundamental change of
circumstances.212
The 1991 CIS agreements offer illustrations of both types of treaties involving national
territory. While declaring that the USSR has ceased to exist, the CIS partners "acknowledge
and respect each other's territorial integrity and the inviolability of existing borders within
the Commonwealth." There is also a general undertaking to discharge international
obligations incumbent on CIS members "under treaties and agreements entered into by the
former" USSR, along with a declaration that the Agreement shall not affect obligations of
209. Right of Passage Over Indian Territory Case (Port. v. India), 1960 I.CJ. 6, 37-43.
210. Resolutions: Succession of New States to the Treaties and Certain Other Obligation of Their
Predecessors, 7, in ILA 53D REPORT, supra note 38, at xiv-xv.
211. The Vienna Treaty Succession Convention, supra note 38, does not address the question directly. but
see id., arts. 17-19, 17 I.L.M, at 1497-98 (declaring that such agreements pass to the successor if -in respect of
the territory- to which that succession relates, unless succession would be incompatible with the object and
purpose of the treaty or would radically change conditions for its operation, i.e. performance would be subject
to claims of impossibility or fundamental change of circumstances). The successor must also notify other treaty
partners. See also ILC Report, supra note 38, at 214-22; see also Richard D. Kearney, The Twenty-Sixty Session
of the International Law Commission, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 591, 597 (1975) (characterizing the Convention
language as 'a truncated rebus sic stantibus clause"). Vienna Treaty Succession Convention, supra note 6, art.
22, 17 I.L.M. 1500, recites notification rules. Id., art. 24, 17 I.L.M. 1501, has oblique language, similar to that
in arts. 17-19, concerning territorial application of bilateral agreements, which are considered in effect as
between the successor state and the bilateral partner when the two states agree to be bound or because of their
conduct they can be considered to be bound.
212. See supra note 211. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 6, arts. 61(1), 62(2)(b),
1155 U.N.T.S. at 34, would deny a claim of impossibility or fundamental change to a state that causes the
situation leading to the change. Fundamental change of circumstances is not available as a claim if the treaty
establishes a boundary. Id., art. 62(2)(a), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 347. This difference between nonavailability of the
claim if a boundary treaty is involved and possible availability if territorial applicability is the issue, further
illustrates the distinction between treaties defining a territory and treaties declaring territorial applicability. For
analysis of fundamental change of circumstances in the context of the law of treaties, see infra notes 286-91 and
accompanying text.
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the parties to third states.2 13 With the disappearance of the Soviet Union, and therefore the
succession of the 11 republics, with Georgia to join them soon thereafter, there was no need
to confirm external boundaries of the former USSR with its neighbors.214 Because of the
possibility of disputes over intra-Commonwealth borders, such as the border between Russia
and Ukraine, the borders statement was helpful. The undertaking to observe external treaties
and agreements of the old USSR was, under Succession Convention practice, only the first
of the two-step process toward reaffirmation of these treaties. For multilateral agreements
under the Succession Convention formula, each new state must notify treaty partners of its
membership.2"5 For bilateral agreements, the new state may either seek agreement with
its treaty partner or engage in conduct with the treaty partners so as to indicate
agreement.2"6
The CIS agreements do not resolve all potential problems as to territorial issues. One
major concern for the future may be the status of Soviet military base agreements, which
may become critical if Russia continues to try to protect Russian minorities in some of the
newly independent republics or to assist in restoring order.217 There are two aspects to the
problem. The first is the disappearance of the dominant owner of the servitude. No
historical precedent exists for such a scenario: all cases following World War II have
involved the impact of military base agreements on newly independent states, 21 8 and the
most comprehensive survey of them219 does not demonstrate any case where the dominant
power totally disappeared. Fundamental change of circumstances does not affect the
existence of the servitude, according to prior practice, 2" but the language of the Treaty
Succession Convention, if it reflects customary law, is neutral as to states affected by a
succession when military bases are concerned. 221 How a claim under the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties on grounds of fundamental change of circumstances
would be determined is uncertain.222 Thus, it is not clear whether Russia has succeeded
213. CIS Agreement, supra note 9, arts. 5, 11-14 31 .L.M. at 144-45; Ahma Ata Declaration, 31 1.L.M.
at 149.
214. Vienna Treaty Succession Convention, supra note 38, arts. 11-12, 17 I.L.M. at 1494-95.
215. l, arts. 17, 22, 17 .LM. at 1497, 1500. Notification is not available if the treaty or the limited
number of parties demonstrate that consent of all parties is necessary. Id. art. 17, 22 17 I.L.M. at 1497, 1500.
Claims of impossibility of performance or fundamental change of circumstances are available, and similar
procedures are available in the case of treaties not in force at the date of succession, or treaties signed by the
predecessor state but subject to ratification, acceptance or approval. Id., arts. 17-19, 17 I.L.M. at 1497-98; see
also supra notes 211-12.
216. Id., art. 24, 17 1.L.M. at 1501.
217. See supra notes 12-13, 26 and accompanying text. (Georgia, Tajikistan and the Baltics are given as
areas where this concern is most present).
218. See supra notes 204, 206-07 and accompanying text.
219. Esgain, supra note 204, at 71-93, lists situations where the dominant power's interest may have been
transferred, perhaps by treaty, but there is apparently no case where a dominant power has disappeared and the
issue of continued existence of the servitude was brought into question.
220. I& at 68-71.
221. See supra notes 204, 206-07 and accompanying text.
222. Vienna Convention, supra note 6, art. 62(2)(a), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 347, denies use of the doctrine for
treaties establishing a boundary. The first question is whether a military base agreement falls within the
"boundary" exception under the language of the Convention. Id ILC Report, supra note 6, at 259, provides that
the boundary establishment exception to the fundamental change of circumstances defense for termination or
suppression of a treaty "would not exclude the operations of the principle of self-determination where the
conditions for its legitimate operations existed." The strong argument could be made, particularly in the context
of the USSR collapse, that principles of self-determination under the U.N. CHARTER, arts. 1(1), 55, should be
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to basing rights in countries outside the former Soviet Union, or whether it has succeeded
to basing rights under inter-republic agreements completed before the collapse, such as the
one between the USSR and Ukraine. The second is the question of whether the other
successor states to the USSR could, if they so chose, assert basing rights of the former
USSR. For example, could Ukraine claim rights for fleet facilities in a third state's ports
under a treaty between that state and the USSR? Although Ukraine has had a quasi-state
status, the issue becomes even murkier if an entity such as Georgia were to claim such rights.
In the case of the now-united Germany, the September 1990 Treaty on the Final
Settlement with Respect to Germany declared the territorial scope of the country and full
German sovereignty over its internal and external affairs.223 The May 1990 Monetary,
Economic and Social Union Treaty, while dealing with only certain aspects of the FRG and
GDR treaty portfolio, declared that it would "not effect the international treaties which the
[FRG] and the [GDR] have concluded with third countries."224 Resolution of any questions
as to which treaties of the FRG and the GDR remained in effect, and the impact of the new
Germany on the EC, has been stated in the Unity Treaty. Community law now applies to all
of Germany, whether formerly West or East.2's All treaties of the former Federal Republic
now apply to all of Germany.226 On the other hand, treaties to which the GDR was party
and to which the FRG was not
shall be discussed with the contracting parties concerned with a view to regulating
or confirming their continued application, adjustment or expiry, taking into account
protection of confidence, the interests of the states concerned, the treaty obligations
of the [FRG] as well as the principles of a free, democratic basic order governed by
the rule of law, and respecting the competence of the European Communities.
227
Germany will determine its position with respect to adopting old GDR agreements after
consultation with other treaty partners and the EC, where it would have an interest. If
Germany decides to accede to a multilateral treaty to which the GDR was party, it will reach
agreement with states already party and with the EC, if EC interests are at stake. 228
applied to determine the continuing vitality of old Soviet base agreements. For further analysis of fundamental
change of circumstances under the Vienna Convention, see infra notes 402-09 and accompanying text.
223. Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, Sept. 12, 1990, arts. 1, 7-8, 29 I.L.M. at
1187-92 (1990).
224. Treaty Establishing a Monetary, Economic and Social Union, supra note 35, art. 35, 29 I.L.M. at
1145.
225. German Unity Treaty, supra note 35, art. 10, 30 I.L.M. at 471.
226. Id. art. 11, 30 I.L.M. at 471.
227. Id. art. 12, 30 I.L.M. at 472.
228. Cf. Vienna Treaty Succession Convention, supra note 38, art. 31(1)(a), 17 1.L.M. at 1506; U.N.
Conference on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, Resolution Relating to Incompatible Treaty
Obligations and Rights Arising from a Uniting of States, 17 1.L.M. at 1517. For an example of an agreement
following discussion with the GDR, see, e.g., Marion Nash Leich, Contemporary Practice of the United States
Relating to International Law: Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 539 (1991). The
Federal Republic of Germany had communicated the text of articles 11 and 12 of the German Unity Treaty,
supra note 35, to the U.S. Department of State by note, Oct. 15, 1990. UNrrED STATES DEPARTMENT Op STATE,
supra note 10, at 85-86. For earlier U.S. practice, see, e.g., HYDE, supra note 54, at 1529-35 (noting the
problems if there is no treaty of union). The RESTATEmEN (TIRD), supra note 6, § 210(2) says that agreements
of an absorbed state end, and any agreements of the absorbing state then apply to the absorbed state's territory.
See Id., cmt. e (providing that rebus sic stantibus allows third states to end agreements with the absorbed state).
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Other territorial problems for Germany remain, such as the treaty regime for the wedge
of East Prussia surrounding Koenigsberg, which is now the Russian oblast of Kaliningrad.
It conceivably could be part of a transfer to Germany, perhaps in exchange for economic
benefits.229 Further, although the Kurile Islands off Japan were transferred to the Soviet
Union at the end of World War II, four small islands with rich offshore fishing grounds, also
occupied by the USSR, remain in dispute.2 30 These bits of territory, if transferred from
Russian to German or Japanese sovereignty in the future, will involve the "moving treaty
frontiers" principle,23 1 as opposed to the theory of uniting states, involved in German
unification. 2
2. Succeeding States
Although several doctrines have emerged with respect to successor states' treaty
obligations, one positive rule is that the successor is bound by its predecessor's territorial
treaties, analyzed above. 2 3 "Successor state" usually has been defined as "the State which
has replaced another State on the occurrence of a succession of States. 234 The "moving
treaty frontiers" principle declares that when a part of a state becomes part of another state,
a treaty of the predecessor ceases to be in effect for that part of the predecessor's territory
which comes under the sovereignty of the new state. A treaty of the successor state is then
in force, unless it appears from the language of the treaty, or application of the treaty would
The Restatement does not consider the possibility of the method employed for German union, except in the allied
concept of separating states, Id., cmt. f. For an application of article 12 of the Unity Treaty, see, e.g., Agreement
in Relation to Ratification of the Border, FRG-Pol., Nov. 14, 1990, 31 I.L.M. 1293 (1992).
229. In FRG-USSR Good Neighborliness Treaty, supra note 36, art. 2,30 id. at 507, the Federal Republic
(and the USSR) declared their respect for existing boundaries, that they had no territorial claims against any
state, and their respect for the territorial integrity of all states in Europe. This treaty does not preclude a
territorial transfer for cash, however. Gary Lee, Kaliningrad: German Roots v. Soviet Rule, Wash. Post, Nov.
27, 1991, at A22, reports yearnings of ethnic Germans and interest from German business in refurbishing
Kaliningrad, formerly Koenigsberg, capital of East Prussia since 1302. A movement is underway to change the
name back to Koenigsberg. Germany and Russia have agreed to turn over Soviet Army property in eastern
Germany after Russian troops leave under an escalated departure schedule and to exchange art seized by the
World War II armies, and Germany has forgiven $11.2 billion in Russian debt. Kohl Grants Debt Relief to
Russia and Offers Confidence in Yeltsin, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1992, at A14. "Political theory aside, Russia is
broke." Uchitelle, supra note 191, at A14. If such a trade has been made for art, can a deal for territory be far
behind? If the Protocol of Collaboration, supra note 13, would recognize rights of ethnic Germans along the
Volga River, deep within Russia, can an arrangement for East Prussia be far behind?
230. Treaty of Peace with Japan, Sept. 8, 1951, art 2(c), 3 U.S.T. 3169, 3172, 136 U.N.T.S. 45,48; David
E. Sanger, Recriminations Fly in Japan on Collapse ofYeltsin Visit, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 11, 1992, at A12; Serge
Schmemann, Little Isles, A Big Fight, id., Sclunemann, Yeltsin Cancels a Visit to Japan As Dispute Over Islands
Simmers, id., Sept. 10, 1992, at Al. For analysis, see Sanger, In Russia and Japan, Once Again, National Egos
Block Cooperation, id., Sept. 13, 1992, at 4; Margaret Scott, Points of No Return, N.Y. TIMEs Magazine, Sept.
13, 1992, at 38.
231. See infra note 235 and accompanying text.
232. Unification of North and South Korea, only recently admitted to the United Nations, supra note 11,
may occur in the foreseeable future. The internal political, economic and social consequences will be much more
exacerbated then in German unification. Nicholas Eberstadt, Can the Two Koreas Be One? 71 FORBiro AFF.
150 (1992). As a matter of international law, however, the issues may be the same as, or similar to, that of
German unification. See supra notes 223-28 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 196-231 and accompanying text.
234. Vienna Treaty Succession Convention, supra note 38, art. 2(1)(d), 17 I.L.M. at 1490.
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be "incompatible with its object and purpose" or "would radically change the conditions" for
its application.235
This basic principle has a number of permutations. If a state divides into two or more
states, or if part of a predecessor remains after separation, the same principles apply. Uniting
states are treated in similar fashion.3 6 Apart from boundary treaties, a successor state can
solve the problem by unequivocal treaty arrangement among the states concerned, 23' by
exchange of notes, 238 or by implication.239 Thus, although the CIS might have pledged
to respect the prior treaty regime of the USSR,240 the U.S. felt obliged to seek explicit
agreements from the USSR's descendants on critical matters such as nuclear
disarmament." The German unification treaty stands on the same footing. 42 The other
235. Vienna Treaty Succession Convention, supra note 38, art. 15, 17 1.L.M. at 1496, a principle of
customary law. See also ILC Report, supra note 38, at 208-11; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 6, § 210(1)
& cmts. a & b; Sinclair, supra note 38, at 160.
236. See supra notes 223-28 and accompanying text.
237. Vienna Treaty Succession Convention, supra note 38, arts. 15(b), 31(l)(a), 34(2)(a), 17 I.L.M. at
1496, 1506, 1509. Conference forPeace in Yugoslavia, Arbitration Commission, Opinion No. 9,31 I.L.M. 1523,
1524-25 (1992) has advocated this for the successor states of the former Yugoslavia. An agreement can also
provide for the succession situation by notification of other parties if so provided in the agreement. If the
agreement provides for succession but does not provide for notification, the successor must expressly adopt the
treaty in writing. Id., art. 10, 17 I.L.M. at 1494. See, e.g., Settlement of Pecuniary Claims Agreement, July 19,
1948, U.S.-Yugo., art. 5, 62 Stat. 2658, incorporating by reference Treaty of Commerce, Oct. 14, 1881,
Serbia-U.S., 22 Stat. 963, applied in Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187 (1961). The General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, various commodity agreements, and an occasional bilateral treaty, have included succession
clauses, the contemplation being that the parties fully expected succession in the foreseeable future. Id. See
generally ILC Report, supra note 38, at 193-96. Even as thoroughgoing an agreement as UNCLOS, supra note
202, does not have a succession clause. Humanitarian law conventions, and those governing human rights, may
not have succession clauses. While the Succession Convention would require any treaty to have a notification
provision, or in its absence a requirement that the successor adopt the treaty in writing, placing this
burden-perhaps only moral in nature-on the successor would be better than inquiry after the fact by the world
community on the treaty's sponsoring organization (the International Committee of the Red Cross in the case
of the humanitarian law conventions) pursuing a successor, which may be in the middle of armed conflict or
other unrest, imperilling the very rights the conventions were negotiated to protect. And while one could fall
back on the argument of parallel customary law or general principles, specific reference to a treaty has the
advantage of relative precision, particularly when addressing the media or general world public opinion. What
is good enough for protecting general trade, tin and coffee should be good enough for protecting human beings.
238. CHEN, supra note 179, at 228-31.
239. RESTATEMENT r(HiRD), supra note 6, § 210, cmt. g. For analysis of various terms of mostly U.K.
treaties as to whether they applied by implication, see D.P. O'Connell, State Succession and Problems of Treaty
Interpretation, 58 AM. . INT'L L. 41 (1964).
240. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
241. See, e.g. President George Bush, Letter of Transmittal to the Senate of the United States, June 19,
1992, 3 DEP'T ST. DISPATCH 510 (1992) and James A. Baker, 1II, START Protocol Signed, 3 DEP'T ST.
DISPATCH 428 (1992), referring to Protocol to the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive
Arms, May 23, 1992, which was necessary because the Treaty, signed July 17, 1991, was negotiated between
the Soviet Union and the United States. Strategic Arms Reduction Talks Treaty, 2 DEP'T ST. DISPATCH 620
(1991). The Protocol was signed by Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine, all of which had or have nuclear
weaponry on their soil. Russia has ratified the Treaty with conditions attached. The U.S. Senate has approved
the Protocol. The other ex-Soviet republics have not done so. John H. Cushman, Senate Endorses Pact to Reduce
Strategic Arms, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1992, at Al; Russia Ratfies NuclearArms Pact with U.S., id., Nov. 5, 1992,
at A8. A second strategic arms treaty between the United States and the nuclear succession states of the former
Soviet Union was signed in January 1993, but its effectiveness depends on ratification of the first one. Steven
Erlanger, Concessions on Arms Pact Made by U.S., id., Jan. 3, 1993, at 8; Serge Schmemann, Bush and Yeltsin
Sign Pact Making Deep Missile Cuts, id., Jan. 4, 1993, at Al. For analysis, see Thomas L. Friedman, Beyond
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clear signal of a successor's intention to be bound is through accession to the predecessor's
treaties, to the extent allowed in those treaties.243 Given the number of states today, and
the number of treaties every state has concluded, these could be daunting tasks for a
succeeding state to accomplish.
Rather than attempting a round-robin of negotiations with all treaty partners, some states
have employed devolution agreements, by which the former power and the successor agree
which treaties of the former bind the latter. However, these agreements, which are usually
in treaty form,2 " cannot of themselves bind the successor state. They are intended merely
to notify third states "that the succession state's policy is generally favorable to the
maintenance of treaty relationships." They have also "contribut[ed] to a stabilizing of
diplomatic relations at a time when stability is a political desideration." On the other hand,
some have been "models of evasive draftsmanship, and almost any point of view may be
sustained by reference to them."" s The treaty cannot confer a benefit on third-party states
because of the rule that consent is required for even a positive advantage to a third-party
state.246 However, a devolution agreement, combined with an exchange of notes or a
similar agreement between the new state and other states, followed by customary practice
in accordance with the post-agreement exchange, will effect a succession to those
treaties.2
47
Start 1I: A New Level of Instability, id., Jan. 10, 1993, at El.
242. See supra notes 225-27 and accompanying text.
243. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 6, art. 15, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 336 (accepts
the modem view that states may accede to treaties not yet in force). SINCLAIR, supra note 156, at 42.
244. An exception is the succession of India and Pakistan.
245. O'Connell, supra note 38, at 18-19.
246. Vienna Treaty Succession Convention, supra note 38, art. 8, 17 I.L.M. at 1493; Vienna Convention,
supra note 6, arts. 35-36, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 341; see also BROWNLiE, supra note 38, at 656; LUNG-CHU CHEN,
AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAw 422 (1989); 2 O'CoNNELL, supra note 38, at 358-
359, 371; SINCLAIR, supra note 156, at 101-03; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 6, §§ 210(3), 324; ILC
Report, supra note 38, at 183-87; contra, McNAiR, supra note 38, at 640. See CnN, supra note 179, at 222-28
(noting the risk of a devolution agreement's being an unequal treaty). He also asserts that third states have an
obligation to supply treaty texts to the new state if they wish to bind the new state. IL at 228. See infra notes
386-87 and accompanying text for further analysis. The Vienna State Property Succession Convention, supra
note 39, arts. 19-31, 22 1.L.M. at 315-21, would place the burden on the predecessor state. UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, supra note 10, at 29, 84, 92, 110, 113, 129, 154, 156, 168, 179, 185, 216, 217, 218,
226, 239, 241, 268 (1992) lists the following devolution agreements or statutes which may have some effect in
U.S. practice: Burma; Cyprus; The Gambia; Ghana; India; Indonesia; Jamaica; Malaysia; Malta; Morocco;
Nigeria; Pakistan; Seychelles; Sienna Leone; Singapore; Sri Lanka; Trinidad and Tobago; Tunisia; Western
Samoa. keL Compare Elihu Lauterpacht, The Contemporary Practice of the United Kingdom in the Field of
International Law-Survey and Comment, VI, 7 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 514, 529 (1958) (stating that the U.S.
practice of publishing such agreements in TREArms IN FORCE may give them some legal effect) with
RESTATENENT (TIRD), § 210, r.n. 3 (stating that although TREnATIES IN FORCE may list the agreements, it does
not state whether the United States has accepted them, the practice being to negotiate an understanding with the
new state as to which agreements remain in force). See also 2 WHrrEMAN, DIGEST, ch. 4, § 10, at 976-1001 for
a partial compendium of U.S. and other countries' diplomatic correspondence.
247. Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 355 F. Supp. 1155, 1159-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 486 F.2d
442, 443 (2d Cir. 1973), on remand, 401 F. Supp. 1215 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 536 F.2d 478 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 833 (1976), notes the acceptance, by the U.S. District Court, of treaty continuity based on the
devolution agreement, notes between the United States and India, and practice in accordance with the diplomatic
correspondence. See also Treaty Obligations Assumed by the Congo upon its Independence, Exchange of Notes,
May 12 & Aug. 5, 1961, Congo-U.S., 13 U.S.T. 2065, 603 U.N.T.S. 19.
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Absent a devolution agreement, a succeeding state may declare unilaterally what treaties
it provisionally considers binding on it, with a stated term of years, usually two to four, in
which the successor will decide which treaties are in force. At the end of that time the
successor state will publish another unilateral declaration which lists the bilateral and
multilateral agreements the successor considers to be still in force. Some unilateral
declarations have carried no time limit and simply declare that a list will be forthcoming "in
due course." The declarations are usually communicated to treaty partners of the successor,
as well as to the U.N. Secretary-General, if that office is the registry under article 102(1) of
the U.N. Charter. These declarations have not been published in the United Nations Treaty
Series.248 However, the United States has published some of them in its annual Treaty
Series.2
49
The Succession Convention takes the position, consistent with commentators' views,
that such successor state unilateral declarations do not become rights or obligations of the
successor or other states party to the agreements by virtue of the declaration. 2 0 U.S.
practice has accepted these unilateral statements as intent by the declarant to be bound,
whether addressed to the U.S., or, as is more likely, to the U.N. Secretary-General. If a
treaty would require assent of all parties, or if succession would be incompatible with its
object and purpose, the U.S. would not recognize such declarations as binding. Although
the U.S. prefers to negotiate new "arrangements" with newly independent states, unless the
declarations have reservations or the declaration would be incompatible with a bilateral
treaty's object and purpose, U.S. practice has been to accept such declarations to continue
a particular treaty relationship, pending the completion of a new arrangement."'
248. ILC Report, supra note 38, at 187-93. See also CHEN, supra note 244, at 422; REsTATEMENT (THIRD),
supra note 6, § 210(3). See O'Connell, supra note 38, at 21-23 (noting that the Secretariat tends to follow the
dictates of the new states rather than rushing an independent evaluation). The problem is more coinplicated
where the depository is other then the Secretariat, e.g. Poland for the Warsaw Convention, Oct. 12, 1929, act.
36-39, 49 Stat. 3000, 3022, 137 L.N.T.S. 11, 31-33, or Belgium for the International Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Bills of Lading for the Carriage of Goods by Sea, Aug. 25, 1924, arts.
11-12, 14-16,51 Stat. 233,253-55,120 L.N.T.S. 155, 171-73. Jones, supra note 38, at 368-69. If a government
were to inquire of such registry states, a list would be forthcoming, but these'might have only those states that
had deposited some kind of document; since many new states may not have done this, the list may not be
complete. kd "[Flew new states have made any effort to tidy up their treaty lists. 1 4 If a state has shown itself
a party on its own list, that will not be recorded by the registry. Id "Mhe lists are no more then prima facie
evidence of partnership in the relevant treaties. Id "A private party, perhaps represented by counsel, seeing such
a list "most likely.., will be met by a blank refusal. Id "Some predecessor states, e.g. the United Kingdom,
have drawn up lists for the devolution agreements, while for others, e.g. France, 'the whole problem has been
left to chance. Id "One of the earliest uses of the procedure occurred when Iceland and Denmark dissolved their
Union in 1944. Id
249. Compare the analysis in ILC Report, supra note 38, at 188-92 with UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT
OF STATE, supra note 6, at 2-3, 12, 15, 19, 24, 28, 62, 75, 96, 100-01, 147, 152, 158, 171, 193, 210-13, 220,
229-30, 235, 239, 246, 274-76 (1992) (listing those nations' statements: Antigua and Barbuda; Bahamas;
Barbados; Belize; Botswana; Brunei; Dominica; Fiji; Grenada;'Guyana; Lesotho; Madagascar, Mauritius; Nauru;
Papua New Guinea; Saint Kitts and Nevis; Saint Lucia; Saint Vincent and the Grenadines; Solomon Islands;
Suriname; Swaziland; Tanzania; Tonga; Tuvalu; Zambia; Zimbabwe).
250. Vienna Treaty Succession Convention, supra note 38, art. 9, 17 I.L.M. at 1493.
251. Letter of Arthur W. Rovine, U.S. Assistant Legal Adviser for Treaty Affairs, to Christopher J.
Makins, First Secretary of the U.K. Embassy to the United States, Apr. 23, 1975, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 863-64
(1975), reprinted in Eleanor C. McDowell, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International
Law, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 861, 863-64 (1975).
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How states may become bound is addressed below, 1 2 but Zimbabwe and perhaps
other states have chosen a unique and helpful way to assure treaty partners of a continuing
relationship short of negotiating a list. After publishing a unilateral declaration in 1981,
Zimbabwe stated positively that all multilateral treaties would be under review for six years,
during which time Zimbabwe would consider them in force. After six years, treaty partners
could consider them in force if no treaty relationships were terminated. Bilateral
arrangements were continued for analogous periods. 3 Zimbabwe, recognizing her
difficulty with review of bilateral treaties and the problems of other states, sent this letter to
the U.N. Secretary-General in 1985:
During the past fouryears my Government has reviewed all such bilateral treaties
as were available to it or were brought to its attention and has also concluded a
number of bilateral treaties with other governments with the effect that these
instruments have superseded some of the earlier ones. It has become evident to my
Government that many contracting parties prefer to enter into new arrangements
with my Government rather than revive those treaties whose operations might have
been suspended or terminated between 1965 and 1979 or which are now considered
to be obsolete in the conduct of present-day international relations.
Whilst it has not been practicable for my Government to re-negotiate and f'malise
all such agreements on which a willingness to keep and maintain them in force was
mutually indicated by my Government and other contracting parties, my
Government has reached the stage at which it considers that legal continuity
between itself and Other Contracting States has been achieved with an
understanding either to revive, modify, re-negotiate, terminate or adopt such
bilateral treaties and, accordingly, my Government now wishes to inform Your
Excellency, and through you all Member States of the United Nations Organisation
as follows:
All bilateral treaties that were validly concluded or recognised by the United
Kingdom Government in respect of Southern Rhodesia and continued to be applied
and respected by my Government pursuant to the declaration aforementioned will
now expire on 18 April 1985, UNLESS:
(i) Either my Government has already communicated to the other contracting party
its intention to maintain the continuance in force of the treaty or the process of re-
negotiating its terms and provisions has been agreed upon; or
(ii) The other contracting party notifies my Government before 18 April 1985
through normal diplomatic channels of its intention either to keep and maintain the
continuance in force of the treaty concerned or to re-negotiate its terms and
252. See infra notes 255-60 and accompanying text.
253. Note of the Prime Minister of Zimbabwe to the U.N. Secretary-General, Feb. 24, 1982, reprinted in
UNE STATES DEPARTmNT OF STATE, supra note 10, at 275-76. The time for reviewing bilaterals was later
extended.
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provisions, in which case, my Government will consider itself bound by that
Treaty.25
Bilateral treaty partners responded with lists of agreements they intended to maintain in
force.25 Absent a complete series of renewals, the "unless otherwise directed" method
that Zimbabwe has employed goes a step further toward promoting clarity of treaty regimes
where a successor initiates a unilateral declaration.
256
If the new state's declaration says, as it usually does, that existing treaties will be
provisionally in force, the Convention provides that such treaties will have that status if other
parties so agree or "by reason of [their] conduct [are] to be considered as having so
agreed."" 7 Multilateral treaties with relatively few parties, where the object and purpose
of the treaty would so indicate, or where the treaty itself requires it, require consent of all
parties.25 ' If the treaty provides, or it is established that provisional application would be
incompatible with the treaty's object and purpose, or if the conditions for operation of the
treaty would radically change, these principles do not apply. 259 To end provisional
254. Letter of the Prime Minister of Zimbabwe to the U.N. Secretary-General, received Feb. 20, 1985,
reprinted in UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT Op STATE, supra note 10, at 276.
255. Note of U.S. Government to Zimbabwe, Apr. 17, 1985, id.
256. CHEN, supra note 179, at 239-40, had proposed a similar formula, albeit in the context of unequal
treaties and without specific time limits.
257. Vienna Treaty Succession Convention, supra note 38, arts. 27(1), 27(3), 28, 17 I.L.M. at 1503-04.
Note the similarity of language in Vienna Convention, supra note 6, art. 45, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 343, on good
faith, or estoppel (preclusion). See also infra note 320 and accompanying text for use of the same concept in
the context of acceptance of bilaterals. Estoppel and similar doctrines are also analyzed infra at notes 354-59
and accompanying text in the context of the law of treaties. For a recent example of a provisional declaration
by a successor state, followed by a proposed list from a third state, and acceptance by the former, see Subjects
of International Law: Continuity & Succession of State's Treaties, 1980 DIGEST § 2 (Tuvalu-U.S.). In id., 1975
DIGEST § 2, at 272, U.S. practice is stated in a letter from Arthur W. Rovine, Assistant Legal Adviser for Treaty
Affairs, to Christopher J. Makins, First Secretary of the United Kingdom Embassy, Apr. 23, 1975, 69 AM. J.
INT'L L. 863-64 (1975):
While the Department of State strongly prefers to receive from a newly independent nation a
statement of its intention to be bound by a particular multilateral treaty before we consider that nation
a party to such treaty, we are generally prepared to accept as valid evidence of succession general
declarations such as those frequently made to the United Nations Secretary-General. Thus we are
prepared to list as parties to multilateral agreements states which have made such general
declarations. This would not be applicable, of course, in cases necessitating the consent of all parties
to the agreement, or cases in which such succession would be incompatible with the object and
purpose of the agreement. In addition, we examine these declarations closely to determine whether
they contain reservations or other statements, such as clauses permitting termination in a fashion not
permitted by the agreement, that may themselves be incompatible with the object and purpose of the
agreement.
As for bilateral treaties, the United States normally attempts to make detailed arrangements with
newly independent states with respect to our treaty relationships. Pending the conclusion of such
arrangements, we have accepted general declarations as sufficient for purposes of continuing a
particular treaty relationship, but again provided that the declarations contain no reservations or
conditions inconsistent with the object and purpose of the agreement in question.
258. Vienna Treaty Succession Convention,supra note 38, arts. 27(2), 27(4), 17 I.L.M. at 1503.
259. Id., art. 27(5), 17 I.L.M. at 1503. The separate concepts of fundamental change of circumstances and
impossibility of performance are considered infra at notes 396-409 and accompanying text.
1993 / Integration and Disintegration in Europe
application, either the new state or a state party can give notice, a reasonable time being
twelve months, unless the treaty provides otherwise.2"
Rather than applying treaties provisionally for a stated time, a few countries have
accepted selectively the prior regime's treaties.2" Although the Succession Convention,
does not cover this situation specifically, presumably the same principles as those for the
Nyerere, or temporary application doctrine, would apply. In a few instances states have
totally deferred making any commitment on treaty succession, or have openly declared they
would be bound by none of the predecessor's agreements.262 These approaches are in
effect the positive and negative aspects of the "clean slate" doctrine, analyzed next.
3. Newly Independent States and the Law of Treaty Succession: The "Clean Slate"
Doctrine
The foregoing principles on successor states apply in any case of state succession, that
is, at any time a state different from the predecessor appears on the scene. When the
successor is a newly independent state, the Succession Convention, article 16, purports to
articulate the flat majority customary rule of the "clean slate" doctrine:
A newly independent State is not bound to maintain in force, or to become a party
to, any treaty by reason only of the fact that at the date of the succession of States
the treaty was in force in respect of the territory to which the succession of States
relates.263
The Convention also defines a "newly independent state" as:
a successor State the territory of which immediately before the date of the
succession of States was a dependent territory for the international relations of
which the predecessor State was responsible.2
The International Law Commission was charged by the U.N. General Assembly "with
appropriate reference to the views of States which have achieved independence since the
Second World War," and the Commission "therefore [gave] due attention throughout... to
the practice of the newly independent States... without.., neglecting the relevant practice
I
260. Vienna Treaty Succession Convention, supra note 38, art. 29, 17 I.L.M. at 1504. See ILC Report,
supra note 38, at 244-48 (citing no state practice in analyzing arts. 27-29, which are made necessary by the
unilateral declaration practice).
261. CHEN, supra note 179, at 23-24.
262. Id. at 21, 24-25; CHEN, supra note 246, at 422.
263. Vienna Treaty Succession Convention, supra note 38, art. 16,1 7 I.L.M. at 1496; see also ILC Report,
supra note 38, at 211, 212; RESTATEMENT Tll), supra note 6, § 210(3) & cmt. f, r.n. 3. Jenks, supra note
38, at 110-49, writing in 1952, found the issue still an open question as to multilateral "legislative" agreements.
264. Vienna Treaty Succession Convention, supra note 38, art. 2(f), 17 1.L.M. at 1490. The present union
of Serbia and Montenegro, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, has been characterized as a "new state" by
Conference for Peace in Yugoslavia, Arbitration Commission, Opinion No. 10, 31 I.LM. 1525, 1526 (1992).
Whether this is the same as a newly independent state under the Convention is less than clear. Id.; Opinion No.
1, 31 1.L.M. 1494, 1495 (1992). Arbitration Commission, Opinion No. 9, 31 I.L.M. 1523, 1524-25 (1992) are
not precise as to the place of the Convention in the context of standards to be applied to the breakup of
Yugoslavia, and this may be but one example of the problems such lack of precision may cause. Clearly, under
the Commission views, the Federal Republic is not a successor state, but does it get clean slate benefits?
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of older States." 265 This is evident in the Commission's provisions for devolution
agreements and unilateral declarations and its separate statement of the law for the newly
independent state. Nevertheless, article 16's seemingly felicitous lanjuage may mask certain
problems with the analysis of the clean slate in the context of a newly independent state, to
be layered atop the succession issue.
First, as the Commission stated,
The metaphor of the clean slate is a convenient way of expressing the basic concept
that a newly independent State begins its international life free from any obligation
to continue in force treaties previously applicable with respect to its territory simply
by reason of that fact. But even when that basic concept is accepted, the metaphor
appears in the light of existing State practice to be at once too broad and too
categoric. It is too broad in that it suggests that, so far as concerns the newly
independent States, the prior treaties are wholly expunged and are without any
relevance to its territory. The very fact that prior treaties are often continued or
renewed indicates that the clean slate metaphor does not express the whole truth.
The metaphor is too categoric in that it does not make clear whether it means only
that a newly independent State is not bound to recognize any of its predecessor's
treaties as applicable in its relations with other States, or whether it means also that
a newly independent State is not entitled to claim any right to be or become a party
to any of its predecessor's treaties. As already pointed out, a newly independent
State may have a clean slate in regard to any obligation to continue to be bound by
its predecessor's treaties without it necessarily following that the new independent
State is without any right to establish itself as a party to them.
The Commission concluded that "the evidence of State practice supports the traditional view
that a newly independent State is not under any general obligation to take over the treaties
of its predecessor .... 266 Despite some commentators' views to the contrary, this
principle applies for bilateral and multilateral treaties, whether the treaty is law-creating or
law-consolidating. The sole exception is the "territorial" treaty.267 Thus, a successor state
265. ILC Report, supra note 38, at 167, 169; Sinclair, supra note 38, at 156-57; See Caggiano, supra note
38, at 73 (Citing the specific resolution of the General Assembly as well as U.N. CHARTER, arts. 1(1), 55;
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation Among States
in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/Res/2625 (1970), reprinted in 65 AMJ. INT'L L. 243 (1971), and criticized in Robert Rosenstock, The
Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations: A Survey, 65 AM.J. INT'L LAW
713 (1971). But see Stewart, supra note 38, at 639-41 (contending that the Commission took a "pragmatic and
political approach," favoring the developing nations, in proposing the clean state principles of article 15, and
questioning whether the "traditional view is really reflected.")
266. ILC Report, supra note 38, at 212 (footnote omitted; emphasis in original).
267. Id. at 212-14. See Jenks, supra note 38, at 142-43 (urging a similar rule for multilateral legislative
instruments). But see O'Connell, supra note 38, at 131-32 (criticizing this approach, stating "it would be rash
to apply the 'clean slate' doctrine to the solution of the problem of treaty survival," favoring near-total
continuity). Resolution: Ill-Succession of New States to the Treaties and Certain Other Obligation of Their
Predecessors, 3(a), in ILA 52D RuPORT, supra note 38, at xiii. The Interim Report of the Committee on the
Succession of New States to Their Treaties and Certain Other Obligations of Their Predecessors, 1 1-2, id. at
575-77, found that in practice a wide variety of multilateral and bilateral treaties had been left in force by
successor states, although there was considerable inconsistency and contradiction.
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can claim rights under the prior nation's treaty regime, but the successor cannot have that
treaty regime forced on it.
The other latent ambiguity lurks in the definition of "newly independent state," which
includes only those "dependent" territories for which the predecessor state had international
relations responsibility.2 68 Contrast the difference, for example, between Ukraine, an
original Member of the United Nations which enjoyed brief independence in the 1920s, and
other components of the former Soviet Union, such as Georgia, which flirted with
independence during the Russian Revolution. Are Ukraine and Georgia "dependent
territories" over which the USSR had the authority to conduct foreign relations? Under the
1922 Union Treaty, the USSR had plenary foreign relations authority,2 69 and this was
followed in the 1923 Soviet Constitution.270 Even the stillborn 1991 Treaty on the Union
of Soviet Sovereign Republics preserved the Union's authority over foreign policy and
foreign relations of the Union, while recognizing the "foreign policy activity" of the
constituent republic.271
The next ambiguity may lie with whether the "newly independent state" concept covers
entities that have not been independent for some time, which have had little or no separate
identity, or both, such as Tatarstan within Russia or Serbian Bosnia within Bosnia and
Herzegovina, assuming for discussion that Tatarstan and Serbian Bosnia achieve other
attributes of statehood. The Convention and much of the customary law since World War
II have dealt with decolonization situations. The only analogous case after World War II
was the reestablishment of Austria, 2 and the only analogous case before World War II
was the dismemberment of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires, with their
succession regularized by treaties after World War L"3 The questions that surround the
268. JLC Report, supra note 38, at 176, commenting on Vienna Treaty Succession Convention, supra note
38, art. 1(f), 17 I.L.M. at 1490.
269. Union Treaty, supra note 8, art. 1, 1 Sov. T.S. at 199.
270. 1923 U.S.S.R. CoNsT., art. 1.
271. Treaty on the Union of Soviet Sovereign Republics, art. 5, published in PRAVDA, Aug. 15, 1991.
272. State Treaty for the Reestablishment of an Independent and Democratic Austria, May 15, 1955, 6
U.S.T. 2369, 217 U.N.T.S. 223. Because Austria was annexed by Germany before World War II by force on
the Anschluss, most have argued that Austria never lost its identity as a state. MAREK, supra note 10, at 73-126,
338-68. But see, e.g., Hans Kelsen, The International Legal States of Germany to be Established After the War,
38 AM. J. INT'L L. 689, 690 (1944).
273. The Peace Treaty of St.-Germain-en-Laye, Sept. 10, 1919, arts. 27-61, 226 Consol. T.S. 8, 14-29,
recognized the new Czechoslovak and Serb-Croat-Slovene states, the latter later called Yugoslavia, the separate
state of Hungary as well as the new border of the Republic of Austria and other border adjustments, for all
nations that ratified the Treaty. Because the U.S. Senate refused to give advice and consent to the Treaty, the
United States concluded bilateral agreements with Austria and Hungary that incorporated by reference the
Treaty's terms without obligating the United States. Treaty Establishing Friendly Relations, Aug. 21, 1921,
Austria-U.S., arts. 1, 2(3), 42 Stat. 1946, 1948, 7 L.N.T.S. 155, 158-60; Treaty Establishing Friendly Relations,
Aug. 29, 1921, Hungary-U.S., arts. 1, 2(3), 42 Stat. 1951, 1952-53,48 L.N.T.S. 191, 194-96. MAREK, supra note
10, at 199-236, would agree with the position of the United States in the preamble of the Austria-United States
Treaty Establishing Friendly Relations, supra, 42 Stat. 1946, 7 L.N.T.S. 155, that Austria emerged as a new state
in the wake of World War L However, the Peace Treaty of St.-Germain-en-Laye, Sept. 10, 1919, preamble, arts.
87, 95-97, 102-03, 110, 113, 177, 203, 205-06, 234-45, 249, 226 Consol. T.S. 8, 35, 37-38, 39-41, 60, 81-83,
85-88, 98-103, 110-12, is ambiguous in this regard, as were courts' and commentators' interpretations. MAREK,
supra at 223-35. The travaux preparatoires are equally inconsistent. Id. at 220-23. Marek's otherwise
comprehensive study takes no position on the status of Hungary after the Great War. The Peace Treaty of Sevres,
supra note 27, arts. 27-139, 113 BRrr. & FoR. ST. PAPERS at 656-81, would have spun off parts of the Ottoman
Empire, but this Treaty was never ratified. The Treaty of Lausanne, July 23, 1923, arts. 1-28, 28 L.N.T.S. 11,
15-27, achieved the purpose of the Treaty of Sevres indirectly, by recognizing the territory of Turkey. By then
The Transnational Lawyer/ Vol. 6
disintegration of Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia thus appear to have few
answers in the Treaty Succession Convention, which is based in part on old and new
customary practice.
a. Newly Independent States and Multilateral Conventions
Assuming that the Convention's norms may be employed directly or by analogy in the
case of the new Eastern European states, the Convention's position on multilateral treaties
may also be useful. Commentators have recognized the importance of this means of
restating or developing the law.274
The Convention states the basic rule that a newly independent state may establish its
status as a party to a multilateral convention in force as the date ofsuccession by notification
of succession. This is consistent with the Convention's philosophy that succession does not
oblige a new state to assume the treaty burdens or benefits of its predecessor; the new state
has the right, however, to accept those agreements to which it wishes to be bound.275 This
provision is in accordance with current practice. 6 The rule is not applicable, however:
(1) if application of the agreement with respect to the new state would be incompatible with
the object and purpose of the treaty, (2) if there are radically changed conditions for
application of the treaty, or (3) where the treaty's terms or where the limited number of
negotiating states and the object and purpose of the treaty would dictate consent of all states
party to the treaty.277
many former Turkish possessions were under the League of Nations mandate system. The United States never
declared war on Turkey and therefore did not sign the Treaties of Sevres or Lausanne. A few days after the latter
agreement was signed, Turkey and the United States signed an Extradition Treaty, Aug. 6, 1923, 49 Stat. 2692,
153 L.N.T.S. 71, also at Lausanne.
274. Baxter, supra note 178, at 99-101; Jenks, supra note 38, at 105-06; Oscar Schachter, International
Law in Theory and Practice, 178 RECUEIL DES CouPs 91-95, 97-98 (1982); see also TUNKIN, supra note 167,
at 133-36.
275. Compare Vienna Treaty Succession Convention, supra note 38, art. 17(1), 17 I.L.M. at 1497, with
id., art. 16, 17 I.L.M. at 1496. See also supra notes 261-71 and accompanying text. Vienna Treaty Succession
Convention, supra note 38, arts. 22-23, 17 1.L.M. at 1500-01, govern procedures for notification by the successor
and times when newly independent states become parties or contracting parties to treaties. See also ILC Report,
supra note 38, at 230-36 (noting that Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 6, arts. 16,28, 57,
73, 78, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 336, 339, 345, 350-51, were the general references and models where applicable,
although there was a division of state practice in the question of when a successor becomes a party to the treaty.
On this point the Commission developed a new rule). See infra notes 317-18 and accompanying text.
276. ILC Report, supra note 38, at 215-17; Roberts B. Owen, U.S. Department of State Legal Adviser,
Reported Use of Chemical Agents in Afghanistan, Laos and Kampuchea (Apr. 9, 1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.
DIGEST 1026, 1035, 1041-42. There is also a rough analogy between the notification procedure in the Succession
Convention and that provided in the Vienna Convention on'the Law of Treaties, supra note 6, art. 65(1), 1155
U.N.T.S. at 347, for notifying parties of the invalidity, termination, withdrawal from, or suspension of, the
operation of a treaty. Occasionally treaties have included a clause permitting new states to declare acceptance
of, as well as to accede to, the agreement. See, e.g., Tatsuro Kunugi, State Succession in the Framework of
GAIT, 59 AM. J. INT'L L. 268, 270-71 (1965) (referring to General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30,
1947, art. 33, 61 Stat.(5) A5, A75, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, 284 (accession)). Protocol Amending the Preamble and
Parts 1I and IH of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Mar. 10, 1957, art. 1(4),8 U.S.T. 1767, 1810-11,
278 U.N.T.S. 168, 204 (adhesion by declaration).
277. Vienna Treaty Succession Convention, supra note 38, arts. 17(2), 17(3), 17 I.L.M. at 1497. The
International Law Association approved a formula providing for continued enforcement of a multilateral treaty,
unless the treaty provides otherwise, if the newly independent state has been notified of the treaty's existence
or otherwise knows the treaty is in force and either agrees to its continuance, applies its terms, or does not
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i. Incompatibility with Object and Purpose
The International Law Commission gives several examples for this exception: required
membership in an international organization of which the successor is not a member,
geographic scope of the agreement, and other preconditions to treaty membership.278
Three hypothetical situations from the current circumstances of Eastern Europe illustrate the
point. The U.N. Charter states the general rule that all U.N. Members are ipso facto parties
to the Statute of the International Court of Justice. 9 Although all new Eastern European
nations have eagerly sought membership in the Organization,8 0 some might choose,
perhaps for financial or other reasonsi as Switzerland has until this day, not to apply for
membership but to seek potential standing before the World Court. Were it not for the
Charter's further provision that such states may become parties to the Statute upon
conditions determined by the General Assembly upon the Security Council's
recommendation, 2 t such states would be barred.
Geographic limitations may be a problem for some of the ex-Soviet republics. The
NATO Agreement is limited to Europe and North America,282 which excludes the clearly
Asian republics succeeding the USSR, such as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikstan,
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, from NATO membership under that treaty as now in force.
Belarus and Ukraine are clear candidates for membership as being wholly on European soil.
Russia, stretching across Eurasia to the Pacific Ocean, poses a problem similar to that of
Turkey. The same issue faces the Asian republics and Russia if they seek EC
membership.2 3 A protocol to the NATO or Rome Treaties, as was negotiated when
Turkey joined NATO,284 would probably be required.
Further, other preconditions are illustrated by the Charter's limitation on U.N.
membership to "all... peaceloving states which accept the Organization, [and] are able and
willing to carry out these obligations."8 ' To be sure, admission of the new nations has
been rapid thus far, perhaps almost disingenuously so in the case of some new states in terms
of their relative love of peace, and it is conceivable that the Security Council or the General
Assembly could draw the line in the future,286 as may occur with Serbia.
Ai. Radical Change of Conditionsfor Application of the Treaty
The International Law Commission saw this as similar in thrust to the exception for
incompatibility.287 Although the Commission's analysis does not say so, the radical
declare within a reasonable period of time that the treaty is not in force as to it. Resolutions: Succession of New
States to the Treaties and Certain Other Obligations of Their Predecessors, ILA 53D REPORT, supra note 38,
at xiii.
278. ILC Report, supra note 38, at 217.
279. U.N. CHARTER art. 93(1).
280. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
281. U.N. CHARTER art. 93(2).
282. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
283. Cf. Treaty of Rome, supra note 74, art. 227, 298 U.N.T.S. at 89 (declaring which European states
are members). Since then other states have acceded after the application procedure in id., art. 237, 298 U.N.T.S.
at 92.
284. See supra note 197.
285. U.N. CHARTER art. 4(1).
286. For U.N. membership procedure, see supra note 11.
287. ILC Report, supra note 38, at 217; see also supra notes 276-84 and accompanying text.
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change exception comes close to, if it does not overlap, the defenses of impossibility of
performance or fundamental change of circumstances for terminating or withdrawing from
a treaty under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.288 This is analyzed below
as another independent factor in treaty succession issues.2 9
iii. Consent ofAll Other Parties to the Agreement
The Commission acknowledged its intellectual debt to the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, which provides analogously for all states' acceptance of a reservation if the
treaty so provides or if the limited number of negotiating states and the object and purpose
of the treaty would require acceptance by all, in the Succession Convention's provisions for
unanimous state consent to a new state's participation in a treaty.29 One example might
be the five-nation Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears,291 to which the USSR
was party. If Siberia, now part of Russia, were to break away as it did very briefly during
the 1917-22 civil war, the relatively small number of states to the Agreement might indicate
consent of all parties is required if an independent Siberia were to seek status as a party.
b. TreatiesNot in Force; Multilateral TreatiesSignedButSubjectto Ratification,
Acceptance, orApproval
The Succession Convention provides for treatment of situations where the predecessor
state has ratified a treaty that is not yet in force or where the predecessor has signed the
treaty subject to ratification, acceptance, or approval. The newly independent state may
notify its status as a contracting state or as a party state where the treaty is not yet in force
or will enter into force after the date of succession. Similarly, the new state may ratify,
accept, or approve a treaty signed by the predecessor. The notification, ratification,
acceptance, and approval rules do not apply if application of the treaty is incompatible with
its object and purpose or radically changes conditions for operation of the treaty, or in the
case where consent of all present parties is necessary because of the limited number of states
or because the treaty so provides. An additional provision says that if a treaty specifies a
certain number of contracting states for it to be in force, notification of the new state of its
contracting status counts for the requisite number unless a different intention is stated in the
treaty "or is otherwise established."292 "Contracting state" is defined as a state that has
consented to be bound by the treaty, whether it is in force or not.293
288. Compare Vienna Treaty Succession Convention, supra note 38, art. 17(2), 17 I.L.M. at 1497, with
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 6, arts. 61-62, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 346-47.
289. See infra notes 395-409 and accompanying text.
290. See ILC Report, supra note 38, at 217 (citing Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note
6, art. 20, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 337). Cf. Vienna Treaty Succession Convention, supra note 38, art. 17(3), 17 I.LM.
at 1497. In 1984, SINCLAIR, supra note 156, at 13, still thought art. 20 was progressive development. See also
id. at 61-62.
291. Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears, Nov. 15, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 3918.
292. Compare Vienna Treaty Succession Convention, supra note 38, art. 17, 17 I.L.M. at 1497, with id.,
arts. 18-19, 17 I.L.M. at 1497-98. But see Resolutions: Succession of New States to the Treaties and Other
Obligations of Their Predecessors, 7, in ILA 53D REPORT, supra note 38, at xiv (taking the opposite position,
that a newly independent state is not bound by rights or obligations resulting from its predecessor's ratification
of a treaty not in force at the date of independence).
293. Vienna Treaty Succession Convention, supra note 38, art. 2(k), 17 I.L.M. at 1491.
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The Succession Convention follows analogous provisions in the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties with respect to ratification, acceptance, or approval. 294 The
Commission noted the apparent clash between the obligation, restated in article 18 of the
Vienna Convention, to refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty
between the time of signature and entry into force,295 and the philosophy of the Succession
Convention, that the newly independent state gets a clean slate, at least as to the right to
choose whether it will be bound.296 The solution was to favor both successor states by
allowing them the option of stepping into the predecessor's shoes to complete the process
of ratification, acceptance, or approval, while maintaining the "effectiveness of multilateral
treaties" by not requiring a new beginning by accession.297 The notification of succession
rules of the Convention articulate the practice of the U.N. Secretary-General.298
Although the Convention's restatement of principles for ratification, acceptance, or
approval 299 covers situations that are relatively ephemeral on a time-line basis, the
provisions for participation in treaties not yet in force 300 may vault many older
international agreements that are not in force into the Treaty Series. A prime example is the
1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which requires sixty
ratifications 30 ' and which now has about fifty-four ratifications or accessions, including
Yugoslavia. °2 If the new spinoff states from the USSR, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia,
which along with Belarus and Ukraine signed UNCLOS, go forward with ratification,
UNCLOS will come into force. At that point the obligations, articulated in article 18 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, that signatories should not do anything to defeat
the object and purpose of UNCLOS, at least until a contrary intention is expressed, will
become effective, 0 3 and progression toward UNCLOS' statements of the law for the
oceans will take a step forward.'" Both succession conventions,"' as well as many
294. Compare id., art. 19, 17 LL.M. at 1497, with Vienna Convention, supra note 6, art. 14, 1155 U.N.T.S.
at 335-36. See also ILC Report, supra note 38, at 221 (noting that these acts do not bind a state, citing North
Sea Continental Shelf Cases (FRG v. Den., FRO v. Neth.), 1969 I.CJ. 3, 24-27).
295. JLC Report, supra note 38, at 221 (citing Vienna Convention, supra note 6, art. 18, 1155 U.N.T.S.
at 336); Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1951 I.CJ.
15, 28. See also German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (the Factory of Chorzow) (Ger. v. Pol.), 1926 P.C.I.,
Set. A, No. 7, at 4, 30. Compare McNAIR, supra note 38, at 199, 204 (saying that art. 18 declares custom) with
SINcLAIR, supra note 156, at 19 (agreeing with 1 D.P. O'CONNELL, INTERNAIONAL LAW 223-24 (2d ed. 1970)
for the view that art. 18 goes further than custom).
296. Compare Vienna Convention, supra note 6, art. 18, at 221 with Vienna Treaty Succession
Convention, supra note 38, art. 17, 17 I.L.M. at 1497 and ILC Report, supra note 38, at 215-18.
297. ILC Report, supra note 38, at 221.
298. Id. at 218-20.
299. Vienna Treaty Succession Convention, supra note 38, art. 18, 17 1.L.M. at 1497.
300. Id., art. 19, 17 I.L.M. at 1498.
301. UNCLOS, supra note 202, 21 I.L.M. at 1327.
302. UNrrED NATIONS, supra note 39, at 770-71.
303. See supra note 293 and accompanying text.
304. UNCLOS, supra note 202, is articulative of customary law in many instances. Cf. President Ronald
Reagan, United States Oceans Policy Statement, Mar. 14, 1983,19 WKLY CoMPIL. OF PRESID. DOCUMENTS 383
(1983); RESTATEMENT (MoD), supra note 6, Part V, Introductory Note, 5-6. Many of these customary norms
are in the four 1958 Geneva conventions on the law of the sea: Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958,
13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 82; Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, 499
U.N.T.S. 311; Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, 516
U.N.T.S. 205; Convention on Fisheries and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, Apr. 29,
1958, 17 U.S.T. 138, 559 U.N.T.S. 285. UNCLOS, supra note 202, art. 311(1), 21 1.L.M. at 1327, will prevail
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other agreements that are not in force, have minimal ratification requirements before they
go into force.
c. Reservations, Declarations, and Understandings or Other Interpretative
Statements Regarding Multilaterals
In the light of prior state practice, the nature of modem multilateral treaties and the
principles stated in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the Succession
Convention has a "pragmatic" and flexible approach to reservations by newly independent
states."re Other forms of limitation or interpretation, such as declarations, understandings,
or other interpretive statements, are not expressly covered in the Convention. However, to
the extent that these expressions would purport to fill the office of a reservation by
modifying the legal effect, as distinguished from the terms, of a treaty, the reservation rules
of the Succession Convention apply.
307
The Convention carries a presumption of succession to reservations for new states,
whether they become parties or contracting states to multilateral conventions by notification.
The presumption disappears when the new state expresses a contrary intention or formulates
its own reservation on the same subject as the predecessor's reservation." 8 If the new state
files a reservation, it must be permitted by the treaty or must not be incompatible with the
object and purpose of the treaty.3" If this hurdle is overcome, the new state's reservation
is subject to the Vienna Convention's rules for acceptance of and objection to reservations
over the 1958 conventions as to parties to both.
305. See Vienna Treaty Succession Convention, supra note 38, art. 49(1), 17 l.L.M. at 1514 and Vienna
State Property Succession Convention, supra note 39, art. 50(1), 22 I.L.M. at 327 (both requiring 15
ratifications).
306. See ILC Report, supra note 38 (citing Vienna Convention, supra note 6, arts. 19-23, 1155 U.N.T.S.
at 336-37).
307. The International Law Association Committee on the Succession of New States to the Treaties and
Certain Other Obligations of Their Predecessors, Continued Report on State Succession to Treaties, ILA 54TH
REPORT, supra note 38, at 103, 104 declared that "A new State also takes over the effects of any interpretative
declaration of its predecessor until it makes an alternative declaration which it can do in its declaration of
continuity." Cf. Arbitration on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf (Fr. v. U.K.), 18 I.L.M. 397, 418 (Ad
Hoc Ct. Arb., 1977) (holding that a "reservation" that excluded or modified the legal effect of a treaty term was
a "true reservation" and not an "interpretative declaration," the definition of the Vienna Convention, supra note
6, art. 2(d), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 333). Although the Succession Convention does not expressly incorporate this
definition by reference as does the Vienna Convention, supra note 6, arts. 19-23, see supra note 305,
undoubtedly this definition would apply for the Succession Convention too. So-called "domestic reservations"
have no effect on treaties on the international plane. Power Auth. v. FPC, 247 F.2d 538 (D.C. Cir.), vacated as
moot, 355 U.S. 64 (1957). Reservations and the like continue to be employed, but the frequency of their
incidence appears to be relatively light. John King Gamble, Jr., Reservations to Multilateral Treaties: A
Macroscopic iew of State Practice, 74 Am. J. INT'L L. 372, 379 (1980).
308. Vienna Treaty Succession Convention, supra note 38, art. 20(1), 17 I.L.M. at 1499; see also ILC
Report, supra note 38, at 226.
309. Vienna Treaty Succession Convention, supra note 38, art. 20(2), 17 I.L.M. at 1499, incorporating by
reference Vienna Conventionon the Law of Treaties, supra note 6, art. 19, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 336-37. The
Succession Convention conforms to U.N. Secretary-General practice. ILC Report, supra note 38, at 227.
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by the multilateral treaty partners, the legal effects of reservations and objections to
reservations, and withdrawal of reservations and of objections to them.310
Since the Soviet Union may have had one of the highest incidences of reservations to
multilateral treaties at the time of its demise, it is likely that the successor republics will have
a heavier burden of decision for retention of reservations than will the successors to
Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Most USSR and Eastern European reservations have been
attributed to these nations' refusal to accept dispute settlement provisions,311 such as resort
to the International Court of Justice. 311 If as a policy matter the new Eastern republics
favor international adjudication as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism, 13 many
such reservations may be removed as a block. The interest of some in the EC, with its option
of litigation in the Community courts,3 14 may point toward elimination of such
reservations.
d. Consent to be Bound by Part of a Multilateral Treaty and Choice of Different
Provisions Within a Multilateral Treaty
Some multilateral conventions allow parties to elect to be bound by only part of the
treaty or allow parties to choose among competing options in a treaty. The 1949 Convention
on Road Traffic is an example of the former because it allows exclusion of two annexes from
applicability under the Convention .3 'S The Road Convention also demonstrates the
availability of options within a treaty; parties can declare that they will allow trailer vehicles
only under certain conditions.316
As in the case of reservations, the Succession Convention gives the same rights of
choice to newly independent states as the predecessor had under the treaty, while preserving
their option to be bound by the predecessor's decisions on options. The same principles
apply to withdrawals of consent or modifications of consent allowed the predecessor. If
310. Vienna Treaty Succession Convention, supra note 38, art. 20(3), 17 I.L.M. at 1499, incorporating by
reference Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 6, arts. 20-23, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 337-38; see
also Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1951 I.CJ.
15, 19-30 (stating rules for reservations to multilateral conventions similar to those of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, art. 19(c), 20(4), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 337). See Committee on the Succession of New States
to the Treaties and Certain Other Obligations of Their Predecessors, Continued Report on State Succession to
Treaties, ILA 54TH REPORT, supra note 38, at 103-04 (suggesting principles similar to those of the ILC).
311. See Gamble, supra note 307, at 380-83 (noting that the United States and Yugoslavia were then
(1980) about even). Czechoslovakia's objections came twice as often as those of the United States, while Soviet
reservations were the highest percexitage of any state and over three times that of the United States.
312. As permitted by I.CJ. STATUTE, art. 36(1). By contrast, the United States has agreed to many such
jurisdictional clauses in multilateral and bilateral agreements. For an application of these, see, e.g., Case
Concerning U.S. Diplomatic & Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 1.CJ. 3, 24-28.
313. Cf. U.N. CHARTER art. 33(1).
314. See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
315. Convention on Road Traffic, Sept. 12, 1949, art. 2(1), 3 U.S.T. 3008, 3010, 125 U.N.T.S. 22, cited
in ILC Report, supra note 38, at 228. Many, but not all, successor states have opted to exclude the Annexes.
Id.; UNIT=D STATES DEPARTmENT oF STATE, supra note 10, at 289.
316. Convention on Road Traffic, Sept. 12, 1949, Annex 6, § IV9(b), 3 U.S.T. at 3037, 125 U.N.T.S. at
76, cited in ILC Report, supra note 38, at 228; See id. at 228-29 (discussing other conventions with opt-out
provisions including the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade).
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there is no action by the new state, it is presumed to be bound by its predecessor's
decisions.317 These terms are consistent with state practice.
318
e. When the Successor Becomes a Party to a Multilateral Treaty
State practice has varied as to when a newly independent state is considered a party to
a multilateral agreement. It may be retroactive to the date of the predecessor's ratification
or accession or it may be the date of independence of the new state, that is, the date of
succession.319 The effective date of a treaty could be important in terms of liability for a
predecessor under the treaty. The Succession Convention leans toward the latter view,
stating that the later date applies, unless the treaty provides or the parties agree otherwise.
The treaty is considered suspended between the date of succession and notification, unless
it is applied provisionally or it is otherwise the subject of agreement.32
f. Bilateral Agreements and Newly Independent States
Bilateral agreements provoke few of the complex problems inherent in the multinodal
web of a multilateral treaty. In the context of succession of states, the bipolar relationship
becomes a trilateral situation among the predecessor state, the successor, and the third state,
unless the bilateral has been concluded between the predecessor and the successor*
Authority, based on a general principle of continuity of rights and obligations, exists for
the proposition that bilateral treaties which are in force and known to a newly independent
state continue unless it makes a contrary declaration within a reasonable time after
independence.321 The Succession Convention declares that bilateral treaties between the
predecessor and third states continue in force for the new state in two situations. One
situation is when the new state and the third states agree that the bilateral treaties should
continue in force. The second arises from the conduct of the states: they may be estopped
from saying they have not agreed to continuity. Such continued bilateral treaties apply from
the date of succession, unless there is a different intention from the agreement or from other
sources. 322 The Convention position appears to be in accordance with the weight of
317. Compare Vienna Treaty Succession Convention, supra note 38, art. 21, 17 1.L.M. at 1499-1500, with
id., art. 20, 17 I.L.M. at 1499.
318. ILC Report, supra note 38, at 228-29.
319. See id. at 234-35 (noting that national practice (i.e. Netherlands, Switzerland, United States) favored
the earlier date; international organizations considered thle date of independence the appropriate date).
320. A new state making a notification of succession is considered a contracting state to the treaty when
it makes notification. Vienna Treaty Succession Convention, supra note 38, art. 23, 17 I.L.M. at 1501. See also
supra notes 273, 297 and accompanying text.
321. ILC Report, supra note 38, at 237. The International Law Association, for example, approved a
formula providing for continued enforcement of a bilateral, unless it provides otherwise, if the newly independent
state has been notified of the treaty's existence or otherwise knows the treaty is in force and either agrees to its
continuance, applies its terms, or the new state or the third state does not declare within a reasonable period of
time that the bilateral is not in force. Resolutions: Succession of New States to the Treaties and Certain Other
Obligations of Their Predecessors, ILA 53D REPORT, supra note 38, at xiii.
322. Vienna Treaty Succession Convention, supra note 38, art. 24, 17 I.L.M. at 1501. See Conference for
Peace in Yugoslavia, Arbitration Commission, Opinion No. 9,31 I.L.M. 1523,1524-25 (1992) (urging successor
to the former Yugoslavia to negotiate treaty succession arrangements on the basis of the Convention).
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custom and the philosophy of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 323 If the
bilateral treaty is in force between the new state and the third state, it cannot be in force
between the predecessor and the third state.32 If the predecessor purports to terminate,
suspend, or negotiate an amendment to a bilateral treaty with a third state when the treaty is
in force between the new state and a third state, such actions have no effect. Even if the
predecessor is successful in terminating or suspending a bilateral before succession, the new
state can still negotiate an agreement with the third state to keep the treaty in force.
Similarly, the new state can agree with the third state on any amendment secured by the
predecessor before succession.
The complexities of regularizing bilateral treaty relationships are relatively simple
compared with the web of issues surrounding new state succession to multilateral
conventions. However, the sheer number of bilaterals, whether seen from a country-to-
country perspective or from a typical standpoint, is immense. For example, the 1992
Treaties in Force lists over 30 bilateral treaties or amendments between Czechoslovakia and
the U.S., nearly 95 between the USSR and the U.S., and over 100 between Yugoslavia and
the U.S. The USSR-U.S. agreements are said to be "under review." 26 The process
described above is undoubtedly going forward in the U.S. Department of State and in Kiev,
Minsk, Moscow, and other capitals. Seen from another perspective, there are over 150
known, published bilateral treaties of the former Soviet Union relating to friendship,
commerce, and navigation or relating to consular matters with various nations.327 These
compilations do not include treaties that states have chosen not to publish for security or
other reasons328 or have chosen not to register,329 or those agreements simply lying in a
file cabinet, misplaced or lost.
323. ILC Report, supra note 38, at 236-41, citing inter alia, Charles I. Bevans, Ghana and United States-
United Kingdom Agreements, 59 AM. J. INT'L L. 93, 96 (1965) (estoppel though conduct); Vienna Convention,
supra note 6, art. 45, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 343. The estoppel or preclusion language also appears in Vienna Treaty
Succession Convention, supra note 38, arts. 27(1), 27(3), 28(b), 17 I.L.M. at 1503-04, in the context of
provisional application of treaties. See supra note 255 and accompanying text. For analysis of estoppel in the
context of the law of treaties, see infra notes 354-59 and accompanying text. See also, Kenneth J. Keith,
Succession to Bilateral Treaties by Seceding States, 61 AM. 3. INT'L L. 521, 544-46 (1967) (noting the
possibility of an estoppel argument but also asserting, tentatively, that customary practice indicates that bilateral
treaties continue in force, subject to a factoral analysis of the nature and function of the treaty, the method of
secession, and the circumstances of the conclusion of the treaty).
324. Vienna Treaty Succession Convention, supra note 38, art. 25, 17 I.L.M. at 1502; see also ILC Report,
supra note 38, at 241; Sinclair, supra note 38, at 161.
325. Vienna Treaty Succession Convention, supra note 38, art. 26, 17 LLM. at 1502; see also ILC Report,
supra note 38, at 241-44. Provisional application of bilateral agreements has been analyzed supra at notes 255-
58 and accompanying text.
326. UNITED STATES DEPARTmENT OF STATE, supra note 10, at 57-59, 247-51, 269-72.
327. See 6 MicHArEL MARKS COHEN, BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY, Doe. 15-1B (7th ed. 1992).
328. Cf. RESTATEMENT (T11=), supra note 6, § 312, r.n. 5.
329. U.N. CHARTER art. 102, requires registry of all international treaties and agreements with the
Secretary-General, but the only penalty for nonregistration is that states cannot invoke the treaty before U.N.
bodies. COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS, art. 18 required registration of every Member's treaties with
the Secretariat; until that occurred, the treaty would not be binding. The CovENANT and the concept of treaties
.openly arrived at" had been among President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points in his address to the U.S.
Congress on January 8, 1918. The reality of the need to close some negotiations to public view was apparent
less than two years later at the Versailles Peace Conference. See, e.g., AUGUST HECKSHER, WOODROW WSON
469-72, 517 (1991).
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For third states, such-as the U.S., the challenge of seeking to regularize relationships in
the form of a relatively known collection of agreements by considering them for continuity
or, perhaps, change, is large. It is likely to be overwhelming to the new successor states.
These states are faced with a frequent shortage of trained personnel, a need to formulate new
policies, entry into a world of over 175 other states, and sometimes incomplete indexes and
texts of the predecessor's agreements. It is likely, therefore, that a new series of unilateral
declarations will be forthcoming. In the meantime, for the business planner or counselor,
the picture is doubly vague. In addition to the problem of figuring out with whom one can
safely deal, there is the further uncertainty of the relative strength of the treaty law governing
the transaction.
4. Problems of Separating States
Much of the previous discussion has been concerned with newly independent states,
which appears to be the circumstance of most of the new republics in the former USSR and
probably will be the situation for half of Czechoslovakia, that is, Slovakia, as well. Although
much reduced in territory, Yugoslavia, now composed only of Montenegro and Serbia,
remains on the map. As such, under Succession Convention analysis Yugoslavia might be
considered a separating state, as distinguished from a newly independent state. 3°
The Convention rules for separation of states are relatively straightforward and logical,
and they reflect the newly independent state concept, but not the clean slate doctrine.
31
The primary principle is that any treaty in force upon the date of separation continues in
force for each state if the treaty applies to the whole territory of the prior state. If the treaty
applies only to the territory of one of the separating states, it travels with the territory. There
are four exceptions to these principles: (1) where "the States concerned otherwise agree;"
(2) where the treaty provides otherwise; (3) when application of the treaty to the successor
would be incompatible with the treaty's object and purpose; and (4) when succession would
radically change conditions for the operation of the treaty.332 The same principles apply
when a state continues after separation of its territory.333 The Convention's provisions for
treaties not in force, for treaties signed subject to ratification, acceptance, or approval, and
for notification are similar to those for newly independent states.31 This article illustrates
the critical difference between separation as a newly independent state and other separations.
Under Article 8 of the Convention, a newly independent state is not bound to any
devolution agreement between it and the predecessor. If the new state is not classified as
330. Vienna Treaty Succession Convention, supra note 38, art. 30, 17 I.L.M. at 150-405, also provides
principles for newly independent states. While there have been media accounts of possible unions of parts or
all of the new republics, none have resulted in a loss of statehood in the process. For example, the Baltic
republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have joined a customs union. This did not result in loss of statehood.
See supra notes 143-49 and accompanying text. The Convention's provisions for uniting states, where one state
remains, do not apply to the EC merger process analyzed in Part 1; the EC members clearly remain separate
states. See Vienna Treaty Succession Convention, supra note 38, arts. 30-31, 17 I.L.M. at 1506-08.
331. Stewart, supra note 38, at 642-44, notes the inconsistency.
332. Vienna Treaty Succession Convention, supra note 38, art. 34, 17 1.L.M. at 1509.
333. Id., art. 35, 17 1.L.M. at 1509.
334. Compare id., arts. 36-38, 17 I.L.M. at 1510-11 with id., arts. 18-29, 22, 17 I.L.M. at 1497-98, 1500.
For analysis of the former, see ILC Report, supra note 38, at 267-69; for analysis of the latter, see supra notes
292-303 and accompanying text.
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"newly independent," it is bound.335 The draft Convention, as proposed by the
International Law Commission, added a third paragraph to the separating state provision
which stated that if part of the territory of a separating state "becomes a State in
circumstances which are essentially of the same character as those of ... a newly
independent state," the successor should be regarded as a newly independent state.336 The
omission is inconsequential if it is assumed that "newly independent state," as defined in the
Convention, has the same meaning under customary law. In this respect, the Commission's
Report is not helpful.337
In the case of true newly independent states, the record of practice is clear: they start
with a clean slate. The classic cases on the subject are the independence of the U.S. from
Great Britain and the independence of former Spanish colonies, including Cuba, from Spain.
Even Czechoslovakia and Poland, the latter having a rich history of independence before
disappearance in the Nineteenth Century, started with a clean slate.3 38 The Restatement
(Third), Foreign Relations makes no distinction between a newly independent state and a
succeeding new state. Each is entitled to a clean slate,3 39 an even more radical departure
from traditional views relying on thepacta suntservanda principle, which is the principle
that international agreements should be observed in good faith.
The record of state practice is more mixed where the separating states each have had
some claim to the attributes of statehood before separation and succession. The majority of
recent practice leans toward the Convention rule of the application to all succeeding states
of treaties brought into force during the period of union. ° The closest precedent for the
Yugoslavia situation would be extinction of the Dual Monarchy and the separation of a
shrunken and separate Austria and Hungary by the Treaty of St.-Germain-en-Laye. 34' In
that situation, Austria argued for newly independent state status, while Hungary chose to
follow the old treaties of the Dual Monarchy."2 The Treaty also combined Serbia, which
was then an independent state, Montenegro, which was also nominally independent,
335. Compare Vienna Treaty Succession Convention, supra note 38, art. 34(2)(a), 17 I.L.M. at 1509 with
id. art. 8, 17 I.L.M. at 1493. The Convention defines "newly independent state" as "a successor State the
territory of which immediately before the date of the succession . . .was a dependent territory for the
international relations of which the predecessor State was responsible." Id., art. 2(1)(t), 17 l.L.M. at 1490.
336. Compare Vienna Treaty Succession Convention, supra note 38, art. 34, 17 I.LM. at 1509, with Draft
Articles on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, art. 33(3), ILC Report, supra note 38, at 260.
337. See ILC Report, supra note 38, at 176 (commenting on article 2(1)(f) of the Vienna Treaty Succession
Convention); see also supra notes 261-62 and accompanying text.
338. ILC Report, supra note 38, at 263.
339. RESTATEmENT (THIRD), supra note 6, § 210(3) & n.4.
340. Compare ILC Report, supra note 38, at 260-63 with Vienna Treaty Succession Convention, supra
note 38, arts. 34(l), 35, 17 I.L.M. at 1509; see also 5 HACKWORTH, DIGEST § 512, at 362 (1943) (separation
of Norway, Sweden).
341. Peace Treaty of SL-Gennaine-en-Laye, Sept. 10, 1919, arts. 27, 90-91, 226 Consol. T.S. at 14-18,
36; Peace Treaty of Trianon, June 4, 1920, arts. 27-38, 74-75, 113 British & Foreign St. Papers 486, 501-07,
517-18. Other analogies might be the spinoff of Ecuador, New Granada (later Colombia) and Venezuela in 1824-
31; dissolution of the union of Norway and Sweden in 1905; the separation of Denmark and Iceland in 1944;
and the end of the short-lived United Arab Republic, where Egypt and Syria resumed separate statehood status
in 1961. Jones, supra note 38 at 369-71, would classify the independence of Burma, Ceylon, India and Pakistan
as "prima facie" separating state cases, but with "special considerations." Today these situations would be
classified in the circumstance of devolution agreements with newly independent states, but at that time (1947)
could not have placed in their later context. Id. See supra notes 244-47 and accompanying text.
342. ILC Report, supra note 38, at 261.
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Macedonia, Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, all under the control of Austria-
Hungary at the end of World War I, into Yugoslavia.
3
Now, after 70 years, Yugoslavia has ruptured into four new independent republics, and
it retains only the territory of the former Serbia and Montenegro, which perhaps were the
most independent of the six areas before World War I, as a rump Yugoslavia. Croatia
enjoyed brief puppet state status under Nazi Germany, but this hiatus was rejected after
World War II.' Although the argument may be advanced today, it is likely to receive
little credence in arguments for continuity of Croatia other than as a dependent state before
the 1991 breakaway. Thus, the curious result is that rump Yugoslavia with its constituent
parts of Serbia and Montenegro, which were the only components with real independent
existence before World War I and the settlement in the Treaty of Trianon and its associated
agreements, may be saddled with a treaty burden. By contrast, Croatia, Macedonia,
343. Under the Peace Treaty of St.-Germain-en-Laye, Sept. 10, 1919, arts. 46-52,226 Consol. T.S. 8,23-
27, Austria recognized "the complete independence of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State," later to become
Yugoslavia, and Yugoslavia's sovereignty over its territory. The Treaty between the Principal Allied and
Associated Powers and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, Sept. 10, 1919, art. 12,226 Consol. T.S. 182, 183, declared
that all treaties, etc. between the Powers and Serbia in force on August 1, 1914, or which had been entered into
subsequently between them and Serbia, were "ipsofacto [to] be binding upon the Serb-Croat-Slovene State."
Other provisions declared protections for Muslims and other minorities. Id Although a signatory, the United
States never ratified either agreement but concluded separate bilateral peace treaties with Austria and Hungary,
incorporating articles 46-52 of the Treaty of St.-Germain-en-Laye by reference but assuming no obligations for
the United States. Treaty of Peace, Aug. 21, 1921, Austria-U.S., arts. 1, 2(3), 42 Stat. 1946, 1948, 7 L.N.T.S.
155, 158-60; Treaty of Peace, Aug. 29, 1921, Hungary-U.S., arts. 1, 2(3), 42 Stat. 1951, 1952-53, 48 L.N.T.S.
191, 194-96. Thus the United States achieved, at least insofar as Austria and Hungary were concerned,
recognitioii of Yugoslavian sovereignty. There was never any treaty recognition of the succession of the Serbian
treaties, but later practice of the United States achieved the same result. See Ivancevic v. Artukovic, 211 F.2d
565, 566-73 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 818 (1954); U.S. amicus brief for id., reprinted in 2
WHITrrEMAN, DIGEST ch. 4, § 10, at 941,943-49. Although HYD., supra note 54, at 1535, would agree with the
U.S. position that Yugoslavia was a continuation and enlargement of Serbia, other commentators said that a new
state came into being. See MARFK, supra note 10, at 237-62; Ivancevic, supra at 572 n. 19 (noting division of
authorities and cases on the point). Thus for the United States, the Yugoslavia of 1920 involved application of
the "moving treaty frontiers" doctrine. See supra note 235 and accompanying text. The evolution of Yugoslavia
came during the disintegration of the Austria-Hungarian Empire in late 1918. Serbia annexed Montenegro, whose
government-in-exile was later denied a League of Nations membership in 1920. Local national governments
sprang into existence in the capitals of Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and elsewhere; these
recognized the supreme authority of a National Council in Zagreb, Croatia. After Austria-Hungary transferred
the Austria-Hungarian navy on the Adriatic Sea to the Council, the Council notified the World War I Allies of
the establishment of the new state and of its intention to unite with Serbia. The union with Serbia was effective
December 1, 1918. MAREK, supra at 237-41; Recognition: Recognition of New States: Yugoslavia, 1
HACKWORTH DIGEST § 46. Thus Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina have followed the same pattern
in 1991-92 as in 1918-19, and one wonders whether a new loose federal union, less Serbia, may be in the offing
in a few years. Conference for Peace in Yugoslavia, Arbitration Commission, Opinion No. 10, 31 I.L.M. 1525,
1526 (1992), has declared that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) is a "new state"
and not "the sole successor" to the former Yugoslavia. Whether this will have an impact on individual states'
practice, e.g. that of the United States, remains to be seen.
344. See 2 WHnrEMAN, DIGEST ch. 4, § 1 at 769 (citing Socony Vacuum Oil Co. Claim, 21 I.L.R. 55
(Int'l Claims Comm'n 1954). In this regard, wartime Croatia was similar to the circumstances of the
dismemberment of Czechoslovakia by the Munich Agreement of 1938, by which the largely German Sudetenland
was ceded to Hitler's Germany; the establishment of the German-ruled Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia
in early 1939; cession of part of Slovalda and Carpatho-Ruthenia to Hungary by arbitration in November 1938;
and the establishment of the Republic of Slovalda in March 1939 as a German puppet state; only the United
States consistently refused to recognize these developments. MAREK, supra note 10, at 283-330. Other, similar
situations of that era included Austria, Albania, and the Baltic states. Id at 331-416.
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Slovenia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, if the latter survives in some form,"5 will have the
options available under the clean slate principle.
IV. OTHER FACTORS BEARING ON TREATY SUCCESSION
Although the Convention on Treaty Succession may serve as a fair restatement of some
customary principles of treaty succession,6 there are other factors that must be weighed
in considering whether treaties survive the current state successions 47 These factors are
grounded in the law of treaties, 8 as distinguished from the law of treaty succession. They
are found in other international agreements such as the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, custom, general principles of law, the research of scholars, judicial decisions, and
the resolutions of international organizations. 4 Those that favor continuity include: (1)
pacta suntservanda; (2) amorphous and sometimes overlapping concepts of acquiescence,
novation, and estoppel or preclusion; (3) continuation of treaty terms through other sources
of international law, such as custom; and (4) accession. On the other hand, treaties can be
invalidated, suspended, or terminated by a number of means: (1) through manifest disregard
of a party's internal constitutional ratification processes; (2) by error, fraud, or corruption
of a negotiator; (3) by coercion of a negotiator or the state; (4) through the unequal treaties
doctrine; (5) by means ofjus cogens, which is a fundamental international norm; (6) by
denunciation; (7) through negotiation of termination; (8) by a new treaty on the same subject;
(9) through material breach; (10) by impossibility of performance; (11) through fundamental
change of circumstances; and (12) by war or armed conflict.
When new states make a unilateral declaration as to some but not all of their treaties and
their treaty partners accept the declaration, there is arguably a novation which cuts off claims
345. See Charles Sudetic, Life Turns Bleak and Perilous in Serb-Held Area in Croatia, N.Y. TMEs, Oct.
14, 1992, at Al; Charles Sudetic, The Many "Non-Negotiable" Demands, N.Y. TDAES, Aug. 25, 1992, at A8;
Charles Sudetic, Serbs are Bracing for Feared Invasion of "Their" Republic in Bosnia, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 9,
1992, at 12. See also supra note 343 (discussing the possible status of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)).
346. Cf. RESTATEMENT ('HI), supra note 6, § 209, r.n. 4; lea § 210.
347. Both the Vienna Convention, supra note 6, art. 4, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 335, and the Vienna Treaty
Succession Convention, supra note 38, art. 3, 14, 17 IL.M. at 1491, 1495 emphasize that such parallel principles
can apply. See also ILC Report, supra note 38, at 177, 208.
348. See SINcLAnt, supra note 156, at 245 (describing the law in this area as an "unintended triptych" of
the Vienna Convention, supra note 6, in the center, the Vienna Treaty Succession Convention, supra note 38,
on one side and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and International Organizations,
Mar. 21, 1986, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.129/15 (1986), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 543 (1986) on the other). The Vienna
Convention, although now in force, is of course not the only source for law. See infra note 347. The Treaty
Succession Convention is complemented by the Vienna State Property Succession Convention, supra note 39,
which would govern this aspect of the problem, absent a treaty on point. See supra note 41 and accompanying
text. There is also a wealth of nontreaty sources on problems of succession to public and private property and
rights. See supra note 39. Thus Sinclair's triptych metaphor is inadequate; the problem is more like a Rubik's
Cube or a brilliant-cut diamond, depending on the researcher's point of view or sense of humor.
349. The analytical approach of the RESTATEMET (THIRD), supra note 6, §§ 102-03, by which treaties,
custom and general principles are considered primary sources and general principles playing only an interstitial
role, and judicial decisions, scholars' research, and resolutions of international organizations as evidence of
sources undergirds the approach of Part IV. I.CJ. STATUTE, art. 38(1), is a similar and more traditional analysis
and is required in cases before the International Court of Justice. Other authorities have limited general principles
to an interstitial place. GERHARD VON GLAHN, THE LAW AMONG NATioNs 23-24 (5th ed. 1986).
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against continuity.35 ° This argument may hold in the case of some claims, as with unequal
treaties, but it does not cover other claims against continuity which may arise later, such as
those falling under the heading of impossibility or fundamental change of circumstances.
Nor would the argument cover devolution agreements,"' clean slate proclamations,"'
or even the situation where a state refuses to agree with the unilateral declaration list.
A. Factors Favoring Continuity
Chief among the factors outside the Succession Convention is the doctrine which is
stated in the U.N. Charter, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the preamble to
the Succession Convention, and customary law, that treaties should be observed: pacta sunt
servanda."3 The force of the doctrine, which favors stability of international agreements,
competes in the succession context with sovereignty, which is also enshrined in the Charter
and elsewhere,3" and with the developing principles of equal rights and self-determination
of peoples.5 s In the context of succession to treaties, apart from arguments based on the
law of treaty succession, a powerful argument can be made that principles embodied in
treaties affecting a successor ought to be observed by that state, particularly if the treaty is
of longstanding duration for the predecessor, the successor, or both.
350. CHEN, supra note 179, at 221-22 (discussing claims of unequal treaties). See also supra notes 248-56
and accompanying text (discussing the impact of unilateral declarations).
351. See supra notes 244-45 and accompanying text.
352. See supra notes 263-73 and accompanying text.
353. U.N. CHARTER, preamble, art. 2(2); Vienna Convention, supra note 6, art. 26, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 339;
Vienna Treaty Succession Convention, supra note 38, preamble, 17 I.L.M. at 1488; Lukashak, supra note 167,
at 513; BROWNLIE, supra note 38, at 616; ILC Report, supra note 6, at 211; HANS KmasEN, PURE THEORY OF
LAW 216 (Max Knight trans. 1967) (pacta sunt servanda a customary norm); McNALR, supra note 38, at 493-505
(general presumption); REsTATEmENT (THIRD), supra note 6, § 321; Wolfgang Friedmann, The Uses of "General
Principles" in the Development of International Law, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 279, 286-87 (1963) (pacta sunt
servanda is a general principle of law); Harvard Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 20, 29 AM. J.
INT'L L. Supp. 657, 661 (1935); Tariq Hassan, Good Faith in Treaty Formation, 21 VA. J. INT'L L. 443,480-81
(1981) (good faith a "firm legal principle"); Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar.
v. U.S.), 1986 I.CJ. 14, 135-42 (June 27); Texaco Overseas Petrol. Co. v. Libya, 17 I.L.M. at 19. T.O. ELIAS,
THE MODERN LAW OF TRATIS 43-44 (1974) notes that pacta sunt servanda cannot be a jus cogens principle
because there are certain exceptions, e.g. rebus sic stantibus, discussed infra at notes 402-07 and accompanying
text.
354. U.N. CHARTER arts. 2(1), 2(7); BROWNLTE, supra note 38, ch. 13; MCNAIR, supra note 38, at 754-66;
R.P. Anand, Sovereign Equality of States in International Law, 197 REcuEiL DES COuRs 9, 22-51, 189 (1986);
Humphrey Waldock, General Course on Public International Law, 106 REcuEn. DES CoURs 1, 156-72 (1962);
Gerald Fitzmaurice, The General Principles of International Law Considered From the Standpoint of the Rule
of Law, 92 RECuEm DES CouRs 1, 49-50 (1957); Manfred Lachs, The Development and General Trends of
International Law in Our Time, 169 REcuEnL DES CouRs 1, 77-84 (1980); S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927
P.C.IJ. (ser. A), No. 10, at 4, 18; S.S. Wimbledon (U.K. v. Ger.), 1923 P.C.IJ.(ser. A), No. 1, at 15, 25.
355. U.N. CHARTER, preamble, arts. 1(2), 55, 73-74; BROWL, a.supra note 38, at 513, 595-98 (seen as
probably protected by the jus cogens principle); Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-Operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, U.N.
G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. Doe. A/RES/2625 (1970), reprinted in 65 AJ.I.L. 243,249-50 (1971); Advisory Opinion
on Namibia, 1971 I.CJ. 16, 31; Western Sahara, 1975 I.CJ. 12, 31-35: id at 121-22 (Dillard, J., separate
Opinion). The scope of the right of self-determination has been debated. See Rosenstock, supra note 265. Its
influence on the Treaty Succession Convention is manifest. Vienna Treaty Succession Convention, supra note
38, preamble, 17 I.L.M. at 1489.
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The general principles of acquiescence, estoppel or preclusion, and novation may
validate an international agreement that the successor argues is no longer in force. These
terms overlap with each other and with other principles such as good faith, which is often
argued as a part of thepacta suntservanda doctrine.356 Descriptive phrases and statements
in treaties can play a role in these kinds of claims.357 If such principles, which declare that
a state should not be allowed to argue against a rule because either its conduct is consistent
with the rule or it has not objected to practice under the rule, apply to nonbinding
agreements358 or otherwise nonbinding resolutions of international organizations,3 9 then
these principles should be enforced for treaties, which are a primary source of international
law.3 60 The doctrines have been employed in a variety of contexts, including the
circumstance of devolution agreements,6 and they provide strong ancillary arguments for
upholding a predecessor's treaty regime, particularly when the successor negotiates a
devolution agreement or does nothing. Given the situation in Eastern Europe, the latter
circumstance may occur.
Although the principal vehicle is custom, treaty principles could also continue to bind
a successor through application of general principles of law.362 Moreover, other subsidiary
sources, or evidence of sources, such as judicial decisions, the research of competent
scholars, and the resolutions of international organizations, can buttress an argument based
356. See, e.g., BRowNLE supra note 38, at 161 (estoppel rests in part on good faith); id. at 162 (novation
covers acquiescence and estoppel); Oscar Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice, 178 REcUEiL
DES CouRs 9, 121 (1982) (estoppel is part of good faith); see also supra note 353.
357. Although McNAiRsupra note 38, at 486-87, confined his statement to estoppel situations, his citation
to Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.IJ. (ser. A)2 No. 53, at 22, 68, a decision thought
by some to involve acquiescence, demonstrates that treaty language may be employed for claims other than
estoppel as well as the overlapping nature of these doctrines. Lord McNair does consider good faith separately.
Id, at 549-50.
358. Oscar Schachter, The Twilight Eristence of Nonbinding International Agreements, 71 AM. J. INT'L
L. 296, 301 (1977).
359. Schachter, supra note 356, at 121.
360. I.CJ. STATUTE art. 38(l)(a); RESTATEMENT (THRD), supra note 6, §§ 102(l)(b), 102(3).
361. Vienna Convention, supra note 6, art. 45, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 343 (general norm); JLC Report, supra
note 6, at 239; RESTATEMENT (THmD), § 325 r.n. 5. See generally, BROWNLHE, supra note 38, at 161-63, 640-43
(commenting on estoppel in Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thail.), 1962 I.CJ. 6 (boundary dispute),
novation in the Right of Passage (Port. v. India), 1960 LCJ. 6 (territorial disputes), estoppel in Hendry Claim,
4 R.I.A.A. 616 (Mex.-U.S. Gen. Claims Comm'n 1930); estoppel in the Award by King of Spain (Hond. v.
Nicar.), 1960 I.CJ. 192 (conduct by loser of an arbitral award), Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.CJ. 392 (acquiescence in recognizing compulsory jurisdiction under
I.CJ. STATuTE art. 36(2)); Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, 1933 P.C.IJ. (ser. A/B) No. 53, at 22
(acquiescence to sovereignty)). 2 O'CoNNELT, supra note 38, at 371-73 (devolution agreements plus express or
tacit consent constitutes a novation; successor is bound); SINCLAiR, supra note 156, at 168-69, 180-81; D.W.
Bowett, Estoppel Before International Tribunals and Its Relations to Acquiescence, 33 BRIT. Y. B. INT'L L. 176,
202 (1957) (general principles of estoppel); Sharma, supra note 161, at 36-42 (estoppel, acquiescence in border
disputes); Resolutions: Successions of New States to the Treaties and Certain Other Obligations of Their
Predecessors, I l(b)(ii), in ILA 53D REPORT, supra note 38, at xiii, which also requires the successor to be
notified or otherwise know about the agreement. Although the RESTATEMENT ('aim), supra note 6, Introductory
Note, at 147 might argue against citation to analogous municipal law concepts in this context, query whether
such might be considered under general principles of law.
362. BRowNLm, supra note 38, at 12, 14; ANTHoNY D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN
INTERNATIONAL LAw 104-06, 114, 136, 164 (1971); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 6, §§ 102, 210 & cmt.
i; Michael Akehurst, Custom as a Source of International Law, 47 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 49-52 (1974);
Jennings, supra note 48, at 305-06 (discussing the reverse phenomenon of a custom-codifying treaty).
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on general principles or custom. 3 63 If the treaty principle is elevated to the relatively rare
and rarefied level ofjus cogens, then no subsequent treaty action can dislodge it, at least
under the view of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.364 Thus, if practice
under a treaty becomes general enough to be accepted as law, if it is recognized as a general
principle, or if the treaty codifies such a practice or principle, the successor may find itself
bound by the treaty, notwithstanding a successful defense against application of a norm
based solely on the treaty.365
The accession by a successor state to its predecessor's treaties is the easiest solution to
the treaty succession problem. In such a case, the treaty must provide for accession by states
not party to the negotiations or it must be shown that the negotiating states agreed that other
states could accede.36 6 However, all parties to a treaty may subsequently agree to the
accession.3 61 Such limitations on accessions were employed in earlier times with more
frequency than today. For most general multilateral conventions, the opportunity and time
to accede is unlimited. For example, both the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and
the Succession Convention have such provisions
61
B. Factors Favoring Invalidity, Suspension, or Termination
Even if a successor state cannot argue successfully that a treaty should not devolve on
it under the law of treaty succession, it may assert that the treaty is unenforceable on grounds
of invalidity or on grounds that the treaty should be suspended or terminated under the law
of treaties. In some instances, these grounds may relate to events during the predecessor
state's regime, and in other cases, the situation might arise when the treaty otherwise would
be in force for the successor. In some circumstances, the objection could pertain to either
regime.
363. I.CJ. STATUTE art. 38(4); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 6, § 103.
364. Vienna Convention, supra note 6, arts. 53, 64, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 344, 347-48; see also ILC Report,
supra note 6, at 247-49, 261. Contra, SINCLAIR, supra note 156, at 222. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 6,
§ 331 accepts the Vienna Convention formula but includes a limited list of jus cogens-protected norms. Levan
Alexidze, Legal Nature ofJus Cogens in Contemporary International Law, 172 REcuEiL DES CouRs 219, 262-
63 (1981) gives a more generous list for the Soviet view. The Restatement position is followed by Eduoardo
Jimenez de Arechaga, International Law in the Past Third of a Century, 159 RECUIL DES CouRs 1, 64-67
(1978), first vice-chair of the Commission when the Convention was presented to the General Assembly. See
also SINCLAIR, supra note 156, at 18, 218-26 (noting the wide range of views on the subject but concluding that
there is a place for the concept, and that its parameters, as of 1984, were relatively narrow). The 1979 Soviet
military intervention into Afghanistan, pursuant to a 1978 agreement between that country and the USSR, was
condemned in part under the jus cogens principle of art. 53. States-International Status, Attributes, and Types,
1979 DIGEST § 1, at 34 (quoting Memorandum from Roberts B. Owen, Legal Adviser, U.S. State Department,
to Warren Christopher, Acting Secretary of State (Dec. 29, 1979)). For a general discussion of the jus cogens
principle, see ELIAS, supra note 353, at 177-87.
365. Schachter, supra note 356, at 91-101; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.CJ. 14, 31-38, 91-135; Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22.
366. Vienna Convention, supra note 6, arts. 15(a)-(b), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 336; see also ILC Report, supra
note 6, at 199-200 (noting that the Commission decided to accept the view for the Convention that states could
accede to treaties not yet in force). SINCLAIR, supra note 156, at 42.
367. Vienna Convention, supra note 6, art. 15(a), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 336.
368. Id., art. 83, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 352; Vienna Treaty Succession Convention, supra note 38, art. 48, 17
I.L.M. at 1514. Earlier treaties or commentators may employ "adherence" or "adhesion" in place of accession.
BROWNLIE, supra note 38, at 607-08.
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1. Grounds for Invalidating Treaties
a. Violation of State Law
Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a state may assert that a treaty is
invalid if the treaty violates that state's internal law of competence to conclude treaties,
provided that the violation was "manifest and concerned a rule.., of fundamental
importance." The violation is manifest "if it would be objectively evident to any State
conducting itself... in accordance with normal practice and in good faith."369 This is a
middle position between a view that a state's constitutional limitations always govern
international validity and the position that states are always bound by their treaties, an agent
duly authorized under international law giving consent to the treaties."3 This claim to
invalidity might be grounded on a violation of the predecessor's constitutional process when
the treaty was negotiated, and it might be raised in connection with the successor's
devolution agreement with the predecessor, or perhaps in connection with the successor's
subsequent agreements with third states about what treaties were in force. Given the fluidity
of constitutional development in new states and, perhaps, the rapid turnover of these
documents, the potential for invocation of this objection is more likely today than during the
era of major decolonization, 1945-1975.
b. Error
The same situations may give rise to occasions for errors in the negotiation of the
agreement. The Vienna Convention, stating the customary law on the point, 71 says that
error can vitiate a treaty only if the error relates to a fact or situation which the state assumed
when the treaty was concluded and which was "an essential basis of its consent to be bound.
..." This principle does not apply if the state contributed to the error by its own conduct or
if, under the circumstances, the state should have been on notice of the error.372
369. Vienna Convention, supra note 6, art. 46, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 343; see also ILC Report, supra note 6,
at 240-42, which declares that such objections are rare. SINCLAIR, supra note 156, at 19, believes that recent
practice has confirmed the customary status of art. 46, although some early commentators argued the provision
represented only progressive development. See also id. at 169-71.
370. BROWNIE, supra note 38, at 613-14; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 6, § 311, cmt. c;
See Louis HENKiN, FoRmGN AFFAIRs AND TE CoNSTrrUTIoN 427 n. 21 (1970) (discussing whether the United
States could claim not to be bound by a presidential agreement to which the Senate had not consented);
McNAIR, supra note 38, at 63. The Vienna Convention, supra note 6, art. 47, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 343-44, declares
that the authority of a representative is presumed unless any restriction on authority was communicated to other
negotiators. See also ILC Report, supra note 6, at 243, which states that such disavowals are rare. Moreover,
art. 47 does not apply if the treaty is subject to ratification, acceptance, or approval, since the equivalent of the
Department of State is the final authority, not the representative in the field. SINCLAIR, supra note 156, at 171-
72.
371. BROWNLE, supra note 38, at 614; JLC Report, supra note 6, at 243-45. The RESTATEMENT (THIRD),
supra note 6, Pt. I, Introductory Note, at 147, cautions against ascribing municipal law notions of mistake in
contracting to treatymaking, but query whether such might be argued under general principles of law.
372. Vienna Convention, supra note 6, arts. 48(1)-(2), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 344. SINCLAIR, supra note 156,
at 15, says that art. 48 may involve progressive development as well as a recitation of customary law, citing the
Convention's omission of denying a claim of error if a party could have avoided it, in addition to denying the
claim if a party's conduct contributed to the error, as stated in Temple of Preah Vihar (Thai. v. Cambodia), 1962
I.C.J. at 26. See also SINCLAIR, supra note 156, at 172-73. Error is one of those grounds for invalidation that
lie in the hands of the affected party, which must claim it. SINcLAT, supra note 156 at 161 (citing Jimenez de
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c. Fraud
The Convention allows fraud as a basis for invalidating a treaty. 3 "Fraud, when it
occurs, strikes at the root of an agreement. . .; it destroys the whole basis of mutual
confidence between the parties."374 As in the case of error, such claims are rare,375 but
fraud may be invoked under the circumstances of original negotiation, when the devolution
agreement was concluded, upon a subsequent confirmation of the treaty, or at accession.
I. Corruption or Coercion
Corruption or coercion of a state representative are grounds for voiding treaties.7
Coercion may include intimidating those involved in the ratification process or the members
of a representative's family.377 The International Law Commission felt that nominal gifts
or favors,37 8 traditionally exchanged at signature or other times, do not constitute
corruption. If a state is coerced by the threat or use of force in violation of the U.N. Charter,
a treaty procured by such a threat is void.3 79 The Commission considered this provision
Arechaga, supra note 364, at 68); accord RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 6, § 338(1). The Harvard
Convention, infra note 425, art. 29. 29 AM. J. INT'L L. Soil'. 657, 662 (1935) would allow error as a ground
for suspension.
373. Vienna Convention, supra note 6, art. 49, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 344. SINCLAIR, supra note 156, at 16,
says that because art. 49 draws from general principles, its content is primarily progressive development in
nature as opposed to a codification of custom. See also id. at 173-74. Like error, supra note 372, fraud is one
of those grounds for invalidation that lie in the hands of the affected party, which must claim it. Id. at 161
(citing Jimenez de Arechaga, supra note 364, at 68); accord RESTATEmENT (T RD), supra note 6, § 338(1);
Harvard Convention, art. 31; 29 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 657, 663 (1935).
374. ILC Report, supra note 6, at 244.
375. ILC Report, supra note 6, at 243, 245. SINCLAIR, supra note 156, at 15, 173, says they may be
nonexistent. Although RESTATEMENT ('m), supra note 6, Pt. EIf, Introductory Note, at 147 warns against
citing municipal law on fraud in contracting, query whether such principles might be useful under the heading
of general principles of law.
376. Vienna Convention, supra note 6, arts. 50-51, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 344. Probably art. 50 (corruption)
represents progressive development of the law, while art. 51 (coercion) reflects customary law, except to the
extent that art. 51 declares that coercion of a representative voids a treaty, as distinguished from making it
voidable, which is customary as well. Compare SINCLAIR, supra note 156, at 16 with McNAIR, supra note 38,
at 207-08. See also SINCLAIR, supra note 156 at 161 (citing, inter alia, Jimenez de Arechaga, supra note 364,
at 68). Although the RESTATEMENT (TIHED), supra note 6, Pt. III, Introductory Note, 147 cautions against use
of municipal law concepts of duress in this context, query whether such might be argued under general principles
of law. Id. § 338(1) follows the Convention and SINCLAIR, supra note 156, but its wording in § 338(2), referring
only to jus cogens, leaves the question of coercion of a representative unanswered. It appears to be an
unfortunate hiatus.
377. ILC Report, supra note 6, at 146. See also SINCLAIR, supra note 156, at 176-77. The Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, arts. 29-37(2), 23 U.S.T. 3227, 3240-44, 500 U.N.T.S. 95,
110-16 codifies this longstanding rule of immunity for diplomats and their families.
378. ILC Report, supra note 6, at 245; see also ELIAs, supra note 353, at 166-67.
379. Vienna Convention, supra note 6, art. 52, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 344; U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4). As in the
case of coercion of a representative, supra notes 376-78, coercion of a state voids the treaty. SINCLAIR, supra
note 156, at 161 (citing Jimenez de Arechaga, supra note 364, at 68). The RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note
6, § 338, appears equivocal. See supra note 376.
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as customary law. 38' However, if a treaty is negotiated in connection with a state's
aggression in violation of the Charter, that is, an armistice or surrender agreement by the
aggressor, the Convention's coercion and other principles do not apply. 3 1 Although the
Commission considered adding economic pressure to the coercion rule, after acrimonious
debate the addition was relegated to a Final Act appended to the Convention. 82 In general,
statements such as the Final Act are not considered part of a treaty.383
The state coercion problem was reflected in the Treaty Succession Convention in its
special provisions for newly independent states and, more particularly, in its statement that
a devolution agreement does not ipso facto pass the predecessor's treaty regime to the
successor. The same rule applies to unilateral declarations, for many of the same
reasons.3 These Convention protections aside, any new state, newly independent or not,
may claim that a treaty was imposed on it by force or threat of force. Given the situation in
the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, it is possible that such claims will be raised.
e. Jus Cogens
Jus cogens, which may uphold a treaty principle if it has become a fundamental
norm, 85 can also be a shield if a treaty term opposed to the norm is asserted.386
f Unequal Treaties
The doctrine of unequal treaties, which the Vienna Convention does not mention, may
be asserted in a claim of invalidity. The doctrine of unequal treaties was originally
developed by prewar Chinese and postwar communist writers, but newly independent states
now assert it, too. Western jurists oppose it because it is too vague. The doctrine says that
380. JLC Report, supra note 6, at 246; see also SINCLAIR, supra note 156, at 17, who notes the agreement
of Fisheries Jurisdiction (Ice. v. U.K.), 1973 I.CJ. at 14. See also Herbert W. Briggs, Unilateral Denunciation
of Treaties: The Vienna Convention and the International Court ofJustice, 68 AM. J. INTL L. 51, 62-63 (1974);
Harvard Convention, infra note 425, art. 32. LAuTERPAcHT, supra note 373, § 74, while admitting in 1927 that
some commentators and then-recent events (e.g. Japan's Twenty-One Demands on China, 1915) would point
the other way, argued for "the well-established rule of international law" as to the admissibility of duress.
381. Vienna Convention, supra note 6, art. 75, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 350; see also ILC Report, supra note 6,
at 268.
382. SINcLAiR, supra note 156, at 177-8 1; EUAs, supra note 353, at 172-75; Richard D. Kearney &Robert
E. Dalton, The Treaty on Treaties, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 495, 532-35 (1970). The Final Act is not published as
part of the Convention in the United Nations Treaty Series. Although treaties need not be registered with the
Secretary-General unless parties wish to invoke them before U.N. bodies under U.N. CHARTER art. 102, the fact
that the Convention but not the Final Act was registered and published underscores the contemporary
understanding that the Act was not part of the Convention. CmN, supra note 179, at 42-49, argues strongly for
inclusion of economic pressure as a ground for invalidity, adding political pressure as a further ground. Some
states have attempted to reinsert the economic coercion ground by reservation or declaration. This has been met
by vigorous opposition. SINcLAIR, supra at 65-68.
383. Jimenez de Arechaga, supra note 364, at 37.
384. Vienna Treaty Succession Convention, supra note 38, arts. 8-9, 16-30, 17 1.L.M. at 1493-94, 1496-
1505. For further analysis, see supra notes 244-327 and accompanying text.
385. See supra note 363 and accompanying text; See infra note 433 and accompanying text.
386. Vienna Convention, supra note 6, arts. 53,64, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 344,347, undoubtedly progressive
development instead of codification. SINCLAm, supra note 156, at 17-18, 218-26. Jus cogens is also a ground
for voiding a treaty. Id. at 161 (citing Jimenez de Arechaga, supra note 364, at 68); accord RESTATEMENT
(Dr-im), supra note 6, § 338(2).
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treaties that are not concluded on the basis of sovereign equality of the parties are invalid.
Brownlie gives an example of the doctrine in an agreement between a powerful state and one
that is virtually a protectorate for economic or military base facilities.387 Chen has listed
a wide variety of agreements susceptible to the claim.388 The unequal treaties argument
approaches the issue of duress by force, threat of force, or economic power, but duress by
economic power was rejected for inclusion in the Vienna Convention." 9 The argument
could surface, particularly in connection with a devolution agreementsituation. An unequal
treaties claim may also lie behind an assertion of fundamental change of circumstances.39
2. Grounds for Suspending or Terminating Treaties
Besides the foregoing reasons for invalidating agreements inherited from a predecessor,
a successor state has several options for suspending or terminating an objectionable treaty.
a. Denunciation
Perhaps the simplest means of suspending or terminating a treaty is denunciation. If a
treaty has a termination clause, which frequently requires notice of one year, the successor
can give notice of termination. If there is no such clause, there is a presumption, flowing
from the pacta sunt servanda principle, that the treaty has unlimited duration, unless the
circumstances indicate otherwise. The successor can always negotiate termination39' or
suspend operation of the treaty if it so provides or if all parties agree.392 In the case of a
multilateral treaty, less than all parties can suspend its operation if the treaty provides for
387. BROWNLU, supra note 38, at 615-16 (citing inter alia, Ingrid Detter, The Problem of Unequal
Treaties, 15 INT'L & ComI. L.Q. 1069 (1966)); S. Prakash Sinha, Perspective of the Newly Independent States
on the Binding Quality of International Law, 14 INr'L & CoMp. L.Q. 121,123-24 (1965); CHEN, supra note 179,
at 28-34 (citing, inter alia, Ramond L. Buell, The Termination of Unequal Treaties, 1927 PRoc. Am. Soc'Y
INT'L L. 90-91). States unwilling to recognize such a doctrine may be willing to negotiate an arrangement based
on the new order, however. McNAIR, supra note 38, at 682-83.
The Treaty Succession Convention specifically exempts foreign military bases from its territorial regime
rules, along with the principle affirming the natural right and sovereignty of peoples and states over their natural
wealth and resources. Vienna Treaty Succession Convention, supra note 38, arts. 12(3)-13, 17 I.L.M. at 1495.
See also supra notes 204-07 and accompanying text.
388. CHEN, supra note 179, chs. 4-8 (political, economic, judicial, territorial, boundary treaties).
389. See supra notes 376-83 and accompanying text.
390. HYDE, supra note 54, at 1525. For analysis of fundamental change of circumstances, see infra notes
403-10 and accompanying text. Today unequal treaties may go unratified, as a U.S. administrative official
recently said in connection with the second strategic arms treaty. Erlanger, supra note 241. However, this does
not eliminate the problem of such a claim based on prior circumstances.
391. Vienna Convention, supra note 6, art. 56, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 345; see also ILC Report, supra note 6,
at 250-51; BROWNLIE, supra note 38, at 617; McNAnt, supra note 38, cs. 32-33; SINCLAIR, supra note 156,
at 186-88; RESTATEmENT (T"HI), supra note 6, § 332. Thus an agreement can be ended by implication arising
from conduct of the parties. If states discontinue use of a treaty, as distinguished from active conduct indicating
a treaty has been terminated, a claim of desuetude, implying termination by tacit consent, could arise. States
could also renounce unilaterally treaty rights. Finally, despite the parties' agreement, a very old treaty could
become meaningless and incapable of practical application. BROWNLIE, supra note 38, at 617-18 (citing inter
alia, Richard Plender, The Role of Consent in the Termination of Treaties, 57 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 133, 138-45,
(1986)); McNAiR, supra note 38, at 516-18; SINCLAIR, supra note 156, at 163-64.
392. Vienna Convention, supra note 6, art. 57, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 345; see also ILC Report, supra note 6,
at 250-51; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 6, § 333; SINCLAIR, supra note 156, at 183-84.
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suspension, if the suspension is not prohibited by the treaty, or if partial suspension is not
incompatible with its object and purchase.393
b. Conclusion of a New Treaty
Another efficient way to end a treaty relationship is to conclude a new treaty among all
parties to the earlier agreement, the successor state replacing its predecessor, with a clause
stating that the new pact supersedes the earlier one. Without such a clause, the Vienna
Convention would allow supersedure if the intent to do so is established or if the provisions
of the new treaty are "so far incompatible.., that the two.., are not'capable of being




The successor may claim that the treaty has been breached, but, following thepacta sunt
servanda policy, the breach must be "material," that is, a total repudiation or a violation of
a provision essential to accomplishing the object and purpose of the agreement. The treaty,
of course, may establish terms in event of a breach. The claimant cannot have caused the
breach, and even a material breach of a humanitarian convention, which are those treaties
dealing withjus in bello, cannot justify suspension or other action by the claimant.395
Claim of a material breach, without notice and other procedures, does not entitle a claimant
to assert that a treaty is terminated. 396
. Impossibility of Performance
Given the economic upheavals and general depression in the former Soviet Union, along
with the widespread dislocations and destruction in what was Yugoslavia, it is possible that
the emerging states will assert supervening impossibility of performance of treaty
obligations. A claim of impossibility could arise from the "permanent disappearance or
destruction of an object indispensable for the execution of the treaty. If the impossibility is
temporary, it may be invoked only... [to] suspend... operation of the treaty."
Impossibility, under the Vienna Convention, cannot be invoked if it results from a breach by
the claimant "either of an obligation under the treaty or of any other international obligation
393. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 6, art. 58, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 345; see also
SINCLAIR, supra note 156, at 185.
394. Vienna Convention, supra note 6, id., art. 59, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 345-46; see also ILC Report, supra
note 6, at 252-53; McNAIR, supra note 38, ch. 31; RESTATEMENT (-nIRD), supra note 6, § 323; SINCLAIR, supra
note 156, at 184.
395. Special rules apply for multilateral agreements. Vienna Convention, supra note 6, art. 60, 1155
U.N.T.S. at 346. The rules for multilaterals were applied in Advisory Opinion on Namibia, 1971 I.CJ. 16,46-47
(June 21) and in Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council (India v. Pak.), 1972 I.CJ. 46, 67 (Aug. 18). See also,
RESTATEMENT (THRD), supra note 6, § 335; SINCLAIR, supra note 156, at 20, 166, 188-90. For U.S. practice,
see Invalidity, Termination, and Suspension of Operation, 1978 DioEsT § 4, at 767 (quoting reply of -Herbert
J. Hansell, Legal Advisor, U.S. State Department, to inquiry of Howard H. Baker, Jr., U.S. Senator (Mar. 1,
1978)). See also id. at 741 (underscoring the need for notice as the Convention provides if the United States
decides to denounce a treaty). See also BRowNtM, supra note 38, at 618-19.
396. JLC Report, supra note 6, at 253-55
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owed to any other party to the treaty."397 The Commission's Report states that total
extinction of a state, often cited as an example of impossibility, should not be considered as
being within the doctrine because it is better left to the law of treaty succession. 398 As
noted above, the law of state succession, particularly as expressed in the Succession
Convention, also includes provisions for impossibility of performance. 39 The separate
claim of impossibility based on events before succession or circumstances following a valid
transition by succession is of concern here.
Although the Report cites the destruction of a certain object, as in the case of the
submergence of an island, the drying of a river, or the destruction of a dam or hydro-electric
installation,' catastrophes on a larger scale, such as the submergence of an economy in
depression, the drying up of credit promoted by a chaotic political situation, or the
destruction of several cities or an industrial or agricultural economy during armed conflict,
could equally trigger a plea of impossibility. The key to treaty avoidance under the
impossibility doctrine is causation. If, for example, the new state or its predecessor is held
to have caused an armed conflict, which traces to the breach of the treaty, then that state
cannot claim impossibility of performance as a defense.
Occasionally, treaties will have clauses requiring negotiations if unusual and unforeseen
circumstances arise.4"' Even if a clause based on an impossibility theory cannot be
invoked, the parties to the treaty are free to negotiate a subsequent agreement.40 2 Thus,
even if some of the new states invoke impossibility, their treaty partners may negotiate a new
treaty, thereby perhaps modifying rights accruing to private parties.
e. Fundamental Change of Circumstances
Fundamental change of circumstances, or rebus sic stantibus, may be invoked. As is
true for impossibility of performance, this claim can arise in the context of the law of treaty
succession." Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which has rejected
397. Vienna Convention, supra note 6, art. 61, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 346; see also ELAs, supra note 351, at
128-30; ILC Report, supra note 6, at 255-56 (noting the relative rarity of the practice); SINCLAIR, supra note
156, at 190-92. McNAIt, supra note 38, at 685, does not recognize a separate doctrine, but some of his
hypothetical examples are clearly situations of impossibility, and might be cited separately as such.
RESTATEmENT (THIRD), supra note 6, § 336, cmt. c & r.n. 3, states that impossibility under the Convention
differs from the concept under municipal contract law or international trade law. See also id., Pt. III, Introductory
Note, at 147.
398. ILC Report, supra note 6, at 256.
399. See, e.g. Vienna Treaty Succession Convention, supra note 38, arts. 15(b), 17(2), 18(3), 19(3),27(5),
30(2)(a), 30(3)(a), 31(3), 32(3), 32(b), 33(2), 33(5), 34(2)(b), 35(c), 36(3), 37(2), 17 I.L.M. at 1496-98, 1503,
1505-10 ('incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty"); ILC Report, supra note 38, at 210. See also
supra notes 212-16, 257, 275, 286, 292, 294, 297-98, 328-34, 338 and accompanying text.
400. ILC Report, supra note 6, at 256. See also BROWNLU, supra note 38, at 619.
401. E-g. Treaty of Rome, supra note 74, arts. 225-26, 298 U.N.T.S. at 88-89.
402. See, e.g., 14 WHrTEmAN, DIoas ch. 42 § 40 (analyzing Financial Agreement, Dec. 6, 1945, U.K.-
U.S., art. 5, 60 Stat. 1841, 1842, as modified by Agreement, Mar. 6, 1957, U.K.-U.S., 8 U.S.T. 2443).
403. See, e.g., Vienna Treaty Succession Convention, supra note 38, arts. 15(b), 17(2), 18(3), 19(3), 27(5),
30(2)(a), 30(3)(a), 31(3), 32(3), 32(6), 33(2), 33(5), 34(2)(b), 35(c), 36(3), 37(2), 17 I.L.M. at 1496-98, 1503,
1505-10 ("would radically change the conditions for its operation"); ILC Report, supra note 38, at 210. See also
supra notes 212-16, 257, 275, 286, 292, 294, 297-98, 328-34, 338, and accompanying text; RESTATEMENT
(THIRD), supra note 6, § 210 cmt. b (refering to § 336 & cmt. a). The Restatement (Third) would lump
impossibility under the fundamental change rubric. Id. § 336 cmt. c.
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the Latin phrase to attempt to avoid the doctrinal implications of that term, the concept is
restated in a carefully circumscribed objective concept:'
(1) The change must "radically transform the scope of the obligation";
(2) the obligation must have been "an essential basis of the consent of the parties
to be bound by the treaty;"
(3) the change must not have been foreseen at the time the treaty was negotiated;
(4) the obligation must be one that remains to be performed under the treaty: a
state cannot seek to avoid the agreement if the remaining obligations under the
treaty are not affected by the change;
(5) fundamental change of circumstances cannot be asserted for boundary treaties;
and
(6) the claim cannot be advanced if the change is the result of a party's breaching
the treaty or a different international obligation owed other parties to the
treaty.'
Although there is customary law to the contrary, the Convention applies the doctrine to all
treaties, whether they be for a term of years or subject to a denunciation clause.40 6
Although it is seldom successfully invoked,0 7 the doctrine of fundamental change of
circumstances may be particularly applicable to the former USSR because of its
extraordinary changes. The changes have been not only structural and economic in nature
but also ideological, with an admixture of destructive armed conflict. Further, Yugoslavia
has experienced the worst armed conflict in Europe since World War II.
404. ILC Report, supra note 6, at 257-58. As BROWNLIE, supra note 38, at 620-21 notes, most authorities
accept the doctrine but base the concept on one of three grounds: (1) it is an implied term of any treaty; (2) the
clause is imported into every treaty by operation of law, to operate immediately upon occurrence of the event;
(3) "the modem law," which says that rebus is "an objective rule of law, applying when certain events exist,
yet not terminating the treaty automatically, since one of the parties must invoke it," the position taken by the
Convention. As noted supra note 402, some examples in McNAiR, supra note 38, at 685-91, smack more of
impossibility than fundamental change. The doctrines overlap, and both claims might be advanced in a proper
case. I OPPENHEiM, supra note 162, § 539.
405. Vienna Convention, supra note 6, art. 62, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 347, considered declaratory of customary
law. Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), 1973 I.CJ. 3, 18 (Feb. 2); SINCLmAIR, supra note 156, at 20; See also
id. at 192-96. For criticism of the Convention approach, see Oliver J. Lissitzyn, Treaties and Changed
Circumstances, 61 AM. J. iNT'L L 895 (1967). ARtE E. DAVID, THE STRATEGY OF TREATY TERMINATION ch.
1 (1975) is also critical of the Convention approach, but EuAS, supra note 353, at 119-28 says the traditional
view is no longer admitted today.
406. ILC Report, supra note 6, at 259; Jimenez de Arechaga, supra note 364, at 48. For further analysis
of pre-Convention practice, see Gyorgy Harszti, Treaties and the Fundamental Change of Circumstances, 146
RacumL DES CouRs 1, 21 (1975), who recalls the Austro-Hungarian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in
1908 under a claim of rebus sic stantibus, contrary to the terms of the Treaty of Berlin, July 13, 1878, art. 25,
153 Consol. T.S. 171,181. For further historical analysis, see David J. Bederman, The 1871 London Declaration,
Rebus Sic Stantibus and a Primitivist View of the Law of Nations, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1988). U.S. practice
has recognized the principle. Lissitzyn, supra note 405, at 908-11. The Harvard Draft Convention on the Law
of Treaties, art. 28, 29 AM. J. INTL L. SuWp. 657, 662-63 (1935) listed rebus as a ground for termination, but
would have required the parties to go to an international tribunal for a determination. RESTATEMENT THIMD),
supra note 6, § 336, r.n. 1 states that the executive must invoke the doctrine, not the courts (citing Trans World
Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243 (1984)). See also RESTATEMENT (HIPD), supra, § 339.
407. See ILC Report, supra note 6, at 257-58.
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Although the International Court of Justice rejected Iceland's claims of a fundamental
change in the methodologies of fishing and the law in the 1973 Fisheries Jurisdiction
case,408 are the more far-reaching changes in Eastern Europe more persuasive? The central
problem with the successful assertion of the doctrine is causation, as is also true of
impossibility of performance. If the change was the result of the claimant's actions, the
objection might not be available. This may be true if Ukraine was the moving factor in her
independence and her independence resulted in the inability to perform treaty obligations.
The same may also be true in the case of Croatia's breaking away from Yugoslavia:
causation would be the major factor in determining whether the Croats could invoke the
doctrine.
Some international agreements have provisions which contemplate change of
circumstances. 41 In any event, the states which are party to such a treaty may choose to
negotiate a new treaty, perhaps to the detriment of private party interests, which may be the
case in a claim of impossibility of performance, too.4 " Because of the deepening
economic difficulties and the antiforeign sentiment in Germany, German unification may
promote a claim, but the quick counter to the claim again may be causation. The same could
hold for the relatively quiet self-dismemberment of Czechoslovakia.
f. Armed Conflict
As is true for the Treaty Succession Convention, the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties takes no position on the impact of armed conflict on treaties.411 The International
Law Commission commented, perhaps naively, as follows on the latter:
Different considerations appeared to the Commission to apply to the case of an
outbreak of hostilities between parties to a treaty. It recognized that the state of
facts resulting from an outbreak of hostilities may have the practical effect of
preventing the application of the treaty in the circumstances prevailing. It also
recognized that questions may arise as to the legal consequences of an outbreak of
hostilities with respect to obligations arising from treaties. But it considered that
in the international law of to-day the outbreak of hostilities between States must be
considered as an entirely abnormal condition, and that the rules governing its legal
consequences should not be regarded as forming part of the general rules of
international law applicable in the normal relations between States.412
Its Report fails to cite customary principles on the subject, giving rise to a gap in an
otherwise solid analysis. As seen above, armed conflict could be the basis for claims of
impossibility or fundamental change of circumstances. 3 In the case of a civil war or a
408. Fisheries Jurisdiction, supra note 405, at 16-2 1. For analysis, see Briggs, supra note 380, at 65-68.
409. E/g. Treaty of Rome, supra note 74, arts. 225-26, 298 U.N.T.S. at 88-89.
410. See supra note 403 and accompanying text.
411. Compare Vienna Treaty Succession Convention, supra note 38, arts. 39-40, 17 I.L.M. at 1512 with
Vienna Convention, supra note 6, art. 73, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 350. Attempts to insert such a provision in the latter
were defeated. Kearney & Dalton, supra note 382, at 557. The result is that other sources must be examined for
the law to be applied in such circumstances. Briggs, supra note 378, at 51. The REsTATEMENT (THIRD), supra
note 6, § 336 cmt. e & rxn. 4, considers war as possibly raising a fundamental change of circumstances claim.
412. ILC Report, supra note 6, at 267.
413. See supra notes 397-410 and accompanying text.
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war between states other than the claimant, these would be the only grounds for a claim of
suspension or termination.414 Some of the conflicts within Yugoslavia and all of the
fighting in the former Soviet Union may fairly fall under the heading of armed conflict. As
in the case of claims of impossibility of performance or fundamental change of
circumstances for other reasons, some agreements may expressly provide for consultation
or other relief in the case of armed conflict. A few Charter-era agreements may include
clauses which state that internal disturbances or international armed conflict trigger such
action.4 15 And as in the case of problems of impossibility of performance or fundamental
change of circumstances for other reasons, private interests may learn that treaty rights have
been modified by a later agreement.416
In the case of armed conflict between or among states, the customary law and
commentators, sub silentio echoing thepacta suntservanda principle, establish the general
presumption in law today that most treaties remain in force or at best are suspended for the
duration of the conflict as between belligerents. Multilateral and bilateral treaties between
belligerents and states not party to the conflict remain in force as to the treaty relationship,
and they remain in full force between states not party to the conflict, absent claims of
fundamental change of circumstances or impossibility, for example. 7 Treaties, such as
the Chicago Convention on civil aviation, that provide that they remain in force during
wartime" or which "by reason of their nature or purpose are to be regarded as operative
during an armed conflict," as is true of humanitarian or human rights conventions, also
414. Lissitzyn,supra note 405, at 911. MCNAIR, supra note 38, at 728, says that these treaties would not
be affected, subject to a possible "implied condition," i.e. fundamental change of circumstances. See also supra
note 404. For examples from state practice, see 5 HACKWORTH, DIGEST § 509, at 341 (suspension of Siamese
silver exports contrary to treaty not objected to by the United States "during the period of abnormal conditions,"
i.e. World War 1)); id. § 511, at 353-56 (citing 40 Op. Att'y Gen. 119 (1941)); 14 WHrTEmAN, DIGEsT, ch. 42
§ 34 at 483-85; Herbert W. Briggs, The Attorney General Invokes Rebus Sic Stantibus, 36 AM. J. INT'L L. 89
(1942) (suspension of International Load Line Convention in August 1941 before the United States entered
World War II). Briggs and HYDE, supra note 54, at 1526-28, criticized use of the doctrine in the context of the
Load Line Convention in 1941, on the eve of U.S. entry into World War II. This view is certainly debatable,
but the Vienna Convention's limitations, supra note 404 and accompanying text, might say that the doctrine was
improperly invoked.
415. E.g. Treaty of Rome, supra note 74, arts. 223-26, 298 U.N.T.S. at 88-89. France admitted it could
not invoke the "vital national interests" clause of the Treaty to veto a recent EC-U.S. farm trade agreement that
may have adverse effects on French agriculture. Alan Riding, French Now Agree They Lack a Veto Over
Farming Pact, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1992, at Al.
416. See supra notes 403, 410 and accompanying text.
417. Institut de Droit International, The Effects of Armed Conflicts on Treaties, Aug. 28, 1985, arts. 2, 3,
5, 11, 61(2) ANNUAIRE 278, 280-82 (1986); Regulations Regarding the Effect of War on Treaties, 1912, arts.
1, 4,7-10, reprinted in 7 AM. J. INT'L L. 153, 153-55 (1913); Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503,513 (1947); Karnuth
v. United States, 279 U.S. 231, 240-42 (1929); Techt v. Hughes, 229 N.Y. 222, 240, 128 N.E. 185, 191, cert.
denied, 254 U.S. 643 (1920); 2 OPPENHEIm, supra note 162, §§ 99(4)-(5). See also George B. Davis, The Effects
of War Upon International Conventions and Private Contracts, 1927 PROC. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 124-29; G.G.
Fitzmaurice, The Judicial Clauses of the Peace Treaties, 73 RECUEI. DES CouRs 255, 307-17 (1948); Harvard
Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 35(b), 29 AM. J. INT'L L. SuPp. 657, 664-65 (1935); Cecil J.B.
Hurst, The Effect of War on Treaties, 2 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 37, 40 (1921); James J. Lenoir, The Effect of War
on Bilateral Treaties, with Special Reference to Reciprocal Inheritance Treaty Provisions, 34 GEO. L. J. 129,
173-77 (1946). Lenoir notes the former custom of states to declare, at the outbreak of conflict, that all treaties
with opponents were thereupon terminated. Id. at 146. (citing declaration of Spain, Apr. 23, 1898, 1898 FOR.
RELS. UNrrED STATEs 774).
418. /Eg., Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, art. 89, 61 Stat. 1180, 1205, 15
U.N.T.S. 295, 356. A treaty can state the opposite rule as well. HYDE, supra note 54, at 155-56.
The Transnational Lawyer/ Vol. 6
remain in force.419 Treaties related to the political relationship of the warring states, such
as alliances, terminate, as do other similar agreements.4 20 In the Charter era, treaties
establishing an international organization are not affected by conflicts of their parties.4 2'
States may suspend a treaty's operation when they exercise the right of individual or
collective self-defense in accordance with the Charter.422 If compliance with a U.N.
Security Council resolution dealing with action on threats to the peace, breaches of the peace,
or acts of aggression conflict with a treaty or a treaty requirement, states may suspend or end
operation of the treaty to the extent treaty performance is incompatible with the
resolution.42 3 Conversely, and perhaps naively, the Institut de Droit International has
stated that an aggressor shall not terminate or suspend operation of a treaty if it would benefit
thereby.4M Similarly, only part of a treaty may be subject to severability in the absence of
a resolution. Part of it may remain in force, part may be suspended, and part may be
terminated, 4' depending on the nature of the treaty's terms.
At the end of a conflict, the peace treaty or other arrangement may declare, at least
among the former contending states, which treaties have survived the conflict.
426
Alternatively, the victorious states may be empowered to notify the loser of which treaties
419. Institut de Droit International, supra note 417, arts. 3-4, 61(2) ANNUAIRE at 280; Regulations
Regarding the Effect of Waron Treaties, art. 5,7 AM. J. INT'LL. 154; 5 HAcKWoRTH, DIOEsT § 513, at 383-84
(1943); 2 OPPENHEiM, supra note 162, § 99(2), 99(5); Fitzmaurice, supra note 417, at 312; Harvard Draft
Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 35(a), 29 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 657, 664 (1935); Hurst, supra note 417,
at 42.
420. Institut de Droit International, Regulations Regarding the Effect of War on Treaties, art. 2(1), 7 AM.
J. INT'L L. 153; Techt, 229 N.Y. at 240, 128 N.E. at 191; 2 OPPENIHEM, supra note 162, § 99(1).
421. Institut de Droit International I, art. 6, supra 'note 417, at 280; Institut de Droit International II, art.
2(l), supra note 417, at 153.
422. Institut de Droit International 1, art. 7, supra note 417, at 280-82. Compare the pre-Charter tone of
art. 5 of the Regulations Regarding the Effect of War on Treaties, Institut de International II, supra note 417,
at 154.
423. Institut de Droit International, art. 8, supra note 417, at 282. This restates a requirement of the
Charter, at least insofar us "decisions" of the Council are concerned. Under U.N. CHARTER arts. 25,48. Members
agree to carry out "decisions" of the Council, which might include maintenance of international peace and
security, not mentioned in the Institut's rules. Id., art. 103 declares that the Charter is supreme over any treaty;
hence decisions-which are part of the Charter as interpreted and directed by the Council-take precedence over
treaties and their fulfilment by members.
424. Institut de Droit International, art. 9, supra note 417, at 282. This appears to be the correlative of the
U.N. CHARTER art. 103 rule imposed on states complying with Security Council decisions; see supra note 422.
The aggressor cannot compound any advantage, gained by being an aggressor, by wriggling out of treaty
obligations. The principle parallels those stating that the party causing the breach of a treaty, or conditions giving
rise to claims of impossibility or fundamental change of circumstances cannot assert these bases to suspend or
terminate a treaty. Vienna Convention, supra note 6, arts. 60(1), 60(2)(b), 60(2)(c), 61(2), 67(2)(b), 1155
U.N.T.S. at 346-47; see also supra notes 394-407 and accompanying text. In other words, a party cannot benefit
by its own wrong. Chorzow Factory Case (Pol. v. Ger.), 1927 P.C.IJ., Ser. A., No. 9, at 4, 31. Commentators
reflect the uncertain state of the law on this claim. See, e.g. BROWNELI supra note 38, at 616-17.
425. Harvard Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 35(c), 29 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 657, 665
(1935).
426. The treaties ending World War I had detailed lists. 5 HACKWORTH, DIGEST, §§ 297, 513 at 386
(1993). See also McNAR, supra note 38, at 723-24, 727-28. One reason for this practice, apart from the
ambiguity on the law of survival of agreements, was the earlier practice of states to declare all agreements with
their opponents at an end at the start of hostilities. See supra notes 416-23.
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are considered to have survived,42 a procedure similar to the one used by successor states
upon independence.428 One state newly independent after World War II, Austria, was left
to make her own treaty arrangements.429 Such treaty arrangements do not, of course,




The necessity doctrine, sometimes phrased in terms of force majeure, is similar to a
claim of rebus sic stantibus or impossibility, but it focuses more on the impact of
circumstances on the existence of the state claiming excuse from non-performance of a
treaty.431 As U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz emphatically stated, the U.N. Charter
is not a suicide pact. The logical extension of this statement is that if compliance with
Charter norms may be excused when the existence of a state is at stake, necessity can
certainly excuse performance under other treaties.
Published state practice is slim to nonexistent with respect to the spasmodically eruptive
internecine conflicts in the former Soviet republics and the open warfare, whether
characterized as a civil war or otherwise, within Yugoslavia. There has been increasing
Security Council involvement in the Yugoslav Conflict,432 which may trigger some of the
principles stated above. If the situation in the former USSR widens to include inter-republic
warfare, or if the conflicts in Yugoslavia continue to devastate that area, chancelleries will
undoubtedly receive notes from new and old states in the area which assert armed conflict
as a basis for treaty suspension or termination. There may also be a ripple effect. For
example, breach of an agreement by an East European state to supply certain raw materials
to a manufacturing state in the West may thereby precipitate trade treaty ramifications
elsewhere.
427. E/g. Treaty of Peace with Italy, Feb. 10, 1947, art. 44, 61 Stat. 1245, 1386, 49 U.N.T.S. 3, 143;
Treaty of Peace with Romania, Feb. 10, 1947, art. 10, Stat. 175, 1803, 42 U.N.T.S. 3, 40-42; Treaty of Peace
with Bulgaria, Feb. 10, 1947, art. 8, Stat. 1915, 1956-57, 41 U.N.T.S. 21, 56; Treaty of Peace with Hungary,
Feb. 10, 1947, art. 10, Stat. 2065, 2115, 41 U.N.T.S. 135, 178; Treaty of Peace with Japan, Sept. 8, 1951, art.
7, 3 U.S.T. 3169, 3175-76, 136 U.N.T.S. 45, 54. See also McNAIR, supra note 38, at 728; 2 OPPENHEIM, supra
note 416, § 99 at 305-06, (providing that omission of a provision for multilaterals gives the inference that World
War U1 did not affect their existence). The notification for bilaterals followed the post-World War I treaties
procedure. See HACKWORTH, DIGEST § 513, at 386 (1943). U.S. bilaterals ending the war incorporated the
procedure, and the United States revived several agreements. Id. at 388-89.
428. See supra notes 259-69 and accompanying text.
429. McNAIR, supra note 38, at 727.
430. The impossibility or fundamental change of circumstances doctrines, in the absence of treaty
arrangements, might apply. See supra note 413 and accompanying texL
431. International Law Commission, Third Report on "International Responsibility," U.N. Doc. A/CN-
4/111 (1958), 1958(2) Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 47, 51-52, citing, inter alla, Russian Indemnity (Rus. v. Turk.)
in JAMES BROWN ScoTr, HAGUE Cr. REP. 297,317-18 (1912) (dictum); Payment of Various Serbian Loans (Fr.
v. Yugo.), 1929 P.C.IJ. (ser.A) Nos. 20/21, at 5, 39-40; see also Oscar Chinn (U.K. v. Belg.), 1934 P.C.I.J.
(ser.A/B) No. 63, at 65, 107, 113 (Anziolotti, J., sep. opin.). See John Fischer Williams, The Permanence of
Treaties, 22 AM. J. INT'L L. 89, 102-03 (1928) (commenting on COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS, art.
19). But see J. L. BRIERLY, TIE LAW OF NATIONS 338-39 (Humphrey Waldock ed., 6th ed. 1963) and
RESTATEiENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 201 (1965), whose comments
speak in terms of rebus sic stantibus instead of necessity, and for which there is no equivalent in RESTATEMENT
CMiRD), supra note 6.
432. Weller, supra note 88, at 569, carries the sad saga through mid-1992.
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h. Desuetude
Another ground for treaty termination, not mentioned in the Vienna Convention, is
desuetude. Desuetude is the discontinuance of the use of a treaty through an extended period
of time. Mere passage of time does not vitiate treaty obligations, however, and treaty
relationships have existed for centuries.4" Desuetude, like all claims for termination, is
subject to the countervailing claim of pacta sunt servanda. One of the more interesting
issues, particularly in the Balkan context, would be whether the new states can "tack on" a
time of nonuse by Yugoslavia for their assertion of desuetude, or whether the time must start
afresh, that is, with their independence.
. Operation of Law
The law itself may operate to terminate a treaty through ajus cogens norm at variance
with the terms of the agreement. Although the traditional list of norms covered byjus
cogens may be brief according to most analyses, the concept can be a good Roman short
sword for cutting off claims under a treaty at odds with a new fundamental norm. 434
Similarly, a balance could be struck which would favor custom or general principles at
variance with an earlier treaty.
4 35
3. Procedures for Asserting Claims of Invalidity
Claiming the invalidity of a treaty or asserting a basis to suspend or terminate a treaty
does not alone terminate a treaty agreement. The Vienna Convention requires that the other
parties be notified of the claim and the proposed measure that the claimant intends to take,
and there is a required three-month response period for the state or states to which the claim
has been directed. "[I]n cases of special urgency," the response period could be shorter. If
other parties object, the claim or claims must be resolved through negotiation or the other
means listed in article 33 of the U.N. Charter.4 36 The Convention is not specific on what
should happen if article 33 methods fail. This was a deliberate omission.
437
There is no provision beyond the notice stage for article 33 procedures in the case of an
allegedly invalid or breached bilateral treaty. Presumably, the aggrieved state could bring
the matter to the U.N. Security Council or General Assembly. Alternatively, the Council
433. BROWNLIEsupra note 38, at 617-18; See SiNcLAiR, supra note 156, at 163-64 (noting the ILC view
that the claim is covered by Vienna Convention, supra note 6, art. 54(b), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 344-45, i.e. that a
treaty can be terminated by consent of all the parties); McNAni, supra note 38, at 516-18; Plender, supra note
391, at 138-45. For an example in U.S. practice, see 5 HACKWORT-, DIOEsT § 506, at 302 (1943) (military penal
jurisdiction established by exchange of notes during World War I had lapsed and become null and void by
1933).
434. See supra notes 383-84 and accompanying text.
435. See supra notes 360-61 and accompanying text (for a reciprocal analysis). Other sources of law can
be opposed to, as well as be complementary to, norms stated in a treaty. See, e.g., 5 HAcKWoRTH, DwoEsT, §
509, at 340-41.
436. Vienna Convention, supra note 6, art. 65,1155 U.N.T.S. at 347-48; McNArR, supra note 38, ch. 36.
A state need not take action after a material breach; it can consider the treaty is still in operation. Id. at 553-71
(citing, inter alia, Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447 (1929) and Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199,261 (1796)). See also
RESTATEMENT (THmD), supra note 6, § 337.
437. ILC Report, supra note 6, at 262-63.
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Assembly could investigate the claim and make recommendations, or the Council could
decide on measures'to take.438 The victim state could initiate retorsions,439 reprisals not
involving the use of force,"0 in addition to the option of declaring the treaty relationship
to be at an end. Non-force reprisals must be proportionate, 4 as is true for their cousins,
appropriate forcible reprisals during armed conflict. The difficulty lies in gauging
proportionality and the risk of escalation. 442 The same type of problem lurks for
retorsions."0 If "dangers for the security of treaties" 444 and the rule of law they represent
increase, the anarchy and chaos of Eastern Europe could easily spread in many directions,
with ominous results for the world of transnational business and, ultimately, the security of
other states.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND PROJECIONS FOR THE FUTURE
What Professor O'Connell said about the law of state succession 25 years ago applies
to today's world:
Contemporary literature on State succession tends to lack the philosophical depth
and academic cosmospolitanism which are so evident in the writers of the specialist
monographs in the earlier part of this century and the last years of the nineteenth
century. These writers... clearly had read everything that had been written on the
subject, and appear to have been at home with the literature of four languages.
They erected doctrinal edifices of a pleasing symmetry on theories of the State that
were philosophically integrated. Admittedly these constructions were easily
demolished, or rendered evanescent, if one disputed the relevant philosophy, but
at least the critic had an instant point of departure for the purpose of evaluation.
The modem pragmatic approach, while in given instances it may yield results far
more consonant with moral and social needs, tends toward superficiality. Authors
nibble piecemeal at the problems of succession, picking and choosing attitudes
without, apparently, recognizing that they may be exposed to serious philosophical
objection. In the result, strands of Hegel and of Thomas Aquinas become
inextricably interwoven in a patchwork of rubrics, and the critic is hard put to it to
say just what theory of the State, or what philosophy of law, underlies the
formulation.
438. U.N. CHARTER arts. 11-12, 33(l)-38.
439. Retorsion is a self-help measure that is legal but unfriendly in response to an unfriendly or illegal
act; some authorities would classify the latter response as a reprisal. 12 WHrrEmAN, DIGEST, ch. 36 § 9, at 311-
13 (quoting 2 L. OPPENHErM, supra note 416, §§ 29-32); RESTATEMENT (rIaMD), supra note 6, § 905 cmL f.;
JuLus STONE, LEAL CONTROLS Op INTERNAiONAL CoNFur 288-89 (2d rev. 1959); C.H.M. Waldock, The
Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International Law, 81 REcuEn. DES CouRs 451, 458
(1952). But see Schachter, supra 356, at 185-86.
440. RESTATEMENT (THID), supra note 6, § 905; BROWNLIE, supra note 38, at 466, says that economic
reprisals are "still a matter of controversy." For an example of legitimate economic reprisals in the Charter era,
see In re Air Service Agreement (U.S. v. Fr.), 18 R.I.A.A. 417, 443-46 (Arb. 1978).
441. RESTATEMENT (TIRD), supra note 6, § 905(1)(b).
442. FRrUs KALSHOVEN, BELLIrERENT REPRIsAmS 341-42 (1971).
443. See, e.g., Schachter, supra note 356, at 185-86.
444. ILC Report, supra note 6, at 262.
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Unless one identifies the relevant strands, and is aware of their philosophical
origins, the doctrine of State succession will appear to be an unpalatable melange
of incoherent and contradictory ideas, and there will be a tendency to despair of
ever formulating an acceptable concept. An awareness of the need for theoretical
criticism is thus a precondition of sound speculation and accurate analysis. The
critic who examines the writings on State succession carefully cannot fail to be
struck by the startling persistence of the view that the successor State should, as a
matter of "equity" or "justice", take over its predecessor's obligations, and by the
constant admission that in practice it almost always does so; and he must come to
the arresting conclusion that only some profound gulf between law and ethics
inhibits the translation of this moral attitude into rules of law. When it is realized
that the gulf is contrived by Kant's categories, which have dominated the European
legal mind, the problem of expressing social, economic and moral needs in terms
of law may not appear so intractable. The jurist's function is to channel the
normative pressures in society and organize them in rubric form. A positive
approach from the position of fact is essential for verification of the pressures, but
a positive approach alone cannot make the facts congruous, or raise the analysis
beyond the anecdotal. To list together the authors pro and contra a proposition,
without enquiring why they take the view they do, is really only to argue ad
hominem. Inevitably the negative scales are depressed by this quantitative method,
for the observer, confronted with a catalogue of opposed authorities, will in despair
take a non-committal position, and this will be translated into State practice by
those who have to make decisions. Incoherency of practice is thus both occasioned
and compounded by incoherence in theory."'
The Vienna Treaty Succession Convention, drafted as it was by the International Law
Commission, with its pluralistic membership, 6 is reflective of this trend, not necessarily
because of the lack of "depth and cosmopolitanism," but because of the wide range of views
on nearly every point." 7 The Convention thus is, to that extent, a "generation from the
needs and aspirations of man in community."" If we say today that people in community
cover the entire Earth, with its wide and rich theories of and about law, as opposed to the
tight little Eurocentric world of Hegel, Aquinas, Kant and others that seem to have confined
and dominated O'Connell's thining in 1967, even as he criticized the present conditions of
superficiality, we still are confronted with a community of over 175 nations. Within each
of these may well be a half dozen schools of thought on state succession, just as O'Connell
-catalogued the German thinkers in several camps.449 The result, as a matter of abstract
445. 1 O'CoNNELtL, supra note 39, at 29-30.
446. See ILC Report, supra note 38, at 160 (listing the Commission membership).
447. Regrettably, this analysis may have the lack of depth and cosmopolitanism, see 1 O'CoNNELL, supra
note 39, at 29, but the thrust of this article was to explore, in the context of the Treaty Succession Convention,
supra note 38, the range of problems that may confront decisionmakers in the wake of European integration,
German unification, and the breakup of Czechoslovakia, the USSR and Yugoslavia.
448. 1 OCONNELL, supra note 39, at 104-452.
449. See id. at 10 n. 4 (universal succession), 12-13 (organic substitution), 14 (self-abnegation), 15-17
(imperative or'clean slate"), 19 (East German communist theory). See HYDE, s6upra note 54, at 1539 (declaring
in 1945 that "the practice of States has not revealed clearness of thought or uniformity of action). Policy rather
than law has at time influenced the decisions of interested parties." lId The theoretical muddle was reflective
of division of thought within governments as they has struggled with the problem, even before the Cold War.
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theory and whatever concrete law that can descend from theory or be shaped by political
events, is far from satisfactory.
The Treaty Succession Convention is reflective of this, and the state of the law is
perhaps one reason why so few states have ratified or even bothered to sign the Convention.
The Convention therefore may become only a secondary source of law, reflective of the
scholarship of the Commission members and the Reporter, or perhaps somewhat declaratory
of customary law. 50 Given the worldwide political and economic uncertainty, ours is not
likely to be an age of crystal-clear rules, if the subject of treaty succession ever was. As
Professor Reisman presciently wrote a few years ago, the time of the multilateral treaty may
have come and gone, and that the current era will be dominated by customary law.
451
Application of general principles of law will undoubtedly play a significant role too. From
custom and principles came in large measure the theories of the last century, and doubtless
this will happen again. For the time being, the adviser, whether he or she be in private
practice, negotiating on behalf of a newly independent state for investment from the West;
corporate counsel on the other side; or a military lawyer, advising a naval commander on
applicability of the law of armed conflict, will not be able to give clear responses.
As this article demonstrates, the problem of treaty applicability is multilayered. The
first inquiry is the conditions of treaty succession in the context of political events. For
example, is the state considered newly independent, such as Croatia, or is it a surviving state,
such as what remains of Yugoslavia? Second, what has each state, whether predecessor,
successor, or third state, claimed, such as a devolution agreement unilateral declaration? If
there has been a valid succession, treaties may or may not survive, depending on factors,
such as pacta sunt servanda or impossibility, largely restated in the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties. The third consideration, only tangentially explored, is what impact the
law of treaty succession and the law of treaties may have on property and other matters that
may be the subject of negotiations.45 2 These uncertainties of transnational law, the law of
treaties, and the law of treaty succession must be considered, along with whatever business
or other risks are involved in a transaction.
As Marek stated in the context of transition of identity of states, as occurred from the
Austro-Hungarian Empire to the Republic of Austria in 1918,
[t]wo important conclusions follow .... First, the problem can only arise as a
result of some violent upheaval, and never in a period of stability and with regard
to a State whose continued existence has in no way been interfered with. Its
historical background will not be one of peace, but of storm. Secondly, the notions
of State identity and continuity thus assume a distinctly polemical character. By
its very nature the problem is a highly controversial one .... '53
We appear to be in that kind of time again.
450. Baxter, supra note 178, at 99-101.
451. W. Michael Reisman, The Cult of Custom in the Late 20th Century, 17 CAL. W. INT'L LJ. 133
(1987).
452. It does no good, for example, to rely on assets presumably available for pledging or development
if a treaty has already committed them elsewhere. A newly independent state may be less than fully aware of
this, even as it negotiates in good faith.
453. MAREK, supra note 10, at 4; accord, O'Connell, supra note 38, at 10.
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[O]ne of the most striking phenomena across all of Europe today is the combined
and simultaneous devolution and evolution of the nation-sate. While the nation-
state remains by far the most significant political unit, its political role is being
increasingly supplemented by both supranational and subnational units.
In Western Europe, an intense and comprehensive voluntary evolution or governing
authority above the national level has been accompanied by the devolution of power
to state and local governments, to regions that sometimes cross national borders,
and to the private sector. In Central and Eastern Europe, and now clearly in the
Soviet Union as well, devolution is certainly the more prominent phenomenon. The
collapse of Communish has freed ethnicity to re-emerge as a powerful political
force, threatening to erect new divisions between countries and, even more acutely,
within multinational states.
Evolution and devolution need not be alternatives, but instead can be
complementary, and indeed interdependent developments.4 54
Although governments may urge democracy and grass roots involvement in political
processes, perhaps through a federal model,455 that is but part of the legal mosaic
confronting international lawyers. They must also be aware of the issues of treaty
succession, and underneath and alongside that, the problems of succession to state property,
as the new Eastern European countries pursue a new-found national identity.
The issue for EC nations is the polar opposite. The question it faces is the place of
national law, including treaty law, in the context of integration, for which Maastricht has
now become a rallying cry. And although the EC may be "an economic giant, a political
dwarf and a military worm,"456 the Maastricht Treaty, whether it falls short of ratification
or not, shows that the Community is also a giant advocate for employing the rule of law to
achieve peaceful transition. The unification of Germany has proceeded on the same theme,
and Czechoslovakia probably will do so as well, albeit in a separation context. These are
models that other states, or proto-states, would do well to follow, whether they confront
integration or separation.
For the international lawyer, whether as government counsel or an advocate for a private
client, the problem of treaty succession adds another layer of uncertainty in a troubling legal
and business situation. Although lawyers for private parties in the U.S. cannot invoke the
defenses of invalidity, termination, or suspension of treaties457 unless their government has
done so, the analysis is less clear with respect to treaty succession. If the government has
agreed with the emergent state or states on the treaties in question, then the answer is
relatively clear: the treaties apply. The same should be true where the government has
accepted the new state's devolution agreement or unilateral declaration. However, where
the government has not spoken, a situation which may persist for some time due primarily
to the number of new states, the number of treaties involved, and rapidly evolving diplomatic
454. Robert B. Zoellick, Relations of the United States with the Soviet Union and the Republics, 2 DEPT
ST. DISPATCH 740, 742 (1991).
455. Id. at 742-43.
456. Attributed to Mark Eyskens, former prime minister of Belgium. Bernard Lewis, Rethinking the Middle
East, 71 FOREIGN AiF. 99, 108 (1992). See also supra note 123 and accompanying text.
457. Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243 (1984). See also supra note 405.
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situations, the practitioner faces risks which cases like Ivancevic v. Artukovic458
demonstrate. A court may decide for or against succession, and until such a decision is
reached, parties and their counsel are left in legal limbo. They must look to custom, 4 9
general principles, or other sources for controlling law, which is scant help in many business
transactions. Those who practice on the public side of the house, such as sea service officers
concerned about applicability of law of the sea conventions,4 6 ° are in the same
circumstances, but at least here a cushion of custom and other sources of law may soften
uncertainty until treaty succession settles out. In either case, caution is the watchword when
advising clients about supposed rights under treaties in an era of state succession, whether
by merger, breakaway, or integration.
The law of treaty succession has been in disarray all this century. The wave of
decolonization which lasted from 1945-1975 further complicated the picture. Several
competing policies are at stake, all of which are part of the U.N. Charter:
(1) The sovereign equality of states;461
(2) the sanctity of treaties, that is, the principle of pacta sunt servanda;4 62
(3) the right of self-determination of peoples;" 3
(4) the maintenance of international peace and security, 4 " which is stated by
some as the primary purpose of the Charter" and which is involved in the
issue of base agreements; 466 and
(5) the right of states to freedom from threats or the use of force against their
territorial integrity, 467 which is expanded by some to include economic or
even political force.468
One could add other policies, such as the right of states to permanent sovereignty over their
national resources 469 or perhaps the development ofjus cogens norms,47 as other factors
not enumerated directly in the Charter.
Three major groups of scholars-the American Law Institute, publisher of the
Restatement (Third), Foreign Relations; the International Law Association; and the U.N.
International Law Commission-have produced essays which seek to express black-letter
458. Ivancevic v. Artukovic, 211 F.2d 565 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 878 (1954); see also
supra note 341.
459. Reisman, supra note 451.
460. See supra note 302. The former Yugoslavia is listed as a party to all four 1958 conventions, and the
former USSR was party to three of them. UNITED STATEs DEPARTMENT OF STATE, supra note 10, at 322-23,
350.
461. U.N. CHARTER arts. 1(2), 2(l); see also S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.IJ. (ser.A) No. 10, at 4,
18; supra note 352 and accompanying text
462. U.N. CHARTPm art. 2(2); see also Vienna Convention, supra note 6, art. 26, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 339;
supra note 351 and accompanying text
463. U.N. CHARTER arts. 1(2), 55; see also supra note 353 and accompanying text.
464. U.N. CHARTER art. 1(1).
465. LELAND M. GOODRIcH, Er AL., CHARTER oF THE UNrrED NATIoNs: COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS
25-26 (3d rev. ed, 1969).
466. See supra notes 203-10, 217-22 and accompanying text.
467. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4).
468. See supra notes 374-81 and accompanying text.
469. See supra note 353 and accompanying text.
470. See supra notes 363, 383-84 and accompanying text
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rules and a draft treaty. The essays and the treaty are at variance with each other, and
sometimes they are even internally inconsistent.47 1 Others have proposed presumptions.
For example, absent certain factors, successor states are presumed to inherit their
predecessor's treaty regime,472 or a presumption against a clean slate.47 Vallat and
others have suggested a factoral approach,474 of which the Restatement (Third)'s
approaches to jurisdiction are a later analogue. 5 Although some U.S. courts have adopted
factoral analysis,476 it has been criticized or rejected by others as biased in favor of national
interests, among other reasons.477 The same objections could be interposed with more
force outside the field of jurisdiction, where the typical arena is the courthouse. Treaty
succession problems have normally been resolved through the instruments of diplomacy or
unilateral pronouncements, which provide much less stable platforms for delicate
Restatement-style balancing 7 8
What should governments do to minimize the legal muddle of treaty succession? Jenks'
suggestions, given in the context of principles for succession of multilateral law-declaring
treaties, bear repeating:
(a) When a new state comes into being or is recognized on the basis of an
international settlement, provision should be made in the treaties constituting the
settlement.., for its continued acceptance of the obligations of the appropriate
multipartite instruments of a legislative character.
(b) When a member of the international community comes into being by a process
of constitutional evolution, provision should be made in the constitutional
settlement .... for its continued acceptance of the obligations of the appropriate
multipartite instruments of a legislative character.
(c) When a new member of the international community is admitted to international
organizations, its admission should.., be made conditional on its continued
acceptance of the obligations of the appropriate multipartite instruments of a
legislative character.
(d) When a new member of the international community is created on the initiative
of the United Nations, the decisions of the General Assembly constituting it as an
independent state should embody suitable arrangements for its continued
acceptance of the appropriate multipartite instruments of a legislative character.479
471. See, e.g., supra notes 261-71 and accompanying text.
472. O'Connell, supra note 38, at 25.
473. ILC Repor; supra note 38, at 167; see also supra note 263 and accompanying text.
474. Vallat, supra note 38, at 126; see also Kieth, supra note 323, at 544-46; Jenks, supra note 38, at 143-
44.
475. Cf. RESTATEMENT ("HIRD), supra note 6, § 401
476. Id. § 403 & cmL & r.n. 1-10.
477. Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 948-57 (D.C. Cir. 1984);
Stephen B. Burbarb, The WorldIn Our Courts, 89 MICH. L. REv. 1456, 1463-64 (1991); James M. Grippando,
Declining to Exercise Extraterritorial Antitrust Jurisdiction on Ground of International Comity: An Illegitimate
Extension of the Judicial Abstention Doctrine, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 395, 400 n. 22 (1983); Harold G. Maier,
Interest Balancing and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 31 AM. J. COMP. L. 579 (1983).
478. The latter sort of analysis could be helpful, of course, in litigation if there is no action in the
diplomatic or executive arenas.
479. Jenks, supra note 38, at 143-44.
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It is submitted that governments could employ the same methods, mutatis mutandis, to
establish the succession of bilateral agreements.
Steps (a) or (b) were largely bypassed in the case of the breakup of the USSR, but the
German Treaty of Union has provided for a notice and negotiation methodology to assure
a relatively smooth transition.48 Hope also seems bright for a similar procedure to smooth
the separation of the Czech state. Further, depending on the outcome of the Yugoslav
conflict and the depth of U.N. intervention, a statement of treaty succession may be a
positive byproduct of the resolution of those wars.48' Principle (c)'s possible application
should not be overlooked for later U.N. admissions, which apparently occurred with the ex-
Soviet and ex-Yugoslav republics. Similarly, if the Organization has a role in constituting
new states, and the Balkan situation may be ripe for that, principle (d) should not be
forgotten.
If none of this occurs, prudent governments are left with the problem of the analysis of
their treaty regimes with a successor state based on the list of treaties in force with the
predecessor state and on negotiations with the successor, and perhaps the predecessor, to
establish a definite enumeration. Between these scenarios, governments must rely on
unilateral declarations of the new state, devolution agreements, or parallel norms of
customary law or general principles. For the practitioner whose private client or government
agency relies on a treaty, the prudent course may well be to mark time, or if action is
necessary, to proceed cautiously.
Time is a theme binding the integration of Western Europe, primarily under EC
auspices, and disintegration in the east. One of the founders of a united Europe, Jean
Monnet, "wrote a thoughtful warning in his memoirs .... It is highly pertinent today: 'The
construction of Europe, like all peaceful revolutions, needs time-time to convince, time to
adapt people's thinking and time to adjust to great transformations. "'4 2 That admonition
is highly relevant in the context of the Maastricht Treaty process. However, where the
destruction of part of Europe is proceeding, rapidly in some cases, time may be a-wasting
for regularization of treaty succession.4"3 For those who depend on a stable treaty
succession, Monnet's counsel applies to them, too: time may be necessary for the
construction, or reconstruction, of a new treaty map.
480. See supra notes 223-27 and accompanying text.
481. Conference for Peace in Yugoslavia, Arbitration Commission, Opinion No. 1,31 I.L.M. 1494, 1495
(1992) and id., Opinion No. 9, 31 I.L.M. 1523, 1524-25 (1992) have urged use of the Treaty Succession
Convention, supra note 38, as a basis for discussion of these problems, without stating that the Convention
articulates customary international law. See supra note 48.
482. See Goldstein, supra note 2, at 132 (referring to JEAN MoNNEr, MEmoIRs 432 (Richard Mayne trans.
1978), in the context of the movement toward political union).
483. If treaty regimes for Europe can be determined, the principles for such, if any, may prove helpful if
there is upheaval in Africa along clan lines, thereby reversing the process initiated in the last century and
described in, e.g. THOMAS PAxENHAM, THE SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA (1991). See Beinder & Crossette, supra note
5, at I (describing ethnic wars).

